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## EZEKIEL.

WE cannot agree with the Roman poet when he pronounces it "sweet" to stand safe on shore and contemplate the crew of a distressed ship struggling with the raging billows. But if we know that the seafarers will escape with their lives, and have done what we could ourselves, towards rescuing them, we may be permitted a sense of relief and thankfulness as we reflect that we are neither their fellow voyagers to-day, nor called on to commit ourselves to their shattered hulk to-morrow or the day after!

Strange as it may seem, it is nevertheless a fact that these reflections have been suggested to the present writer by a renewed perusal of the prophecies of Ezekiel. As he closed the book the thought rose involuntarily to his mind, that we who have learned to regard the Bible as a precious collection of *human* writings, do, indeed, enjoy a rich privilege over those who still reverence it as a book of divine oracles! From their position they have no choice but to bow their heads in wonder and admiration, and to find some deep meaning in all that is most grotesque or repulsive in it. And, in truth, this is a task in comparison with which the wrestling of the distressed seamen with the elements is mere child's play. How much is there in

Ezekiel alone, for instance, that has to be explained away, twisted and turned, and in one fashion or another set right! What a piece of work to be sure for the well-meaning Bible-reader to get some of his prophecies into shape, and hammer out an interpretation that permits him still to regard them as a part of the word of God! Who can tell, for example, how often the believing commentator has bent his brows over the scene depicted in chaps. xxxviii. and xxxix.? When Israel has returned from the captivity into his own land, and is living there in prosperity and untroubled peace, Yahveh summons from the far North, Gog, the prince of Magog and the suzerain of a number of other tribes and peoples. At the head of an innumerable host he marches upon Canaan. It is greed for plunder that urges him on; and so certain does the success of his undertaking appear, that merchants from every quarter of the globe attach themselves to his expedition to drive their trade in the treasures he is about to seize. In reality, however, this is but the carrying out of the counsel of Yahveh, who seeks the long-announced occasion for the display of his might. Hardly has Gog overstepped the boundaries of Israel when a mighty earthquake spreads terror and confusion through his host. The peoples of which it is composed fall into mutual strife, and destroy each other to the last man, while the Israelites they came to attack have no need to lift a finger. Even the countries from which the enemy came are smitten by the judgment. So great is the number of the slain that their weapons supply the inhabitants of Canaan with fuel for seven years, while as many months are needed to bury the bodies and purify the sacred soil. Thus shall the heathen world be taught to recognise and revere the might of Yahveh. For it is now, and now only, that the irrefragable proof has been given that the carrying away of Israel to Babylon was a manifestation, not of Yahveh's weakness, but of his unbending justice. The destruction of Gog's army makes it abundantly manifest that Yahveh could have destroyed the Chaldeans likewise, and that the latter only saw their



designs against Jerusalem successfully carried through because they were the unconscious and involuntary instruments of Yahveh's sentence against his apostate people. The restoration of Israel partially vindicated Yahveh's supremacy and glory; but this slaughter of his assailants is the final and conclusive proof thereof. . . . Is this the word of God, and, as such, at once the announcement of an event that we must still look for, and a true indication of God's disposition towards his children upon earth? Truly, we may congratulate ourselves on not thinking it our bounden duty to answer these questions in the affirmative.

There is, as we all know, an extremely simple escape from all these difficulties, and the number of those who avail themselves of it is daily increasing. It consists in simply giving up reading Ezekiel, and troubling oneself no more about him. Now, as far as the reading is concerned, we may well be content to leave it to a few special students; for the book of Ezekiel's prophecies has never been, and even in the best of translations will never be, either edifying or attractive. But if all serious attempts to understand Ezekiel himself were likewise abandoned there would be real cause for regret. For more reasons than one he is deeply interesting. In the historical development of Israel's religion he occupies a place of his own. If he excites little sympathy he earns much respect. As soon as we are relieved from the painful duty of justifying and admiring *everything*, and can judge impartially, we are struck by more than one trait that arrests our attention, and may well put us to shame. It would be sad, indeed, if so much that is good and beautiful were lost to us. Let me, at least, do what I can to make this champion of two thousand five hundred years ago live once more for some few of the children of our age!

It was in the year 597 B.C. Jerusalem had been forced to open her gates to Nebucadrezar, the mighty ruler of the Chaldean empire. With anxious hearts the inhabitants

looked for the conqueror's sentence upon them. Jehoiakim's revolt would be severely punished. Of that there was no question. But how? The uncertainty was of no long duration. The kingdom of Judah, it was decreed, should still exist; but the kernel of the nation, with the king, Jechoniah, the youthful son and successor of Jehoiakim, should be carried away captive to Babylonia. It was a terrible doom; but no repeal or mitigation could be so much as thought of. The families and the individuals who were to be torn from the land of their fathers were forthwith selected. Preparations for the sad journey took but little time. Under proper escort the caravan started within a few days on its long and painful journey.

The majority of the captives reaped what they had sown, inasmuch as they had helped to stir the king to his rebellion against the Chaldeans, or encouraged him in his resistance. But some of them were punished for an offence of which they were not guilty. Like Jeremiah, they had opposed a rebellion which seemed to them equally impious and hopeless, and yet they must now pay the penalty of a course of action which they had openly or secretly condemned. Amongst these was Ezekiel-ben-Buzi, one of "the sons of Zadoc"—*i. e.*, one of the priests who conducted the temple service at Jerusalem.

Babylonia, the goal of the journey, was reached. Of the dispositions now made with regard to the Judean captives we know but little. Jechoniah was kept a prisoner in the capital itself,\* together, probably, with a number of his courtiers. But the great majority seem to have had abodes assigned them in the country. They were probably split up into small bands, as a necessary precaution against conspiracies. One of these colonies was settled at Tel-Abib ("Corn-ear Hill"), not far from the river Chebar; and it was there that Ezekiel dwelt.

How gladly would we look into the soul of this pious priest, and follow the reflections to which he surrendered

\* 2 Kings xxv. 27—30; Jer. lii. 31—34. Had Jechoniah been confined in any other city it would have been mentioned here.

himself in the foreign land! But his inner life, even more than his outward fortune, is a closed book to us. We can, therefore, give no answer to the question how he was trained and formed to the prophetic work. But is this really anything peculiar? Isaiah \* and Jeremiah † describe the visions of their call—and so, indeed, does Ezekiel himself ‡—but they keep silence respecting all that went before. And yet we are better informed concerning both Isaiah and Jeremiah than concerning the prophet-priest on the banks of the Chebar; for we can follow the former along their path by the clue of their successive prophecies; they make us witnesses of their changing moods, and of the impression they received from the events of their day; but Ezekiel is only known to us when he has reached his full maturity. The final result is all that remains to tell us of his growth and development.

This assertion will sound strange to the attentive reader of Ezekiel's book; and as I would not willingly incur the charge of arbitrariness, let me hasten to justify what I have said. Numerous superscriptions in the book of Ezekiel mention the year, the month, and the day on which revelations were vouchsafed to him from Yahveh, or communicated by him to his fellow exiles. § Nothing is more natural than that we should begin by accepting these chronological data, and therefore thinking that we can walk by the prophet's side, so to speak, at any rate from the fifth year of his captivity onwards. But when we look closer, and observe both the systematic plan of the whole work, and the mutual relations of the several prophecies, we see that our first impression cannot be trusted. The book of Ezekiel is a carefully planned and studied literary whole. In the first half (chap. i.—xxiv.) the announcements

\* Chap. vi.

† Chap. i.

‡ Chap. i. 4—iii. 21.

§ See Ezek. i. 2; viii. 1; xx. 1; xxiv. 1, where the fifth, sixth, seventh, and ninth years of Ezekiel's captivity are successively mentioned. Many of the prophecies against the heathen are dated—xxvi. 1; xxix. 1, 17; xxx. 20; xxxi. 1; xxxii. 1, 17. The eleventh year of the captivity is mentioned in xxxiii. 21 (for "the twelfth year" is a copyist's error, cf. xxvi. 1), and the twenty-fifth year in xl. 1.

of Israel's punishment are collected, while the second (chap. xxv.—xlvi.) is devoted to the future of the chosen people, and refers, at first (xxv.—xxxii.), to the lot of Israel's foes, the neighbouring tribes and peoples, and then to the restoration of Israel and the founding of the new community (xxxiii.—xlvi.). The occasional departures from this arrangement are really only apparent. Within the several parts of the book the sub-sections mutually support and illustrate one another. The beginning implies the sequel and conclusion as much as the end depends and rests upon the beginning. There is, therefore, no kind of modification to note in Ezekiel's judgments and expectations, from first to last,—no progress or development whatever. The only apparent exception is really a confirmation of this.\* From the first, the conquest of Jerusalem by the Chaldeans, and the wiping out of the kingdom of Judah are regarded as certain; and even the incidental details of these great events are not only foretold but actually assumed in prophecies, which, according to the superscriptions, were delivered four or five years before the fall of the city and temple.

These phenomena, taken all together, admit of but one explanation. We might call Ezekiel's book his last will and testament. When he had passed five-and-twenty years in captivity, and was probably an old man, he resolved in the interest of his own and future generations to compose his prophetic work. More than any one of his predecessors he must have felt the necessity of such a step; for in the foreign land he had never been able to reach more than a few scattered fellow countrymen, and the people as a whole had never heard his voice. He gave his work, which was intended for all Israel, the form of a record of his prophetic activity. He drew upon his memory for certain details, but

\* In Ezek. xxix. 17 sqq., the prophet himself confesses that his expectations, with regard to the conquest and sacking of Tyre (xxvi. sq.), had not been fulfilled, and he assures Nebucadrezar of compensation for the promised reward which he had not received. But these verses are a postscript, added in the twenty-seventh year (xxix. 17), probably after the completion of the whole book.

his purpose was not to reproduce the past point for point. His careful figures only serve to complete his picture and give it distinctness. Israel must be taught to know that "a prophet has been in his midst,"\* and—for this is the real point—must yield to the solemn preaching of repentance upon which the event had set its seal.

When we know the character of Ezekiel's book we are naturally cautious in our use of the details concerning the past which it contains. It is very often impossible to tell for certain whether they belong to the literary dress or are genuine historical reminiscences. Did Ezekiel, soon after beginning his public work as a prophet, meet with material resistance and find himself compelled to desist from teaching openly?† Did he remain thenceforth the adviser of some few better disposed than the rest, and is it to them that he refers as "the elders of Judah," who came to consult him in his own house?‡ Did he subsequently, when Jerusalem had fallen, begin to speak in public once more?§ All this is probable enough, but I would not vouch for it. Let us leave these details, then, for what they are worth, and confine ourselves to what is beyond dispute. Even in a wholly fictitious scene a writer, whatever else he does, must at least reveal *himself* to us, showing us what he is, what fills his soul, whither his desires tend, and what are his expectations for the future. How much more must Ezekiel do so, in his prophetic testament, the materials of which he borrows from his own past! Let us see then how he presents himself to us in it.

We choose as our point of departure the last sub-section of Ezekiel's book—chaps. xxxiii.—xlvi. A prophet, like other men, is best and most quickly known by his ideals; and in these chapters Ezekiel has drawn out in clear and orderly array the constituents of his ideal. After a word about himself and his task by way of introduction (chap. xxxiii.) he begins with a sketch of the restoration of the Israelitish

\* Ezek. ii. 5; xxxiii. 33; cf. xxi. 12.

† Chap. iii. 22—27.

‡ Cf. chap. viii. 1; xiv. 1; xx. 1.

§ Chap. xxiv. 26, 27; xxxiii. 21, 22 (on the text of this passage see note on page 621).

state, or perhaps we should say of the Israelitish government (chap. xxxiv.). At the outset he is impelled to deliver his soul on the subject of "the shepherds of Israel," and dark indeed is the picture he presents of their reckless neglect of duty and of the wickedness which they permitted or even encouraged in civil life. The denunciation, however, ends in a promise; Yahveh will raise up one shepherd for Israel, David, his servant, who shall rule as prince ("Nasi") in the midst of a people reunited to Yahveh (vv. 23 sq.). Elsewhere he expresses this same expectation again,\* making it clear at the same time that for fear of the Nasi abusing his power he would only allow him a strictly limited authority. His revenues and his duties are closely defined, and indeed he is no more than an official charged with the protection of the temple, and useful, in his own way, in heightening the splendour of its services, but in no way corresponding to the royal head of the people before the captivity. The prophet next turns to the land of Israel. The Edomites, who had appropriated a part of it, will be expelled, and their punishment will overtake them in their own abodes in the mountain land of Seir (chap. xxxv.). On the other hand "the mountains of Israel" will now be inhabited by their rightful owners once more, and their fertility will give the lie to the reproaches once hurled against them by their now humbled neighbours (chap. xxxvi. 1—15); and thus will the doubt as to Yahveh's might, which was raised by the carrying away captive of his people, be refuted (vv. 16—38). But this people itself: where was it to be found? The scattered exiles against whom Ezekiel had so much to urge were alike unfit for the duties and unworthy of the blessings laid up for Israel. The answer to this objection is contained in the first half of chap. xxxvii. Yahveh himself would bring life into the dry bones and create himself a new people. So should the one Israel, no longer divided into two often hostile kingdoms, be restored (vv. 15—28). What would now take place we know

\* Not only chap. xxxvii. 24, 25, but also xlv. 3; xlv. 2 sq.; xlviii. 21 sq. and *passim*; xlv. 7 sq.

already ; for it is here that we read that description of Gog's attack upon Canaan and the penalty that will overtake him, to which I called attention at the beginning of this article (chaps. xxxviii. sq.). And now has the prophet uttered all that he has to say in the name of Yahveh? No, not yet. We know that Israel is to return to his fatherland and to live there in inviolable prosperity, but we have not yet been told *how* he is to live there, and especially how the worship which lies so close to Ezekiel's heart is to be conducted. In the last nine chapters of his book, Ezekiel makes known his expectations, or rather the ordinances of Yahveh, on these subjects. The chapters include the minute regulation of the new order of things, with a description of the temple, its forecourts and chambers, regulations concerning the priests and their servants, their rights and their duties, ordinances about the sacrifices and feasts and the functions of the Nasi. But although these subjects occupy the chief place in Ezekiel's mind, he has some concern with other matters too. In chap. xlvii. 13—23 he accurately defines the boundaries of the land to be occupied by Israel. The Transjordanic district is excluded, but the whole territory between the Mediterranean and the Jordan belongs to Israel. To each of the tribes a strip of this land is assigned by Ezekiel, and he determines the order of their succession from North to South. Near the middle, between the territories of Judah and Benjamin, a piece of land is left over, on which the temple and the holy city are to rise, the remainder of the strip being divided between the priests or sons of Zadoc, the other Levites, and the Nasi (chap. xlviii.).

In all this we might go into much greater detail, but we have already said enough to give an adequate idea of Ezekiel's wishes and expectations. Without at present dwelling upon the character and tone of his ideal, let us compare it with the state of things actually existing before the exile. It is not too much to say that the two pictures stand over against each other in sharpest contrast. And yet the prophet was acquainted with the former condition



of things by no mere hearsay, but by his own experience. It is no accident, therefore, but a deliberate purpose that makes him depart so widely from it. He is evidently convinced that Israel must make a fresh start. Observe that he does not, with the second Isaiah,\* look for "new heavens and a new earth"; but, standing upon the soil of reality and confining himself within the accurately defined limits of the holy land, he sketches a new and minutely regulated national life. Everything is changed, though everything remains sober and matter of fact. If we knew nothing else about Ezekiel, this alone would justify us in ascribing to him a very unfavourable opinion of Israel's past; for nothing else could explain his expecting and even demanding an entire breach with it.

But the prophet has not left us to mere inferences concerning his views of the former condition of his people. The picture he presents of it is dark beyond all description, and the sentence he pronounces on it so terribly severe that we are inclined to call it pitiless. To convince ourselves of this we really need only dip here and there into the first great division of his book (chaps. i.—xxiv.) But I may be permitted to give the reader who desires to be better informed some few particulars. During the first years of Ezekiel's activity Israel was partly in exile and partly resident in Judah. Even his fellow-exiles he judges severely, and calls them not the "house of Israel" but the "house of rebelliousness."† They are not worthy of hearing the word of Yahveh.‡ Their corruption is so deep that they would be ready for their part "to become like the heathen, like the peoples of the lands, serving wood and stone."§ But the case is far worse yet with the inhabitants of Judea, and more especially with the citizens of Jerusalem. They deem themselves exalted above their brethren in the foreign land, because they have the dwelling of Yahveh in their midst.¶ Even after the fall of Jerusalem in 586 B.C.

\* Isaiah lxx. 19 sq.; lxxvi. 22.

† Chap. ii. 5—8; iii. 9, 26, 27; xii. 2, 3, 9, 25; xvii. 12; xxiv. 3.

‡ Chap. xiv. 3; xx. 3, 31.

§ Chap. xx. 32.

¶ Chap. xi. 14 sq.

the insignificant remnant still left in Judea persists in regarding itself as the people of Yahveh and in hoping for better times.\* All this stirs Ezekiel's deepest indignation, and he cannot find words strong enough to express his wrath against such presumption. Judah is ruled by a king who is guilty of shameful breach of faith with Nebucadrezar, and who will therefore receive the perjurer's chastisement.† Jerusalem is "the city of blood."‡ Every manner of abomination is practised there. In the very temple itself idols are worshipped.§ There is no commandment which the men of Jerusalem do not break: they shed innocent blood, they have no respect for their parents, they oppress the stranger, the orphan and the widow, they desecrate the sabbath, they commit adultery and all manner of uncleanness, their judges take bribes, their prophets seek nothing but their own gain, their priests neglect their duties, their princes fatten on the inheritance of their victims.|| And over and above all this they slaughter and burn their children in honour of their dung-gods—apostasy from Yahveh compounded with murder.¶

Such a sentence on the present naturally implies a very unfavourable judgment upon Israel's past. But here again Ezekiel does not leave us to guess his thoughts. We have already heard the grievances he had to urge against "the shepherds" of his people. But he also lays open the record of the whole nation's sins in more than one of his prophecies. From her earliest youth upwards she has trespassed against Yahveh. In Egypt she served the gods of the land and gave no ear to the exhortation to abandon them; and even then Yahveh would have relinquished his purpose of delivering her had not his own honour been at stake. In the wilderness things went no better. The generation that was redeemed from Egypt was so rebellious that it must needs be left to die out; but the sons and daughters were as corrupt as the parents! Arrived in

\* Chap. xxxiii. 23—29.

† Chap. xvii. 1—21.

‡ Chap. xxii. 2; xxiv. 6.

§ Chap. viii.

|| Chap. xxii. 6—13, 25—27.

¶ Chap. xxiv. 6 sq.

Canaan, Israel fell away to the service of the idols worshipped on the "high places" instead of Yahveh, or by his side.\* Jerusalem was a heathen city from the first. "Her father was an Amorite and her mother a Hittite." What wonder then if her history was an unbroken succession of abominations? Samaria and Sodom are her sisters, and as they have been smitten by Yahveh's judgments and destroyed, so must she, too, look for a like destruction.† The parallel between Samaria ("Oholah") and Jerusalem ("Oholibah") is elsewhere worked out more fully. The two sisters had been guilty of in chastity even in Egypt, and they continued their evil practices in Canaan and remained the same to the end. "Oholah" gave herself to the Assyrians, and by the Assyrians she was stripped naked and deserted. "Oholibah" followed her example, committing adultery at a later time with the Babylonians, and it is from their hand accordingly that she is now to receive her doubly-earned punishment.‡

I must be content with this rapid summary of Ezekiel's denunciations. Even if the space at my disposal allowed of more detail, decency would forbid it. In working out the image he has chosen the prophet knows no limits. He seems to find a kind of satisfaction in dragging his sinful people through the mire. The violence of his indictment is unqualified by a single word of approval or praise. Not a single ray of light breaks the thick darkness of night. What wonder, then, if his visions of the future bear so little resemblance to the present or the past! That which Yahveh will one day bring to pass—as surely as he can never forsake his people—will not be the restoration of the old order of things, or its continuance in a modified form, but something altogether new. A new Israel, in a land with changed boundaries and divisions, under a different government, ranged round a new temple of Yahveh and subject to other laws—nothing less than this can Ezekiel contemplate in the future.

We have, however, accomplished but half our task. We

\* Chap. xx.

† Chap. xvi.

‡ Chap. xxiii.

can now understand why Ezekiel's ideal differs so widely from the actual past ; but the positive contents of that ideal itself are still unexplained ; nor shall we be able to understand them till we have considered the man himself who elaborated them, and have thus brought the structure into connection with its architect.

To begin with, Ezekiel, as one of the series of prophets whose writings are preserved to us in the Old Testament, belongs to the small minority that waged war against the popular religion and the sins of the people from the beginning of the eighth century onwards. When he places himself over against Israel and inveighs against its moral and religious condition, he treads in the footsteps of all his predecessors, and especially makes himself the ally of the last of them all, namely Jeremiah. Again, the characteristics by which, in the midst of all similarities, he is severed from these other prophets, find their explanation partly in the fact that he was a priest, not only by descent and calling, but in tone of mind and disposition. It is only in a priest's ideal that the temple and its servants could take such a place as is distinctly assigned to them in chapters xl.—xlviii. Very characteristic in this respect is the description of the stream which rises under the threshold of Yahveh's sanctuary and flows eastward\* :—it is from that sanctuary that life and fertility go forth even into regions hitherto parched and pestilential. Nor is the fact that Ezekiel belonged to that priestly family which filled the most important offices in the temple of Jerusalem without its influence on his ordinances for the future. Had he not been one of "the sons of Zadoc" himself, he would hardly have come to regard them as so much superior to the other sons of Levi, or to exclude the latter from the priestly office altogether. †

Ezekiel is far from representing the ideas of his fellow exiles in general, and he is equally far from being a mere typical specimen of the priestly clan. On the contrary his own special individuality is strongly marked. He has a

\* Chap. xlvii. 1—12.

† Chap. xlv. 6—16, cf. xl. 46 ; xliii. 19 ; xlviii. 11.

pronounced personal character of his own. If we wish to appreciate this character we must turn our attention in the first place to a thought which stands in the foreground both at the beginning of Ezekiel's denunciations,\* and again when he is declaring his anticipations as to Israel's restoration.† He represents his own task as similar to that of the sentinel in time of war. If from his watch-tower the sentinel has seen the foe approaching, and has given the concerted signal and so warned every one of the danger, then whoever has failed to seek timely refuge has only himself to blame. "His blood is upon his own head." "But if the watchman sees the sword coming and blows not the trumpet and if the sword comes and takes away a soul from amongst them, then is this soul taken away in its iniquity, but I will demand its blood at the watchman's hand."‡ So, too, with Ezekiel. He is responsible, not indeed for the impenitence of "the house of rebelliousness," but for seeing to it that no single soul perishes without having received an earnest warning. So speaks the man who more than once complains of the reception he meets with at the hands of his people. This is the standard by which he tries himself and desires to be tried by others, for he registers, in the book of his oracles, the word of Yahveh that lays this heavy burden upon him. This indicates a scrupulous and earnest conscientiousness, a strictness in the conception and the carrying out of his life-task which cannot fail to impress us. When we hear Ezekiel recounting their sins to the exiles or to the citizens of Jerusalem, or note how he descends to trivial details in his sketch of the restored Israel, we might well grow impatient; but when we see that he is at least as exacting and punctilious in his demands upon himself, we are ready to repress our first feelings. There may be little to attract us in him, but at any rate he deserves our respect.

The consideration of this first trait in Ezekiel's character has brought us at once to the true standpoint. We have heard his witness concerning the task entrusted to him *by Yahveh*, and the responsibility laid upon him *by Yahveh*. It

\* Chap. iii. 16—21. † Chap. xxxiii. 1—9. ‡ Chap. xxxiii. 6.

is no exception for him to contemplate his own life and his surroundings from this, the religious point of view. Yahveh is to him all in all. It is as the servant and interpreter of Yahveh that he stands before us. His sole aim and purpose is to fulfil this duty. And if this is so, then his own personality must find its clearest reflection in his religion, in the conception of Yahveh that stands before his mind, and in the impression it makes upon his heart. "As is the man, so is his God, and so his faith." If this saying of the poet be true—and who does not see it confirmed by his own daily experience?—then we must study Ezekiel's personality in his conception of God, and conversely illustrate this conception itself from his character.

And here, again, we cannot hesitate for a moment as to what it is in the first instance that distinguishes the Yahveh before whose face Ezekiel stands from the god in whose name the other prophets speak. The god of the other prophets is indeed the Righteous One, the rewarder of good and the punisher of evil; but in Ezekiel's conception these attributes not only come prominently into the foreground, but they receive a special and characteristic colouring. The fundamental thought which he shares with the others he works out in a special way that distinguishes him from all his predecessors and successors. Yahveh is to him, in a single word, *the rigidly just one*. Ezekiel has taken care to leave no doubt as to the weight which he attaches to this conviction of his. More than once he brings it forward and applies it to typical cases which are admirably calculated to bring out all that it involves.\* The Israelites had a proverb which Jeremiah as well as Ezekiel refers to: † "the fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge." But the words sounded like blasphemy in the ears of our prophet, and he cried out against them: "the soul that sins, it shall die."‡ This rule he goes on to work out. First, he draws the picture of a righteous man—and the sketch itself deserves our close attention, for it shows us

\* Chap. xviii.; xiv. 12–20; xxxiii. 10–20. † Jer. xxxi. 29.

‡ Chap. xviii. 4b, cf. ver. 20.

the standard which the prophet was accustomed to apply\*—and we are assured that such an one “shall surely live.” The son, on the contrary, who does not tread in the steps of such a father, shall be struck by the judgment and shall not be spared. But likewise in the opposite case: the son who takes warning by the bad example of his father and the punishment which has overtaken him, shall surely be spared and made to prosper. † And if the consequences of good and ill are thus confined to those who themselves have trodden the path of righteousness or of sin, they are likewise limited in their duration by the period during which that way of life is persevered in to which they have been bound by Yahveh. If the sinner repents he shall live: “Should I, Yahveh, have pleasure in the death of the wicked?” But on the other hand: if the pious man forsakes the good path, then his former “righteousness which he has done” shall avail him no more: “in his sin which he has sinned, in that shall he die.” ‡ Elsewhere the prophet illustrates his belief in yet another way. Suppose, he says, that a sinful land is visited by the judgments of Yahveh, and that three righteous men dwell in it, such as Noah, Daniel and Job. In such a case these three shall without doubt be spared, and shall deliver their souls. But think not that they will protect the land in which they dwell from beasts of prey, from the sword, from famine, and from pestilence—no, not so much as their own sons and daughters, nothing but their own bare lives! §

These assertions are assuredly not drawn from experience; for her teaching is nearer that of the Israelitish proverb: that the sins of the fathers are visited upon the children, and that the righteous suffer with the godless, sometimes even more severely than they. All the more certainly then may we affirm that Ezekiel is here drawing from some other source than that of experience. His conception of Yahveh's justice is the reflection of his own scrupulous and precise character. Such as he represents

\* Chap. xviii. 5—9.

† Chap. xviii. 21—24.

‡ Chap. xviii. 10—13, 14—17.

§ Chap. xiv. 12—20.



Yahveh in his judgments and dealings, such would he be himself, giving "to every man his due," and, let us add, taking care above all to let no man suffer a heavier or longer punishment than he had deserved. For we must not fail to observe that Ezekiel, though pressing his ideas of Yahveh's justice as a warning to his sinful people, is yet principally actuated by the desire to comfort and encourage those Israelites who had entered on the path of repentance but yet did not dare to hope for restoration. It is expressly with this intention that he once more repeats his conviction on this subject before setting forth his ideas concerning Israel's future.\*

Yahveh, then, is strictly just; but is he also merciful, pitiful and long-suffering? The answer to this question is really implied in what I have just said. The epithets in question are never applied to Yahveh by Ezekiel, nor does he speak of Yahveh's love or fatherly tenderness. But ought this really to surprise us? With regard to a people so deeply sunk as Israel was, in the prophet's estimation, there could hardly be room for such emotions of tenderness. And yet they are rather passed over in silence by Ezekiel than denied or excluded by him. We may even say that they are implied throughout in the recognition of the indissoluble bond of union between Yahveh and Israel upon which all Ezekiel's preaching rests. Both in the past and present Israel fails to respond to this relationship; but Yahveh does not on that account lose sight of his people, but repeats the promise again and yet again: "I will be their God, and they shall be my people."† Nay, even with respect to the present time, that same "house of Israel" which has earned the name of "house of rebelliousness" is also called "my people" by Yahveh.‡ And, indeed, it is this fidelity to the covenant on Yahveh's part that secures the promise of life to all who genuinely repent. It is because Yahveh is inseparably bound to the nation which

\* Chap. xxxiii. 10—20.

† Chap. xi. 20; xiv. 11; xxxvi. 28; xxxvii. 23, 27.

‡ Chap. xiii. 9, 10, 18, 19, and in twenty other passages.

he has chosen that he can have no pleasure in the death of the sinner. For his grace does not extend beyond Israel, and would seem therefore to be not so much a part of his very being as a result of the special relation in which he has placed himself to this one people. In contrast, for example, with his immediate predecessor, Jeremiah,\* Ezekiel has not one friendly word or wish or promise for the heathen peoples.

No! It is not mercy that stands by the side of justice in our prophet's conception of Yahveh, but rather majestic might. Indeed, this latter is the real kernel of Ezekiel's idea of God, or rather (for it is from the religious rather than from the philosophical or theological side that we must approach his mind) this is the divine attribute by which he is most powerfully laid hold of and under the impression of which he lives. We see this at the very outset, in the vision of his call,† to which he subsequently refers more than once.‡ Is this an account of an actual vision seen by the prophet in an ecstasy? Or is it the freely adopted form under which he endeavours to set visibly before his readers his own conception of Yahveh's being? The latter supposition is, in my opinion, far more probable than the former, and indeed is alone consistent with the character of the picture here presented. But, be this as it may, so much is certain: that to the man who speaks in these pages Yahveh is, above all else, the infinitely exalted, the Almighty, the unapproachably glorious one. The attitude of soul that was provoked by the vision—or rather that expressed itself in it—is exemplified by the words that close the description: "I saw it, and fell down upon my face."§ Under the crushing sense of his own littleness he lies overwhelmed and powerless on the earth, nor can he rise again till the spirit of Yahveh comes into him and raises him upon his feet. The very name by which he

\* See, for instance, the identical conclusion of the three prophecies against Moab, Ammon, and Elam, Jer. xlviii. 47; xlix. 6, 39; and cf. my *Prophets and Prophecy in Israel*, pp. 249—251.

† Chap. i.

‡ Chap. iii. 22, 23; x; xliii. 1 sqq.; xliv. 4.

§ Chap. i. 28; iii. 23; xliii. 3; xliv. 4.

hears Yahveh address him emphasizes this same feeling of littleness and humility. "Son of man" (that is to say, "weak mortal") is the constant appellation under which Yahveh speaks to the prophet. How different is the spirit of the well-known saying of Amos: "The Lord Yahveh does nothing without revealing his counsel to his servants the prophets."\* The time of such confidential relations is clearly at an end. Yahveh's throne is loftier and more dazzling now than in earlier times, but also more far-removed. And accordingly we need not wonder if sometimes the angels, who stand nearer to Yahveh, appear to the "son of man" to make known the will of the deity or to interpret his oracles.†

But there is more evidence yet of the wide space occupied in Ezekiel's field of vision by the majestic might of Yahveh. Whenever he lays open the counsels of Israel's god, we are impressed by the fact that this deity is concerned above all things in guarding against the suspicion that he is powerless to accomplish his promise, and to work out his designs concerning Israel. It may well be that the fall first of Samaria and then of Jerusalem was really taken in heathen circles as a proof of Yahveh's impotence, and that the prophet had heard something of it. But even apart from any such specific occasion he clearly felt called upon to support the honour of his god and so to represent him as jealous of his own fame, and always planning the confusion of those who impugned his greatness and his honour. We have already had an opportunity of noting the lengths to which this is carried in the great indictment of Israel in the twentieth chapter. In spite of Israel's repeated disobedience Yahveh preserves his people and continues his benefits "because of his name's sake, that it may not be desecrated before the eyes of the heathen, in whose midst Israel dwells, for in their sight had Yahveh made himself known to Israel and led him out of Egypt."‡ So, too, the restoration of Israel tends to the

\* Amos iii. 7. † Chap. ix. 2 sqq.; x. 2 sqq.; xl. 3-5; xliii. 6; xlvii. 3.

‡ Chap. xx. 9, 14, 22, 44.

vindication of Yahveh's honour: "When I bring you out from amongst the peoples and gather you together out of the lands in which you are scattered, then shall I be hallowed in you (*i.e.*, recognised and adored in this change in your lot) before the face of the heathen."\* If Yahveh turns against Sidon it is "that he may be glorified in her midst, and that she may acknowledge that he is Yahveh when he executes judgment upon her and is hallowed in her (*i.e.*, in her destruction)."+ It is not only in passing that Ezekiel expresses this idea. When he has announced to "the mountains of Israel" the glorious restoration of their former fertility‡ he opens a kind of parenthesis in order to explain the significance of this deed of Yahveh. He now declares expressly that the carrying away of Israel captive has given rise to doubts as to the might of Israel's god. With the exiles in view, men had cried "They are the people of Yahveh and (yet) they have been torn from their land!" This was more than Yahveh could endure: "he had respect to his holy name, which the house of Israel had put to shame amongst the heathen in whose midst they dwelt." Not for the sake of Israel, but for his name's sake would he bring them back into their land. This great name, now dishonoured by the heathen, he will hallow, and "the heathens shall know that I am Yahveh when I am hallowed in you before their eyes!"§ Nor is even this enough. The most obstinately incredulous must be put to silence. It must be rendered clear as the sun that Yahveh did not yield to the Assyrians and Chaldeans, but made use of them to execute his judgment on the apostate people. And this purpose is served by the expedition of Gog and his armies against the holy land, once more inhabited by Israel. When the countless hosts are destroyed by Yahveh with no human instrumentality, even the blindest will be forced to admit that he is the Almighty One.||

There is an unmistakable connection between this con-

\* Chap. xx. 41, cf. xxviii. 25.

† Chap. xxviii. 22.

‡ Chap. xxxvi. 1-15.

§ Chap. xxxvi. 16-23.

|| See for example xxxviii. 16, 23; xxxix. 7, 25, 27, 28.

ception of God and the representation which Ezekiel gives us of Israel's future state. This connection will come out very clearly if we turn our glance backwards for a moment. The writer of Deuteronomy—whose life may have lasted well into the time of our prophet—had exhorted the Israelites "to love Yahveh with all their heart, and with all their soul, and with all their strength," \* to "cleave to him,"† in a word to give themselves up and consecrate themselves to him wholly. Is that Ezekiel's conception of the true relation between Israel and Yahveh likewise? And is his prophetic eye directed to the restoration of it? No doubt we meet with some expressions from his lips which remind us of the Deuteronomic exhortation, and particularly of that trait in it which attracts us most, viz., the ready love with which the people ought to serve their god. Does he not announce that in the time to come "Yahveh shall hide his countenance no more, for he will have poured out his spirit upon the house of Israel" ?‡ Do we not read elsewhere in his book the beautiful prediction that Yahveh will give the Israelites "a new heart, and put a new spirit within them, taking away their stony heart and giving them a heart of flesh" ?§ And so, too, the promise that Yahveh shall henceforth dwell in the midst of his people,|| indicates a closer relationship which at any rate is not alien from the Deuteronomic ideal. But for all that we must not overlook the great difference. Ezekiel's promise of "a new heart and a new spirit" is immediately followed by the words, "that they may walk in my ordinances, and may observe my statutes and accomplish them."¶ And we see that this is no mere phrase, for when we come to the description of the new Israel\*\* we find that Ezekiel is not content to assure his readers that all, without distinction, will love Yahveh and serve him freely after the impulse of their hearts, but he must needs prescribe the way in which the

\* Deut. vi. 5.

† Deut. x. 20; xi. 22, and elsewhere.

‡ Chap. xxxix. 29.

§ Chap. xi. 19 (for "one heart" read "a new" or "another heart"); xxxvi. 26.

|| Chap. xxxvii. 26—28. ¶ Chap. xi. 20; xxxvi. 27. \*\* Chap. xl. sqq.

temple is to be arranged, the sacrifices that shall be offered there, and the feasts that shall be celebrated, who may and who may not do service as priests, and how the expenses of the whole institution are to be met. Nay, what trivial detail is there which he does not make Yahveh expressly regulate? The "ordinances" and "statutes" according to which the Israelites will have to live, and which they have only neglected hitherto to their own sorrow, are always upon Ezekiel's lips.\* Henceforth they are to be put into practice. In a word: Yahveh is to Ezekiel the *lawgiver* of his people. In this one function his rigid justice and his uncontrolled supremacy are united. Or, if we look at the same thing from the human side: the religion which Ezekiel bore in his own heart and which with the eye of faith he saw established in the future, is the religion of *legalism*.

It is not easy to pass a fair and impartial judgment on such a man as Ezekiel. The temptation to side against him is obvious. The companions of his exile in Babylonia treated him with mockery or turned away from him in wrath. We will not undertake to defend their conduct—but we can very easily understand it. If we had been of their number we should perhaps have done as they did. For, if we are to go by what we read in his book, Ezekiel certainly did not make it easy for his contemporaries to give him an impartial hearing. He does not conciliate, but repels. Sometimes it seems as though he were bent on embittering his hearers rather than winning them over. We have all of us met such men from time to time on our way through life; and we have only to remember the impression they made upon us in order perfectly to understand Ezekiel's unpopularity in his own day.

We, however, for our parts, stand far enough away from the prophet to be able to drop these personal considerations; but there is yet another difficulty in the way of an impartial estimate of Ezekiel and a recognition of his true deserts.

\* Chap. v. 6, 7; xi. 12; xviii. 9, 12, 17, 19 and elsewhere.

He did not live and work in vain. Power went forth from him. We are not left to guess what he accomplished, for we can lay our finger upon it not only in past history but in the actual surroundings of our own lives to-day. Ezekiel, in a word, is the first designer, so to speak, and in so far the father, of *Judaism*. We have just noted that he failed to bring over the majority of his contemporaries to his views, and he did not therefore actually found this new form of the religion of Israel. But a band of faithful disciples must have gradually gathered round him. Thus rose what we might call "the school of Ezekiel," only that we must not think of it as a close and organised body. In this school "the ordinances, the laws and the statutes" of Yahveh were reduced to writing, partly in accordance with the scheme drafted by Ezekiel himself, and partly in accordance with the oral priestly tradition. From this school there sprang, a century after Ezekiel's death, the man who was to put his ideas into practice, the priest and scribe Ezra. And this brings out the difficulty of which I have just spoken. Judaic legalism, not to put it too strongly, inspires us with but slender sympathy. As a form of religion it seems to us to stand below the prophetic Yahvism out of which it sprang. Indeed, the fact that it survives to the present day—I am not speaking of the Jewish people, nor of their religion in general, but of Talmudism, the present form of Judaic legalism—is one of the causes of that antagonism between Christians and Jews which we so justly deplore as amongst the saddest phenomena of national life in the Europe of to-day. Is it any wonder that our want of admiration for the edifice should be transferred to the architect, and should therefore translate itself into an unfavourable judgment on Ezekiel?

But would this really be, as I have intimated, unfair to the prophet? Beyond all question it would. We cannot indeed surrender the right to have feelings, opinions, and preferences of our own even with respect to historical phenomena. It is a demand which cannot be complied with and which should never be made, that requires us to



stand as cool and indifferent spectators over against the past, with no sympathy or antipathy for what it exhibits to us. But neither must we allow our judgment of facts, still less of individual characters, to be determined exclusively by these likes or dislikes of our own. Let us rather begin by asking what was inevitable at a given period ; and what was beneficent or even indispensable for the time which gave it birth. This twofold test Judaism at any rate can pass through victoriously. It was alike inevitable and indispensable. Inevitable,—for the little community which should recognise the Almighty and Righteous One, the Creator and Lord of heaven and earth as its God, could not but reverence him, as the slave his master, making religion consist in absolute subjection to his law. Indispensable,—for in what other form but this could the worship of Yahveh become the possession and the passion of a nation ? And unless it became such how could the Jewish people fulfil its mission in the history of the world, and in the fulness of time give birth to Christianity ? If we place ourselves at this point of view in forming our judgment we shall be able to do justice to Ezekiel ; and all the more fully and gladly because the influence he exerted was due in the last resort not to any brilliant qualities or talents which he possessed but to the moral kernel of his character. He was in earnest, passionately in earnest, to the very bone. There lay his power, and there, too, in connection with the outcome of his work, lies the lesson he may teach us yet.

A. KUENEN.

*Leiden.*

## THE ARGUMENT FROM DESIGN IN THE ORGANIC WORLD

RECONSIDERED IN ITS RELATION TO THE DOCTRINES OF  
EVOLUTION AND NATURAL SELECTION.\*

THE request which has been courteously presented to me on your behalf, that I should address you on a subject on which Scientific thought is at present much exercised, and which has a direct and important bearing on Theological inquiry, gives me an opportunity of which I am very glad to avail myself, of setting forth the results of the careful and, I hope, candid reconsideration of the old Theistic "Argument from Design in the Organic World," which has been continually before my mind from the time when the publication of Mr. Darwin's *Origin of Species by Natural Selection* brought its validity seriously into question.

You are all familiar with the frequently repeated remark, that whenever Science and Theology have come into conflict, Theology has had to "go to the wall." And there are probably several among you whose faith in the old "Argument from Design" has been more or less seriously shaken by the confident assertions of men of high scientific distinction, that the last victory which Science has gained over Theology has been its greatest,—consisting in nothing less than the complete subversion of the whole doctrine of Final Causes. For, as they affirm, the adaptation of means to ends which is recognisable in the structure of Plants and Animals, can now be so fully accounted for by natural

\* An Address delivered to the London Ministers' Conference at Dr. Williams's Library, June 6th, 1884.

agencies, as to afford no evidence whatever of an originaive intention, a creative purpose.

Now, if I regarded this claim as Scientifically valid, I should unhesitatingly counsel you to abandon your former position without any attempt to defend it. For if we look back at the results of former conflicts, we see that nothing has been more injurious to Theology than the persistence of Theologians in antiquated error. We of the present time can only wonder at the obstinacy with which the self-styled 'Orthodox' have clung to the idea that the World with its living inhabitants was created in six successive days of the year 4004 B.C., the Creator resting from his labours on the seventh; that our own Terrestrial globe is the fixed centre of the Universe—sun and moon, stars and planets, revolving around it every twenty-four hours; that not more than 6,000 years have elapsed since Man was first called into being; and that the Noachian Deluge extended over the whole globe, and destroyed all the animals then living on its surface, except the few pairs that found a refuge in the Ark. As each of these positions has been successively impugned by Scientific research, Theologians have raised the cry that the foundations of Christianity were being undermined; and yet they have now, tacitly if not openly, agreed to abandon them all, as ancient traditions altogether destitute of historical value. That Theology has gained and not lost by this abandonment, I do not suppose that any one now doubts; the lamp of Truth must always shine brighter, when no longer darkened by the mists of error. But Theologians have not come out unharmed from the conflict; for they have given their opponents a right to charge them with either a wilful blindness to scientific truth, or an intellectual incapacity to recognise it; and this lesson should not be lost upon us of the present time.

I cannot doubt that all whom I am now addressing agree with me in the conviction that Theology can only maintain its ground in the future, by placing itself in accord with the highest Scientific thought of the time,—by readily accepting all that Science reveals to us in regard to the

Order of Nature,—and by rigorously abstaining from all attempts to fetter or discourage its advance. Such has ever been the teaching of one to whom we all look as the best exponent of Liberal Theology, and the influence of whose writings is more and more advancing its progress. Whilst strenuously defending the Theistic position against its scientific as well as its non-scientific assailants, Dr. Martineau has ever cordially welcomed every real advance in Science, not merely as extending our knowledge of the material Universe, but as leading us to a more thorough recognition of its Unity, its Order, and its Harmony. And he has shown us how, by availing itself of the highest and best results of Scientific investigation, Theology is expanding and elevating itself above the narrow limits of Mosaic Anthropomorphism, so as to reveal to us the Divine Thought as pervading all Space, and exerting itself in action through all Time.

It was in this spirit that, two years ago, I reviewed, before a different but kindred audience,\* the bearing upon Theistic belief of that doctrine of the Progressive Evolution of the Inorganic Universe, which modern Astronomical research, by the help of methods of observation altogether new, has now established beyond reasonable question. For, I maintained, if ever the entire succession of changes by which the consolidation of the original Nebular matter into the multitude of Suns and Systems that have sprung out of it, shall be scientifically shown to be the work of Physical Forces acting in accordance with determinate Laws, we shall have only arrived at a knowledge of the Order of Creation, and shall have advanced no nearer to that of its primal Cause. The Physicist who deduces from the activities of different forms of matter certain 'properties' which he attributes to them, and then uses these very 'properties' to account for those activities, is obviously reasoning in a circle. What he calls 'properties' and 'laws' are really but *forms* or *categories* under which he finds it desirable to correlate those

\* "The Doctrine of Evolution in its Relations to Theism";—an Address delivered at Sion College. MODERN REVIEW for October, 1882.

"uniformities of co-existence and sequence" which his observation of Nature brings under his cognisance. "Why does an apple fall to the ground?" is a question which has as great a significance to us now as it had before Newton was led by pondering upon it to the discovery of the Law of Gravitation. For that Law only expresses the *conditions of action* of a universal force tending to draw together all masses of matter; while of the *force* itself it gives no account whatever. We recognise it by our own consciousness of effort in lifting a weight from the ground; and this recognition carries us from the sphere of Physical into that of Moral Causation. For, as Sir John Herschel long ago pointed out, our consciousness of direct Personal causation in the performance of a voluntary act, leads us to regard what we call the "Forces of Nature" as the emanations of an all-pervading Will, and those uniformities in their action which we term her "Laws" as the manifestations of its unchanging continuity. As Dr. Martineau has admirably expressed it, "In whatever sense, and on whatever grounds, we affirm the tenancy of our own frame by the soul that governs it, must we fill the Universe with the ever-living Spirit of whose thought it is the development." The very conception of Evolution involves a beginning; and for that beginning, which *de facto* excludes all antecedent Physical agency (otherwise it would not be a real *beginning*), none but a Moral Cause can be assigned. And thus the continuous Uniformity in the Evolutionary process, which some have regarded as *explained* by the Laws that merely *express* it, really testifies to the perfection of the Original Design, the progressive unfolding of which has never needed a departure from it.

I have never met with a valid reason for regarding the relation of the Evolution-doctrine to the Organic World, as in any respect different from that in which it stands to the Physical Universe. All the elders among us were brought up in that anthropomorphic conception of 'special creations,' which seemed natural to the Childhood of our race, just as it does to the Child-mind of the present day. And to the

older Geologists, who regarded the successive Geological 'periods' as marked off, one from another, by cataclysmic interruptions that involved the destruction of all the existing races of Plants and Animals, a similar introduction of fresh forms, to re-people the newly-modelled globe after each cataclysm, seemed quite as conceivable as the original Creation. But all Geological and Palæontological inquiry has of late so decidedly tended towards the substitution of the idea of slow continuous change for that of violent convulsionary disturbances, that when Mr. Darwin showed that a doctrine of continuous "Descent with Modification" might be built upon a really scientific basis, it gained a much more ready reception among unprejudiced thinkers than he had himself ventured to expect. Many of us had been already prepared to entertain it favourably, by the plausible and in some respects forcible manner in which a similar doctrine had been previously presented in the *Vestiges of Creation*; in reviewing which book, nearly forty years ago, I expressed myself as fully concurring with its Author in regarding the idea of a *continuous ascending succession*, along which the various races of Plants and Animals of the past and present epochs, each of them adapted to its external conditions of existence, have come into existence according to 'laws' of genetic descent, as a far higher expression of Creative Wisdom and Power than that of Special Creations devised to meet each exigency as it arose.

Considered from this point of view, the Darwinian doctrine of "Evolution," even when based on "Natural Selection," seems to me to have no other bearing. For it is simply a concise expression of what is maintained to have been an orderly and continuous succession of phenomena, referable to natural causes; and no more *excludes* the idea of Moral Agency, than does the substitution of the idea of the continuous Evolution of the Inorganic Universe for that of the Creation of that Universe in its present form. In the pursuit of Biological as of Physical Science, I most fully recognise the essential importance of keeping clear of

what are termed 'final causes,' or assumptions of purpose, and of rigorously limiting our study to 'physical causation.' But the question now before us,—whether the evidences of Intelligent Design, which Theology has hitherto recognised in the structure of Organized beings, are or are not any longer tenable, when viewed under the new light thrown upon them by the Darwinian lamp, is one which—though Science has much to say upon it—it is beyond the province of Science to decide. Newton and Laplace were both accused of Atheism by their contemporaries for setting up their own conceptions in the place of the action of the Creator; and you well know that the same charge has been brought against Darwin. I shall endeavour to show you that in his case, as in that of his great predecessors, the real result of his scientific work has been to effect for Biology what they are well said by Dr. Whewell to have effected for Astronomy—the "transfer of the notion of design and end from the region of facts to that of laws."

For the thorough consideration of this question, I think it very important that we should start with a clear conception of what the "Argument from Design" really means, and with a right appreciation of the probative value of the evidence on which it rests; and these will therefore be the subjects to which I shall first direct your attention.

It is a mere truism to assert that Design implies a Designer; because the definition of design is "the intentional adaptation of means to a preconceived end." We do not perform any voluntary motion without a preconception of the action we 'will' to perform. It is this preconception of result that constitutes the foundation of the effort made to carry it out. I may determine the action itself; as when I 'will' to bend my fore-arm on my arm. Or I may 'will' to do something—as to lift a book from the table, or to carry a spoon to my mouth—which requires this flexion to carry my purpose into effect. But no action,



in which there is not such a preconception, is "intentional" or "voluntary." We are constantly using the word 'design' in this sense. An architect 'designs' a building; a ship-builder 'designs' a ship; an artist 'designs' a picture, and so on. In all such works, we unhesitatingly recognise an intentional adaptation of means to a pre-conceived end (though the designer and his purpose may be alike unknown to us), from our personal experience of other cases more or less similar.

But we have now to deal with cases in which we have had no such experience; and to consider the grounds on which, in any individual instance, we should feel justified in concluding that an obvious *adaptiveness* has been 'intentional,' or, in other words, that the object has been 'designed' for the use which we find it to answer. I do not affirm that we can in any case obtain logical or demonstrative *proof* of such 'designed' adaptation; but I think I can make it clear that this is one of the numerous instances in which a *convergence of separate probabilities* acquires the probative value of a *moral certainty*.

What we call 'demonstration' rests entirely upon our mental inability to accept as true anything that contravenes the thing affirmed; and if, in a chain of demonstrative reasoning, every link has the strength of a necessary truth, we accept its conclusion as having the same validity as the *datum* from which it started. Now, I hold that exactly the same state of 'conviction' may be produced by a concurrence of probabilities, if these point separately and independently to the same conclusion,—like radial lines that converge from different parts of the circumference of a circle, though none actually reach its centre. For the result of that concurrence may be as irresistibly probative as any demonstration; the conclusion to which they all point being one which we are compelled to accept by our inability to conceive of any other explanation of the *whole aggregate* of evidentiary facts, though any one of them may be otherwise accounted for. I am not aware that this principle has been discussed in any treatise on

Logic ; but it is familiar to every lawyer who practises in Courts of Justice ; and its validity cannot, I think, be questioned by any one who has studied the theory of what is commonly called 'circumstantial' evidence. Indeed, it would be difficult to adduce a more remarkable example of the stability of an argument erected on a broad basis of independent probabilities, than is presented in the wonderful fabric built up by the genius of Darwin ; the general acceptance of the Evolution-doctrine resting on exactly the same kind of evidence as that on which I base the Argument from Design. The most pronounced Evolutionist may be challenged to produce anything like a 'demonstration' of any one of his propositions. But (as I showed in my Zion College address) the concurrence of probabilities supplied by Morphology and Embryology, by Physiology and Palæontology, is so complete as, in the minds of those most competent to appreciate their probative value, to exclude any other hypothesis. Those, therefore, who find in this concurrence a sufficient reason for their assent to the doctrine of Evolution, should be the last to impugn the validity of the same mode of reasoning, when brought to bear on the evidences of Design, which are afforded by the very orderliness of that Evolution.

In applying this principle to the question we are now considering, I am quite willing to admit, *in limine*, that the mere adaptiveness of a thing to a particular purpose, is often a very unsafe ground for concluding that it was devised for that purpose. For cases are constantly occurring, in which we find ourselves able to turn some instrument to a use altogether different from that for which it was intended by its maker ; and every one who has had much experience of changes of residence (as happened to myself in early life), has found pieces of his furniture fitting into appropriate recesses just as exactly 'as if they had been made for them.' But I rest my argument on cases in which the idea of such *casual* adaptiveness is altogether excluded by the *accumulation* of separate and independent evidentiary facts, all indicative of the same purpose ; and I

shall further show you that it is not invalidated (as Professor Huxley has maintained it to be) by a possible misapprehension of that purpose; the evidence of a 'design' being the same, even though we may be mistaken as to what that design was.

Necessarily limiting myself to two typical illustrations, I shall select one of a very simple nature, in which conviction is produced by the accumulation of *similar* evidentiary probabilities, each of which—taken individually—is of the slightest character and the lowest value, their probative force depending entirely on their collocation; whilst in the other I shall show that our conviction rests on the elaborate character of the constructive arrangements by which a small number of separate but *dissimilar* adaptations are so combined as to work out a single product.

About 30 years ago we began to hear a good deal about "flint implements." They had not been altogether unknown previously, as specimens of them were to be found in Museums of Antiquities; but they had never been brought to light in such numbers, and under such very peculiar circumstances, as in the working of the gravel beds of the Valley of the Somme, near Abbeville and Amiens. The matter was brought into notice by M. Boucher de Perthes, a distinguished antiquarian and collector at Abbeville. English men of science went over to study the conditions under which these flint implements were found; and very soon satisfied themselves of the genuineness and importance of this discovery. There were many who at first denied that they afforded any evidence of the existence of Man at the time when these gravel-beds were deposited; maintaining that their peculiar shapes had been given by accidental collisions. I do not know that any sane man now questions their human production; and I ask you to follow me in the examination of the evidence which has wrought that universal conviction. We are all familiar with the opening passage of Paley's Natural Theology:—"In crossing a heath, suppose I pitched my foot against a stone, and were asked how the stone came to

be there, I might possibly answer that, for anything I knew to the contrary, it had lain there for ever: nor would it perhaps be very easy to show the absurdity of this answer. But suppose I had found a *watch* upon the ground, and it should be inquired how the watch happened to be in that place, I should hardly think of the answer which I had before given—that, for anything I knew, the watch might have always been there." Now, if you were to "pitch your foot" against one of these *flint implements*, you would find it very difficult to account for its condition by any hypothesis of accidental configuration. Flints are found, in considerable numbers, wherever there has been a great denudation of the chalk; those originally embedded in it having been left on the surface of the ground. You will generally find them whole, but not unfrequently they have undergone fracture. If, in walking through a chalk country, you look at a heap of flints collected by the roadside for mending the road, you will find the greater part of them entire, having shapes that suggest to the Naturalist the forms of the Sponges, by the silicification of which they were originally produced. You will doubtless find some broken; but you will never meet with one that even remotely resembles the characteristic 'flint implement' of the Amiens and Abbeville gravels. They may have one or two, or perhaps half-a-dozen, fractured surfaces; but these are quite irregular, having no relation one to another. Now, a 'flint implement' exhibits, perhaps, fifty fractures; and they are all so related in size and position as to bring out a very definite shape. Yet this consideration alone did not by any means satisfy those who were unwilling to admit the conclusion that this shape had been worked out by human hands. I well remember that when these objects were first brought into public notice, there were many persons who said, "The shaping of these flints is merely accidental; the flint fell into a river in which there were many stones knocking about, and the fractures have been produced by the flint having got, so to speak, under a number of hammers; so that, a bit having been

broken away here and a bit there, it has come to be shaped as it is now found." I will not say that this is an absolutely impossible supposition with respect to any single example; but when we find numbers of these flints, all showing the same form, in one gravel bed,—when we meet with forms exactly similar in other gravel beds—and when we learn that exactly similar flints are used at the present time by peoples (some of the hill tribes of India, for instance) among whom iron implements, have not yet found their way, the implements being held in a cleft stick, and bound round by a leather thong,—then, I think, we have an accumulation of evidence which makes it inconceivable that these gravel flints, of which I have spoken, owed their shape to anything else than human handiwork. But besides these large and powerful implements, there are also a number of other kinds. Some of these, though smaller, are of the same general shape, each showing a similar series of regularly disposed fractures. But there are also found, in the same beds and in the same numbers, smaller 'flakes' of flint, whose shapes might more easily be supposed to have been accidentally acquired, for many of them exhibit only two fractured surfaces, indicative of two knocks; so that it would be by no means inconceivable that any single flake had been casually struck off by a second blow from a flint which had already sustained a fracture nearly in the same direction. But when we look at a number of these found together, and when we know that similar flakes are used as cutting instruments at the present time by some of the survivors of the old "flint folk" (being often retained for sacrificial purposes, long after the use of metallic cutting instruments has become general), then we come to feel sure that even these small flakes must have been struck off *with a purpose*.

Such is the *cumulative* argument that I would draw from a consideration of this case. Even if we admit it as conceivable that any single flint implement, or a small number of such implements, might have derived their regular shape from a number of accidental blows, and that

the people who now use such instruments might have adopted and turned to account such as thus came to their hands ready made, I hold it impossible for any one who brings an unprejudiced mind to the examination of a sufficiently large collection of them, brought from localities widely remote from each other, to come to any other conclusion than that they have been shaped by Human handiwork.

I might carry this argument from the "palæolithic" to the "neolithic" forms; in the latter of which smooth surfaces and sharp continuous edges have been given by friction on other stones. It is true that every pebble of a shingle beach exhibits the result of similar attrition against other pebbles, in the shaping and smoothing of its surface; but any one who should maintain that a characteristic flint implement of the neolithic kind could have got its shape and polish from any such casual milling, would be accounted destitute of common sense.

Now, although we can assign a use for each kind of implement, it does not at all follow that such was the use for which it was designed by its maker; but the argument that it *had* a maker, and that he designed it for *some* purpose, is not in the least weakened by this uncertainty. And I shall hereafter show that we are justified by exactly the same kind of evidence, in distinguishing the variations in Organised structures, which persistently take place in definite directions, and culminate in the evolution of a more elevated type, from those 'aimless' variations which correspond to the accidental fractures of flints.

From one of the earliest products of human ingenuity I now pass to one of the latest—the Walter printing-press, which I first saw in operation in the Great Exhibition of 1862, and which embodies one of the most marvellous combinations of different actions, all related to one and the same end, that I have ever seen in any single machine. In fact, it more impressed me with its resemblance to an *organised structure*, than any other piece of mechanism that I am acquainted with. If you were to join on to the Walter printing-press

the paper-making machine, which is worked separately for convenience merely, you might put in paper-pulp at one end, and this would come out at the other end as printed *Times* newspapers, at the rate of 15,000 per hour, without any human intervention. For the paper-making machine is now so perfected, that a continuous sheet can be produced of any length desired. Rolls three miles long are brought to the *Times* printing-office, and put into the machine: the paper, as it is unrolled, is damped-through by passing over a hollow roller pierced with multitudes of small holes, through which water is ejected from the inside; and the superfluous moisture is then squeezed out by passing the paper between another pair of rollers, so that it is prepared to receive the impression. Then there are a number of most elaborate and beautiful contrivances, by which for the flat 'form' of the ordinary printing-press is substituted a stereotype plate, wrapping completely round a cylinder, the continuous revolution of which at a very rapid rate impresses the paper that is made to pass over it. When the compositor has finished setting up his type, and the proof has been taken, read, and corrected, so that the 'form' can be 'made up', an impression of it is taken off on a sheet of damp *papier maché*; and this, having been bent round the interior of a hollow cylinder and rapidly dried, serves as the mould from which a cast is made in type-metal, exactly representing on a cylindrical surface the flat type-surface of the 'form.' This cast, after being examined for defects, which are rapidly repaired, is fitted on the printing-cylinder; which is thus made ready, in a wonderfully short space of time, for impressing the paper which is to pass over it, with the 'matter' of which the original 'form' was composed. As the paper has to be printed on both sides, two such cylinders are needed; and the sheet, having been printed on one side by passing over the first, is printed on the other by being conducted over the second. Another set of beautiful and yet simple contrivances is provided for distributing the ink with the most perfect uniformity, and for preventing



any accidental deficiency, such as might be produced by an air-bubble, from leaving a blank on the type. After having passed over both cylinders, the continuous roll passes through a cutting-machine, which cuts off the sheets one after another at the proper length; and these fall from above to one and the other alternately of two boys who receive the sheets and lay them in two piles.

Now, could any one who should see such a machine in operation, doubt that every part of it had been constructed with a view to a preconceived purpose, whatever he might suppose that purpose to be? An illiterate savage who knows nothing about the meaning of *Times* newspapers, would none the less (if he had a capacity for reasoning upon the matter at all) recognise an intelligent purpose in the construction of the machine. But it is by him who knows something of the difficulties which baffled all previous attempts at printing from a continuously revolving cylinder, and can thus appreciate the beautiful simplicity of the method by which these have been overcome, and by which the machine has been brought to its present perfection, that the greatest admiration will be felt for the ability with which so many separate and dissimilar arrangements have been brought into consentaneous and mutually related action, so as to concur towards a common result, which the machine would altogether fail to work out, if any one of its processes were to suffer derangement.

Now, in the first of these cases we have a very close parallel to those forms of Vegetable and Animal life, which are characterised by the Biologist as of "low organisation"; by which is meant that there is comparatively little differentiation in the structure of their several parts, which are often repeated almost without limit, performing actions identically the same. And yet in these, as in the collocation of the individual fractures which have shaped out a flint implement, we see evidence of a *plan*, in the orderly arrangement of these parts, and in the adaptiveness of their combined action to the well-being of the organism as a whole. Look, for example, at a Sea-anemone in the act of

feeding; and see how its multiple tentacles attach themselves to a piece of fish, or to the shell of a mussel or periwinkle, and draw it by their united contraction into the creature's stomach. The adaptation is not less perfect, because the action is so simple; nothing could be conceived more suitable to the conditions under which the sea-anemone lives; and the multiplication of *similar* parts, so disposed as to enable them to work together to a common end, seems to me as clear an evidence of 'designed' adaptation in the sea-anemone, as it is admitted to be in the 'flint implement.' But, as we ascend the scale of Animal life, we find this repetition of similar parts giving place to differentiation, alike in structure and in action; and in proportion as each kind of functional activity becomes limited to a particular organ, does the mutual dependence of the several parts of the organism necessarily become more intimate. With this functional limitation we commonly find an increasing complexity of structure, which enables the function to be more effectively performed; and thus the body of any 'highly organised' animal consists of a number of *dissimilar* organs, each—like the several parts of the Walter-press—doing its own proper work, but thereby contributing, at the same time, to maintain the activity of the rest.

It has been on this marked adaptiveness of particular organs to the kinds of action they respectively perform, that the "Argument from Design" has been commonly based; and no case of this adaptation has been more frequently dwelt upon, as showing in its perfection the most obvious and convincing evidence of "design," than the Human Eye. The perfection of this adaptation, however, has been partially denied by several modern writers, who have based their denial on a statement contained in a most interesting and instructive lecture on "The Eye and Vision," given some years ago by my very distinguished friend, Professor Helmholtz.\* The first part of this lecture is devoted to an exposition of the structure and actions of the eye,

\* *Popular Lectures on Scientific Subjects.* Translated by Dr. Atkinson. London, 1873.

considered merely as an optical instrument, and of those more recent researches, which have shown that, in addition to retinal defects previously known, the eye is not perfectly corrected for either spherical or chromatic aberration, that the crystalline lens has by no means the perfect clearness it has been supposed to possess, and that its fibrous structure produces an irregular radiation in the image of any single bright point. "Now, it is not too much to say," continues the lecturer, "that if an optician wanted to sell me an instrument which had all these defects, I should think myself quite justified in blaming his carelessness in the strongest terms, and giving him back his instrument."\*

Every one who has any knowledge of theological controversy, will recollect how frequently the charge has been justly raised of unfairness of quotation; a single passage, detached from its context, often conveying a meaning altogether different from that which it bears when taken with its context, so that even "the Devil can cite Scripture for his purpose." Those who take the anti-theological side are specially bound, as it seems to me, to abstain from doing the very thing for which they would severely blame their opponents; and yet I have seldom met with a case so unfair as the citation of this statement without any of the qualifications which it subsequently receives. Thus, after showing that these defects scarcely reveal themselves in our ordinary vision,—some of them requiring most refined methods of observation for their detection,—Professor Helmholtz continues: "If I am asked why I have spent so much time in explaining the imperfection of the eye, I answer, as I said at first, that I have not done so in order to depreciate the performances of this wonderful organ, or to diminish our admiration of its construction. It was my object to make my readers understand, at the outset of our enquiry, that it is not any mechanical perfection of the organs of our senses which secures for us such wonderfully true and exact impressions of the outer world. The extraordinary value

\* *Popular Lectures*, p. 219.

of the eye depends on the way in which we use it : its perfection is practical, not absolute, consisting not in the avoidance of every error, but in the fact that all its defects do not prevent its rendering us the most important and varied services." This "practical perfection" he afterwards defines as "adaptation to the wants of the organism"; the defects of the eye as an optical instrument being "all so counteracted, that the inexactness of the image which results from their presence very little exceeds, under ordinary conditions of illumination, the limits which are set to the delicacy of sensation by the dimensions of the retinal cones."\*

An optical defect which has long been known to Ophthalmologists,—the inferiority in the sensitiveness of the retinal surface generally, to that of the central spot known as the *macula lutea*,—is shown by Professor Helmholtz to be fully compensated by the facility and rapidity with which we move the eye, in such a manner as to bring the image of the object, or of any part of the object, which we wish to examine minutely, upon this sensitive spot; whilst the field over which our vision ranges with sufficient distinctness to see our special object in combination with its surroundings, is far larger than is attainable in any optical instrument of human contrivance.

I venture to think, moreover, that my special experience as a Microscopist has given me the means of adding something to Professor Helmholtz's demonstration of the practical efficiency of the Eye.

Until recently, it has not been found possible by the most skilful constructors of the Microscope to produce object-glasses of high power and wide angular aperture, which should be perfectly free from both *spherical* and *chromatic* aberration. This, however, has recently been accomplished by what is called the 'oil-immersion' system; but the correction can only be perfectly made for a certain relative position of the conjugate foci;—that is, when the object is at the precise distance in front of the

\* *Ib.* p. 226.

lens, and its image is formed at the precise distance behind it, for which it is adjusted by the maker. Hence, the principal Continental constructor of these lenses, Zeiss, of Jena, makes two forms of each power: one for the short 8-inch body of the microscopes generally used on the Continent, and one for the long 10-inch English body. Neither of such object-glasses will work perfectly with a microscope of the other length. For, in order that its image may be projected at ten inches' distance, the object must be brought nearer to the objective than when its image is formed at eight inches' distance; and this diminution will sensibly disturb the performance, on the English Microscope, of the combination which was perfectly corrected for the Continental microscope; whilst a disturbance in the opposite direction will be produced by the increase of distance between the object and the objective, which becomes necessary when an objective corrected for the long English body is used with a short Continental microscope. These disturbances will alike affect the chromatic and the spherical aberration; and there is no known method by which they can be prevented. In fact, I believe I may say that it is demonstrable that no combination *could* be constructed, which should give perfectly aplanatic and achromatic images at different focal distances.

Mark, now, the superiority of the Eye. In its normal condition, this wonderful organ possesses a power to which no optical instrument of human construction can show the remotest parallelism,—that of *adjusting itself* to differences of focal distance. Thus, if I close one eye, and hold up my finger between my other eye and the clock at the far end of the room, I cannot see both of them distinctly at the same time, because, as they are at different distances from my eye, their pictures on my retina cannot both be distinct. But, without moving either my head or my eye, I can so 'focus' my eye on either as to see *it* distinctly, the *other* becoming hazy. This we all constantly do without the least knowledge of the mechanism by which it is

effected: and all that the most careful and refined investigation has revealed to the Physiologist, is that the focal adjustment is made by a change in the curvature of the crystalline lens; its curvature being increased when the rays that fall upon it are *more* divergent, because proceeding from a nearer object; and being diminished when the rays, proceeding from a more distant object, are *less* divergent;—so as in each case to bring them to a focus on the retina. This change of curvature is produced, it is believed, by the action of the ciliary muscle which surrounds the lens; but *how* that action is called forth we do not know. Indeed, we are quite unconscious that we are putting it into contraction. I simply determine, "I will look at the clock," or, "I will look at my finger," and my eye adjusts itself accordingly. If, on the other hand, I were to look with a Telescope, first at a watch-face a few feet off, and then at a church-clock at a distance, I should have to diminish the distance between the object-glass and the eye-piece; and I cannot conceive of any optical mechanism by which the telescope could be enabled to make this adjustment *for itself*. That the Eye should be provided with such a mechanism, has always seemed to me a most wonderful evidence of intelligent design; and the importance of this provision in our daily life is so great (as every one knows in whom it is even partially deficient\*), as to outweigh beyond all comparison the slight want of optical perfection, which—as I have already shown you—is inseparable from it.

Let us now turn our attention to the fact that it is only in the sensitive spot of the retina, the *macula lutea*, that we have the most perfect provision, in the elaborateness of its structure, for the reception and transmission of the visual picture. The 'rods,' and 'cones,' as they are called, of

\* While a person with good ordinary vision has a range of focal adjustment from six or eight inches (ten inches being the ordinary 'reading distance') to as many miles, that of a 'short-sighted' person is limited to near objects, and that of an elderly 'long-sighted' person to distant objects. A complete want of power to adjust the focus of the eyes is seldom met with; but sometimes occurs as one of the odd local paralyses often left for a time by an attack of Diphtheria.

that spot are much smaller than they are in any other part of the retinal surface; and our vision of objects whose picture falls upon it is proportionately distinct and minute. Now to me it seems that the inferior visual perfection of the rest of the retina, far from being disadvantageous, is a positive advantage. How completely the disadvantage is compensated by the facility with which we move our eyes, I have already shown in Professor Helmholtz's own words. The direction of their axes which is required to bring upon the *macula lutea* the image of any object at which we wish to look, is given without any conscious exertion of our own; we have only 'will' to look at the object, and the muscles of our eyes automatically bring their axes into convergence upon it. If you look at the eyes of a person who is reading or writing, you will see them move from left to right as he follows each line across the page, and then turn suddenly to the left again as he begins the next line; and yet he is not conscious of giving them any such direction. So, again, if we fix our gaze on any object, and move our head upwards or downwards, or from side to side, another person looking at our eyes will see them move in the opposite direction, so that their axes continue to point to the object at which we are looking.\* Now while the disadvantage of the limitation of distinct vision to the *macula lutea* is thus fully compensated, I hold that this limitation is positively advantageous in this way,—that we see the object, or the part of the object, at which we will to look, with *much greater distinctness* than we should do if the whole of the visual picture which we receive at one time were as complete and vivid as that portion of it which is formed on the central spot of the retina. For our *mental* receptivity of this picture depends upon the *attention* we give it; so that the more completely our attention is concentrated upon the thing at which we specially wish to look, the more distinctly

\* Any one may make this experiment for himself, by looking at his own eyes in a looking-glass, and moving his head either horizontally or vertically.



we see it. The Microscopist well knows the great advantage of limiting his field of view when he is examining objects of the greatest difficulty. And every one who has been accustomed to visit Picture-galleries is aware how much more fully he is able to appreciate a picture, when he looks at it in such a manner that its surroundings are kept out of his view.

To be able to bring our fullest measure of visual power to bear upon any object we desire to examine, and at the same time to see surrounding objects with sufficient distinctness for the recognition of their local relation to it, is, thus, far more advantageous to us, than would be the extension of that highest degree of visual power over the whole range at once. Here again, therefore, the asserted imperfection of the eye as an optical instrument proves to be the very contrary, when its structure and action are regarded in their relations to the use we make of the organ; added force being thus given to the final conclusion drawn by Professor Helmholtz, that "the adaptation of the eye to its function is most complete, and is seen in the very limits which are set to its defects" (p. 228).—Those who quote his previous statement for the purpose of depreciating the perfection of the organ, are bound in honesty to cite this also.

In the human Eye, then, as in the Walter printing-machine, we find a combination of a number of separate contrivances, each individually of the most elaborate kind, yet having most complete consentaneousness of action, all tending towards one common end, which is attained with a perfection not theoretically surpassable by our highest science. And the cumulative probability that the eye, like the machine, is the product of "intelligent design," though not logically demonstrative, has a cogency not inferior to the "moral certainties" on which we are accustomed to rely in the ordinary conduct of our lives.—This argument seems to me not to be in the least invalidated, but rather to be strengthened, by the fact that in the ascending series of animals we meet with eyes which, compared with ours, are very imperfect. Beginning at the bottom, we find a little

coloured spot, generally on some part of the surface of the animal, with a nerve-fibre proceeding from the central ganglion to that spot; and we judge this to be a rudimental organ of vision, by what we encounter as we proceed upwards. The next stage consists in the addition of something like a crystalline lens—a little, bright, pellucid particle on the end of the nerve-fibre, that seems by the concentration of luminous rays to intensify the sensation of light. We have strong reason to believe that Animals very low in the scale are guided by this sensation; not in the manner of Plants, whose *growth* towards light is accounted for by its physiological action on the formation of their tissues; but in *movements* directed by a conscious perception of light, resembling that of a nearly blind person who can just distinguish light from darkness. We find this direction towards light, and the avoidance of intervening obstacles, more and more obviously manifested in the movements of animals, as we pass upwards to higher forms of the visual organ. In front of the crystalline lens, we meet with a transparent film representing a cornea, separated from it by an anterior chamber; and behind it we come to distinguish a vitreous humour, covering an expansion of the nerve-fibre which is backed by a pigment layer. When we have arrived at this stage, seen in the 'simple eyes' of Insects, it is most beautiful to trace how the further ascent takes place along two distinct lines; one culminating in the 'compound eye' of the Insect, and the other in the single eye of the Vertebrate animal, of which that of the predaceous birds is, perhaps, the highest type.

The 'compound eye' of the Insect, as you all know, is, in its typical form, an almost hemispherical mass projecting from the side of the head, which is made up of a number of separate 'eyelets' of nearly cylindrical form, whose several axes are directed radially towards the spheroidal surface. Each 'eyelet' consists of a number of different components which appear to correspond with those of our single eye; probably giving an achromatic character to the minute picture formed by its refractive action. But each can

receive only those rays of light, whose direction corresponds with that of its own axis; and as the eye of the insect is immovable, no eyelet can be made to turn towards any particular object. By the multiplication of these eyelets, however, and the radial direction in which they are fixed, the aggregate 'compound eye' will have a range fully equal, and probably superior, to that of any single eye constructed on the Vertebrate plan. In some Butterflies and Dragon-flies, each 'compound eye' is made up of many thousands of these 'eyelets,' the individual 'corneules' of which give the 'facetted' appearance presented by the exterior of the aggregate mass; whilst the inner extremities of the cylinders abut upon a bulbous expansion of the optic nerve, from which a filament proceeds to each of them. Now we seem fully justified by observation of the movements of Insects, in concluding that these are guided by visual perceptions of external objects not less distinct than our own. And it seems probable, therefore, that the action of the compound eye is to impress the sensorium of the insect with a single picture, corresponding to that which is formed upon our own retina, though received through a very differently constructed instrument. Modern investigations, moreover, have shown that the difference is rather apparent than real. For it is now known that the retinal layer of the human eye is not a mere spreading-out of the fibres of the optic nerve; but that in front of these terminal fibres is a layer of 'rods' and 'cones' on which the retinal picture is formed. Thus, the visual picture which our mind receives from either retina, is made up (so to speak) of the aggregate of the visual impressions made separately and individually upon each of its 'rods' and 'cones,' and—through these—upon the individual fibres of the optic nerve on which they severally impinge. And thus what may be called the 'mechanism' of our own vision, is really analogous to that of the vision of the Insect. In fact, it would now seem probable that the 'rods' and 'cones' of our own retina are really homologous with similar structures contained in the cylin-

drical 'eyelets' of the insect; so that the difference between its 'compound eye' and our own 'single eye' lies only in the arrangement of the parts of the recipient nerve-structure. Whilst *we* have a single refractive apparatus for the whole retinal area, by which a continuous picture is thrown upon its entire expanse, the Insect has a separate refractive apparatus for each of its retinal elements; but as the retinal elements themselves are essentially the same in both cases, we may fairly presume that the resulting visual sensation, which the Insect receives by the combination of their separate actions, corresponds closely with our own. That in the Insect the same effect is produced by *multiplication of parts*, as is produced in ourselves by their *concentration in a single apparatus*, is altogether conformable to their general type of organisation. And it seems to me greatly to strengthen the argument of "intention," that a similar perfection of adaptiveness should be attained by the working-up of the same elementary materials on two different methods of construction, in accordance with the general plan of Articulates and Vertebrates respectively. With regard to those more simple forms of visual apparatus which *we* regard as inferior or rudimentary, it is to be borne in mind that they prove no less suitable than our own to the requirements of the animals which possess them, and are therefore *equally perfect in their kind*. All the wants of the Leech, for example, are provided for by its very simply-constructed eyes; and it would have no use whatever for the elaborately-constructed eyes of the actively-flying Insect,—the evolution of the visual organs in the animal series showing a close relation to that of the locomotive apparatus.

Further evidence of 'intelligent design' is supplied by the history of the development of any one of the highest forms of the Eye, such as that of the Chick *in ovo*. For it has been ascertained by the careful study of this process, that the complete organ is the joint product of two distinct developmental actions, taking place in opposite directions,—a growing-inwards from the skin—and a growing-outwards

from the brain: the former supplying the optical instrument for the formation of the visual picture, and the latter furnishing the nervous apparatus on which this is received, and by which its impression is conveyed to the sensorium. A hollow, pear-shaped projection is sent out from the division of the brain called the mesencephalon; the narrowed neck or stalk of which afterwards becomes the optic nerve, whilst its expanded portion, pressed back into a concavity, becomes the retina. At the same time, an inward growth takes place from the skin, at first strongly resembling that which gives origin to a hair-follicle; a sinking-in of the surface of the dermis or true skin, being accompanied by an increased development of its epidermic cells. This depression deepens into a round pit, the lower part of which expands whilst its orifice contracts, so as to form a closed globular cavity, which is at last completely shut off from the exterior. This cavity is lined by epidermic cells, out of which the crystalline lens is ultimately formed; the derm on which they rest becomes its capsule; and the loose tissue which underlies the derm becomes the vitreous humour. The back of the globe thus formed, meeting the pear-shaped projection of the brain, pushes it, as it were, inwards; and thus derives from it the retinal investment which is necessary to bring the Optical apparatus into relation with the Nervous centres. Neither of these developmental processes would be of any use without the other. It is only by the conjunction of the two, that this most perfect and elaborate instrument is brought into existence.

I have now put before you the original Argument from Design, as set forth by Paley, expanded by the more advanced knowledge of the present time. That this argument, based on the combination of adaptations presented in the structure of each Organic type—considered as a 'special creation'—to the external conditions of its existence, needs now to be reconstructed under the new light of the Evolution-doctrine, must be freely admitted

by those who (like myself) maintain it to be still tenable. And I have now to inquire how it is affected, first by the acceptance of the doctrine of Evolution taken *per se*; and secondly by the explanation supposed to be given of that Evolution by attributing it to 'Natural Selection.'

I can best bring you to my own mode of viewing this question, by first leading you to consider how it has been affected by the substitution of our present knowledge of the Evolution of any one of the higher types from its protoplasmic germ-particle, for the old notion that this germ-particle is a miniature representation of the mature embryo, into which it has only to expand by growth. The primordial 'jelly-speck' in the Fowl's egg during the progress of its development into the fully-formed chick, passes through a succession of phases, of which the first represents that lowest or most homogeneous type of organisation which is common to the simplest Plants and the simplest Animals,—the second, one which is distinctively Animal,—the third, one which is distinctively Vertebrate,—the fourth, one which is distinctively Oviparous,—and the fifth, one which is distinctively Ornithic,—while the peculiarities of the special Bird family to which it belongs are the last to make their appearance. Thus, in the language of the great Embryologist, Von Bär, to whom we owe this splendid generalisation, its evolution consists in a gradual progress *from the general to the special*, or, as Herbert Spencer would say, from the *homogeneous* to the *heterogeneous*.

Now if, in examining the structure of a typical Bird, we find evidences of 'design' in the wonderful adaptation of its clothing of feathers alike to keep-in the warmth of the body, and to sustain it in its flight through the air,—in that organisation of its heart and lungs which enable them to keep-up the energetic circulation and respiration required for the maintenance of a high standard of muscular activity,—in those arrangements of the skeleton and muscular apparatus which give support and motion to the expanded wings,—in the adaptation of the eye to that acute and far-ranging vision which is needed for the guidance of

its actions,—and in many other provisions I might enumerate,—I affirm, without any doubt of your assent, that this evidence is not in the least degree invalidated by the discovery that the germ-particle is not a miniature bird, but a protoplasmic ‘jelly-speck.’ In its capacity for ‘evolution’ into the complete type, the germ-particle is just as much ‘potentially’ the Bird, as if it could become one by merely swelling out.

So, if we go back in thought to the origin of the Race, as we can by actual observation to that of the individual, the old conception of ‘design’ which was based on the idea of an original Bird-creation does not lose any of its applicability, if we find reason to believe that the *original* progenitor was a protoplasmic ‘jelly-speck,’ certain of whose descendants have passed through a series of forms progressively improving in structure and capacity, and culminating in the perfected Bird. We merely substitute for the idea of continuous uniform descent, that of the ‘progressive development’ of the race, as representing the mode in which our present Bird has come to be; deeming the latter the more probable, because we find it correspond with the embryonic history of every Bird now existing. The original progenitor was just as ‘potentially’ the Race, whether called into existence as a protoplasmic ‘jelly-speck,’ or as a fully-developed Bird. And the evidences of ‘design,’ which on the doctrine of ‘special creations’ we find in the construction of the original Bird, and in the provision for the continuous propagation of its own type, we equally find in the production of the original ‘jelly-speck,’ and in the evolutionary process by which the very lowest type of organisation has been progressively elevated to one of the highest. The marvellous succession of changes by which a Chick is evolved from the germ-spot of the fowl’s egg in the short period of two and twenty days, assuredly does not become less worthy of our admiration, if looked at as the abbreviated repetition of one which has extended continuously over millions of years.

Let us now consider this question, not in regard to any



particular species of Bird, but in regard to the Class as a whole,—consisting, as it does at the present time, of many thousands of reputed 'species,' each of them possessing some particular adaptation to its own conditions of existence, and hence regarded (according to our former ideas) as a separate product of Creative Design.

Every Zoologist is aware that the structure of all Birds conforms so closely to a common type, as to make it difficult to divide the class into subordinate groups characterised by well-marked distinctions. For these distinctions almost entirely rest on the comparative development, or peculiar shaping, of organs which all alike possess. I remember that on remarking to my friend, Professor Milne Edwards (the successor of Cuvier as the official head of French Naturalists), soon after the publication of the *Origin of Species*, that I could very well believe that all Birds had descended from a common ancestry, he replied, "I regard Birds zoologically as constituting but a single family;"—meaning that their diversities of structure are not greater than those which we find among the members of many single families of Mammals or Reptiles. Now if we find adequate grounds for the belief that all the Birds which now exist, or ever have existed, are the descendants of a common progenitor, and that the special peculiarities of each type have arisen in the course of their 'descent with modification,' the adaptiveness of each resultant organism is not less an evidence of design, because the aggregate result has been wrought out through a continuous passage from the general type to the special, instead of having been elaborated in all its completeness in the first instance. If the original Bird was so constructed as to be capable not only of engendering its own type, but of giving origin by genetic succession to all the diversified forms under which the Ornithic type has presented itself, we must regard that progenitor as 'potentially' the entire Class, and as endowed with a capacity for producing the whole aggregate of 'adaptations' presented by its individual members. At each stage in the progress of differentiation, we have

thus precisely the same evidence of 'design,' as if the entire set of specific types had been turned out complete (as it were) by their Maker's hand in the first instance; and the substitution of the idea of progressive divarication from a common Bird-type, for that of the original multiplicity and continuous transmission of separate types, thus involves no other modification in the mode of presenting the argument, than the replacement of paroxysmal exertion by continuous orderly operation,—a change which brings it into conformity with the accredited Evolutionary history of the Physical Universe.

It is freely admitted by Mr. Darwin that it is by analogy only that we are led to regard the progenitors of the great divisions of the Animal and Vegetable Kingdoms as having themselves had a common origin; but if we go along with him as far as we have now done, we can scarcely stop short of that conclusion. For as we know that the primitive germ-particles from which Birds or Mammals now spring are not distinguishable by any recognisable differences from those in which Rhizopods or Zoophytes originate,—the special 'potentiality' of each only manifesting itself in the progress of its development,—so it seems more in accordance with Nature's Order, that the distinctions between the fundamental types of Animal organisation should have arisen, like those of their subordinate divisions, by 'descent with modification,' than by 'special creations' of their several progenitors. Accepting provisionally, then, the doctrine of Evolution in this widest sense, as implying the common origin of the whole Organised Creation—past and present—from a single stock, we shall find that no further modification will be required in the form in which I have put the Argument from Design, than such as gives it yet further range and greater comprehensiveness. For we must then regard our one ancestral germ-particle as endowed with a 'potentiality' of progressive development, that has been equal to the peopling of our Globe with all that vast variety of living creatures, by some or other of which it has been inhabited through all save the remotest periods of it

ever-changing history to the present time. That this progressive development has taken place according to an orderly succession, the study of which will ultimately enable us to frame 'laws' that shall express the conditions of the 'perturbations' as well of the 'uniformities' of genetic descent, is the belief of every Philosophic Biologist. But when Biological Science shall have reached this elevated point, it will have revealed to us only the Order of the Evolutionary process, leaving us still to seek for its Cause. But how much grander a conception of that Order do we obtain, when we are thus led to regard it as embodied in one original Design continuously working itself out through the ages, in constant harmony with the changes contemporaneously taking place in the condition of the Terrestrial surface, than when we suppose it to have needed successive interpositions for re-adaptation to those changes as they successively occurred!

But, it is affirmed, there is nothing in this adaptation that cannot be accounted for by 'Natural Selection.' As changes took place in their 'environment,' variations occurred in the living inhabitants; some of these were favourable to their new conditions, some were the reverse; the fittest survived, the unfit became extinct; and thus those 'adaptations' came about in the natural course of things, for which Theologians have needlessly invoked the 'design' of a *Deus ex machinâ*. In one of those most able expositions of the doctrine of the *Origin of Species by Natural Selection*, by which Prof. Huxley very early impressed the educated public with the scientific value of the new views which Mr. Darwin had opened out, he remarked that nothing had more strongly impressed him than the fact that they had completely disposed of the old teleological argument; the adaptations in organised structures which had been regarded as evidences of 'design,' being sufficiently accounted-for as results of the 'survival of the fittest.' And this view of the case has

been so zealously adopted by some of the younger advocates of the doctrine, that they have gone the length of representing the Plants and Animals which exhibit them, as having *made themselves* for the purposes which their organisation is found to answer,—as if *they* had the intelligent design which is denied to an universal Creator. When challenged to justify that language, they represent it as merely “figurative”; their intention being only to show that as Natural Selection gives a sufficient account of the adaptiveness, there is no need to seek for any other explanation of it.

But to me it seems that Prof. Huxley and his followers in this line of argument have entirely overlooked the consideration, that before Natural Selection among varietal forms could come into operation, there must have been varieties to select from,—that for the ‘fittest’ to have survived, they must have *come to possess* the structure that made them the fittest. It was very early pointed out that ‘Natural Selection’ only expresses a *general fact*, and can in no sense be accounted a *vera causa*; and this, in his later years, Mr. Darwin showed himself quite willing to admit. In what I believe to be his last public utterance on the subject, he spoke of the Causes of Variation as at present the greatest problem of Biological Science; and the greater our success in the investigation of it, the more surely—I feel convinced—shall we recognise the evidences of an originating Design. While the argument is carried back—exactly as by the determination of the ‘laws’ of the Celestial motions—a stage nearer to the primal source, its basis is extended, and its upward reach elevated. In the admirable language of Dr. Martineau, “The Law of ‘natural selection,’ instead of dispensing with anterior causation, “and enabling the Animal races to be their own Providence “and do all their own work, distinctly testifies to the constitution of a world pre-arranged for progress, externally “spread with large choice of conditions, and with internal “provisions for seizing and realising the best.”

The life of every Organised structure, from the lowest to

the highest, consists in a series of physical interactions between itself and its environment; these interactions being maintained by certain physical forces, and requiring certain material supplies. The simplest Algal protophytes, under the influence of light and a moderate degree of heat, can manufacture their own food out of the inorganic components of Air and Water; and can thus flourish at all ordinary temperatures, wherever they can get an adequate supply of these elements. Most of the higher Plants, on the other hand, whilst still capable of generating out of Air and Water the organic materials which they require for their own sustenance, need also to be supplied with certain special mineral substances; and will only flourish within certain limits of temperature. Moreover, as Mr. Darwin has shown us, many of them require the agency of Insects for the fertilisation of their ovules; and cannot reproduce themselves by seeds where that agency is not supplied. But the aggregate of these physical conditions constitutes only a part of the *cause* of the Plant's growth: there must be an aptitude on the part of the organism itself to turn them to account; and of the source of that aptitude, we at present know nothing whatever. Some Plants can adapt themselves in a much greater degree than others, to differences in external conditions; that adaptation involving some modification of their own structure. "What," said Prof. Lindley, fifty years ago, "is a 'common' plant, but "one which can grow and propagate itself in almost any "kind of soil, and under almost every range of temperature; and what is a 'rare' plant, but one which cannot "flourish and produce seed, except under certain special "conditions?" Every Botanist knows that among our own wild plants, *Rosa*, *Rubus*, and *Salix* are alike the most 'variable,' and the most 'common' types; 'common,' because they have the capacity for adapting themselves to different conditions of growth; 'variable,' because of the influence of those varying conditions upon their organisation. Out of the forms of Rose, Bramble, and Willow, ranked as 'varietal' by Mr. Bentham, our ablest

student of them, previous systematists had created more than three hundred 'species.'

Take, again, the influence of cultivation. There is no more remarkable example of the alteration produced by more abundant supply of food and more regulated temperature, than that exhibited in the development of the wild *Brassica oleracea*, a rambling sea-shore plant, into the various kinds of cabbage, broccoli, and cauliflower. Why will not culture produce the like effect upon other plants? It is quite illogical to say that this transformation has been the effect of 'physical causes,' when the most essential factor in that entire 'aggregate of antecedents,' which (according to J. S. Mill) constitutes the 'cause,' is the 'unknown quantity' which we designate as the 'constitution' of the organism itself. As I have already pointed out, we do not get any nearer to the explanation of this constitution by tracing it backwards ancestrally; for supposing *Rosa*, *Rubus*, *Salix*, and *Brassica* to have derived their respective peculiarities by 'natural selection' from among previous varieties, the question recurs,—Whence those varietal modifications? No physical agencies can be assigned, at any stage whatever of the descent, as an adequate account of them; since, for those agencies to take effect, there must have been a concurrent capacity for variation, either in the organism itself, or in its germ, in virtue of which its varietal forms were engendered. The necessity for this factor is evinced by the negative results of its deficiency, shown in the 'rareness' of many wild plants, and the unconquerable resistance made by others to all improvement by cultivation.

Precisely the same thing obtains in the Animal Kingdom. The lowest *Protozoa*, of which *Amæba* is the type, find in every pond the organic materials which they require for their sustenance; and live and multiply under all ordinary ranges of temperature. But most Animals of high organisation require particular kinds of food: some being purely carnivorous, others purely herbivorous; whilst others, like Man, are omnivorous, and are thereby enabled to

sustain themselves on a greater variety of alimentary substances. So, again, all the higher types of Animals need an elevated temperature for the maintenance of their activity; but while the 'cold-blooded,' as Insects and Reptiles, are entirely dependent upon the temperature of the medium they inhabit, and are therefore reduced to a state of torpidity by its depression, 'warm-blooded' Birds and Mammals carry their heating furnaces about with them, and are thus in great degree independent of depressions in external temperature. Yet even with this advantage, we find the whole Quadrumanous order and the larger Carnivora, as well as the (existing) Elephant, Rhinoceros, and Hippopotamus, restricted to tropical or sub-tropical climates; none of them being able to resist the winter cold of the temperate zone. In striking contrast with their limitation of range is that of our 'domesticated' animals, especially Dogs and Cats, Sheep and Oxen, Asses and Horses; all of which possess more or less adaptability to a wide range of climatic and other conditions, while the original (or supposed original) type of each becomes the subject of numerous varietal modifications. Some of these are distinctly *adaptive*, rendering the animals that exhibit them more fit to sustain themselves in the new conditions in which Man's agency (directly or indirectly exerted) has placed them; whilst others are as distinctly *non-adaptive*, rendering the animals *less* fit to maintain their existence if left to take care of themselves, although perpetuated by Man's 'artificial selection' as either useful or pleasing to himself.

In these varying capabilities of particular races, then, we must recognise—no less than in the ordinary characters proper to each race—the constitutional factor which extends the range of some, and limits that of others, so that the physical agencies to which the former show themselves amenable, have no similar effect upon the latter. If we say that the unknown cause of the variability of the one, or of the invariability of the other, lies in the 'properties' of the germ of each,—whether that of its immediate progenitor,



or of the primordial ancestor of both,—we really get no nearer to an explanation of it, than we do by calling the former *x* and the latter *y*. There is no Family in the whole Mammalian series, of which the members are more closely similar in the essential parts of their conformation, than the *Cat* tribe; the Lion, Tiger, Panther, Leopard, Puma, and Jaguar, differing in little else than stature and hairy covering, and the domestic Cat being but a reduced copy of the general type. What it was in its original wild state, is not certainly known; many races of 'wild cats' being pretty certainly descendants of the domesticated stock. In virtue, however, of its adaptability to a lower range of temperature, *Felis catus* has established itself where neither *Felis leo* nor any other of the larger (existing) cats can keep itself alive; but whence did it get this adaptability? Suppose it to be replied, that, being a smaller species than the rest, it was very early brought under the influence of Man; and that as the people who domesticated it extended themselves further and further north of their original home, successive generations came to adapt themselves to greater and yet greater degrees of winter cold,—the question still recurs, whence this *ancestral adaptability*?

The influence of physical conditions in modifying the constitution is well known to be most strongly exerted during the earlier period of life; for as long as the organism is in process of development, it will *grow to* its environment, as it will not do at a later epoch, when it will either resist or succumb. We are told by Sir Charles Lyell that the Cornish miners who went out some sixty years ago to work the Real del Monte mines in Mexico, took out some greyhounds to hunt the hares which abound on the elevated *plateaux* of that country; but that, in consequence of the rarefied condition of the air, the dogs could not continue the chase, but lay down panting for breath. The offspring of those dogs, however, brought up at this elevation, were able to run down the hares as well as if both had been on a lower level. The constitution of the young dogs adapted itself to the environment in which they grew up; but

whence that adaptability? We do not find it in any but *living organisms*; no physical property gives the least account of it.

The most remarkable example with which I am acquainted, of the effect of physical conditions in modifying the developmental process, is that which is seen in the economy of the Hive-bee. It is well known that whenever, from any cause, a community wants a queen, a worker-grub at an early stage is selected; a 'royal cell' is constructed round it, several ordinary cells being demolished for the purpose, and their contained grubs killed; the selected grub is fed with 'royal jelly' instead of with 'bee-bread'; and (it seems probable) a higher temperature is maintained by the incessant activity of the bees which cluster about the royal nursery. In due time a perfect 'queen' comes forth, differing from the 'worker' not merely in the completeness of its reproductive apparatus, but in the conformation of its jaws and antennæ, the absence of 'pollen-baskets' on the thighs, and yet more remarkably in its instincts. Now it is obviously no explanation of this extraordinary transformation to say that every worker grub is a 'potential' queen; because the attributing this 'potentiality' to it is only another way of expressing the fact that it can be so transformed. The existence of the 'potentiality,' and of the wonderful instinct that leads the worker-bees to act upon it, are not less evidences of 'design,' because physical agencies are needed to call them into exercise.

A familiar instance of adaptiveness between the conformation of animals and their environment, is the possession by Birds and Mammals inhabiting the Polar regions, of a tegumentary covering that serves to keep-in the warmth of their bodies, the former being provided with an under-clothing of down, the latter with a thick close fur; whilst, on the contrary, many of the larger quadrupeds inhabiting the torrid zone show a marked deficiency, or even entire absence, of hairy covering. Now this is the more remarkable, because the ordinary effect of external warmth is to

increase, and of external cold to diminish, the determination of blood to the skin; of which we see the effects alike in the increase of perspiration, and in the more rapid growth of the hair and nails during summer. Yet I have myself seen in Southdown sheep, which had been transported only two years previously to the West Indies, the thick covering of wool replaced by short crisp hair, scarcely distinguishable from that of the goats which had inhabited the island for several generations; and the hottest parts of the South American Pampas are inhabited by breeds of cattle (the descendants of those introduced by the Spaniards), of which some are nearly, and others quite, destitute of hair, and which cannot live in the more temperate air of the slopes of the Andes. It seems clear, then, that this adaptation results from some direct physical action of temperature on the constitution of the animals; and yet (like the expansion of water in cooling from  $39^{\circ}2'$  to  $32^{\circ}$ ) it is in direct opposition to a very general law.

The same may be said of the winter whitening of the fur and plumage of Arctic mammals and birds. For although this (like the preceding) has been adduced as an example of 'natural selection,'—the white varieties surviving because they escape being seen upon ground whitened by snow,—yet there must have been some cause for the production of the white varieties; and it has been the experience of some of our Arctic voyagers, that the winter whitening could be retarded by keeping the animals in a warm cabin, but took place in a few hours when they were put out into air whose temperature was considerably below zero.

Supposing, then, that we could trace out all the *physical* conditions under which these adaptations come to be, we have still to account for the adaptiveness in the *constitution of the animals* which exhibit them.

We find a singularly parallel case in that beautiful piece of human workmanship,—a clock or chronometer so constructed, as, by the accurate 'compensation' of its pendulum or balance-wheel, to keep accurate time under all

ordinary variations of climatic temperature. Surely we do not consider it a sufficient account of its self-adjustment, to attribute it to the physical action of heat or cold; for this would disturb the performance of an ordinary clock or watch. We seek the explanation of its special 'potentiality' in the compensating apparatus; and we trace back the origin of this apparatus to the mind of its contriver. So, as it seems to me, however long may be the chain of 'causation,' or the series of 'unconditional sequences,' that may be traceable backwards in the ancestral history of any organised type, we come to a *beginning* of it, as to the first term of an arithmetical or geometrical progression; and we have no less to account for the common beginning of the whole Organised Creation, with its unlimited possibilities of modification and adaptation, than if we had to account for the separate production of each type of Plant and Animal.

I shall introduce one more curious illustration of my argument, from a department of inquiry well worthy of systematic study,—the influence of *psychical* conditions on the *colour* of animals. The advocates of 'natural selection' as an all-sufficient explanation of the correspondence between the gorgeous hues of tropical Birds and Insects, and the brilliant foliage and blossoms of the trees in the midst of which they live, altogether neglect to tell us how those varieties came to be engendered, the conformity of whose colours to those of their environment made them the 'fittest' to survive. The story of Jacob and Laban shows the antiquity of the belief that some influence exerted by the colour of the 'environment' on the visual sense of the parents, affects the colour of the progeny; and this belief seems justified by modern observation. Thus, the Dingo, or wild dog of Australia (probably the descendant of some domesticated race originally introduced thither by Man), has a uniform dull brown hue; but when the parents have been brought by domestication into a more varied environment, the pups vary in colour,—as has been often seen in the Zoological Gardens. The breeders of the polled Angus—a particular race of black cattle in Scotland—who

make a great point of keeping up the perfect uniformity of their blackness, getting rid of every individual that has even a single white foot—take care to have everything black about their farmsteads: all the buildings are black, the horses are black, the dogs are black, the fowls are black. No breeder will have anything coloured or white about his place. Though no account can be given of the physiological action which makes these precautions effective (as they are asserted to be) in securing the desired result, yet I am strongly inclined to think that some influence of this kind is concerned in producing many singular correspondences between the surface-aspect of Fishes and Crustacea inhabiting shallow waters, and the characters of the bottoms on which they live. Every angler for trout is familiar with variations of this kind; and I have been assured of cases in which these fish, when transferred from one part of a stream to another, were found in no long time to have undergone a change in surface-markings, which gave them the same conformity to the new bottom as they previously had to the old. I once found in a pool on the sea-shore some small Fishes and shrimp-like Crustaceans, the hue of whose surface so exactly resembled that of the yellow sand speckled with black that formed the bottom and sides of the pool, that the closest watching scarcely enabled me to distinguish them; and I found, on microscopic examination of their respective integuments, that their colouration was due in both alike to the presence of large yellow pigment-cells, with small black ones interspersed. Hence, even if we attribute this singularly close adaptation to 'natural selection,' we have just as much to account for the development of the peculiar pigmentation in the variety—alike of the Fish and of the Crustacean—that exhibited it, as if we believed these animals to have been originally created with it. And if we prefer to believe, as I am myself disposed to do, that in all these instances the colour of the environment is reproduced by some sort of physiological reflexion in the integument of the animal (the *psychical* impression, as in numerous other cases, reacting in a *physical* change), we have still to

account for the peculiarity of constitution which made those particular races amenable to that influence.

I trust that I have now satisfied you of the validity of the position I took up in the first instance, that "natural selection" does not—as has been affirmed—effectually dispose of the teleological argument, by reducing adaptiveness to an accidental conformity between the capacities of the 'fittest' and the external conditions of their existence. That conformity cannot exist, unless the beings possessed of it have previously come into existence. There is no such thing as 'accidental' variation. A departure from the rule that 'like produces like,' never takes place without a cause. If it should happen that a variation is—under the circumstances—injurious rather than beneficial, it would not be right to call it 'aimless'; for it may be no less perfectly adapted to conditions which exist elsewhere, than is that variation which gives to the race that possesses it an advantage in the struggle for existence. If a Highland cow were to produce a hairless calf which could not stand the winter cold, or a Pampas cow were to bear a calf with a thick shaggy covering of hair which would unfit it for its tropical habitat, none the less should we recognise the *general* adaptiveness between each race and its climatic environment, and see the evidence of 'design' in the provision for thus peopling almost every country in which Man can maintain his existence, with races of Oxen serving for his support.

I have now, in fine, to ask you to follow me through an entirely different line of argument. All the variations among which "natural selection" can be shown to have any effective operation, have reference to comparatively insignificant modifications of structure. Let us grant, for the sake of argument, that all past and present modifications of the original Bird type may have thus arisen. But on the mode in which that singularly-specialised *type* came

into existence,—in which that most wonderful feature of its organisation, the feather, arose out of the scaly covering of its Reptilian ancestors,—in which its heart came to be divided into four chambers instead of three, and the arrangement of its blood-vessels altered accordingly, in the establishment of the ‘complete double circulation,’ that insures the perfect aëration of the blood needed for the maintenance of the extraordinary muscular energy by which the feathered wings can sustain the body in flight,—I cannot see that “natural selection” throws the least light. There is, as I have already pointed out, an adaptation in the several parts of the structure of the Bird, not only to one general result, but to a consensaneous action in bringing about that result, which shows itself to be more complete, the more closely it is scrutinised. And on the hypothesis of “natural selection” among ‘aimless’ variations, I think it could be shown that the probability is infinitely small, that the progressive modifications required in the structure of each individual organ to convert a Reptile into a Bird, could have taken place without disturbing the required harmony in their combined action; nothing but intentional pre-arrangement being competent to bring about such a result. And the point on which I now wish to fix your attention, is the evidence of such pre-arrangement that is furnished by the *orderly sequence of variations following definite lines of advance*.

I shall illustrate this, in the first place, by a general outline of a Memoir which I last year presented to the Royal Society, in which I embodied the final results (as relating to this subject) of an inquiry on which I had been engaged for forty years into the organisation of the *Foraminifera*; a group of marine animals of the simplest protoplasmic nature, which yet form for themselves shelly coverings of singular regularity and complexity of structure, the aggregation of whose remains forms many important Limestone-strata (as the Nummulitic limestone of which the Pyramids are built, and the Miliolite limestone which has



furnished the chief building material of Paris), whilst Chalk is a product of their disintegration. My studies of this group began with a comparatively gigantic type called the *Orbitolite*; which is a shelly disk, sometimes attaining the diameter of an inch, living at the present time on the coast of Australia, the Fiji reefs, and other Pacific shores, and found fossil in the early Tertiary limestones of the North of France, one bed of which is in great degree formed of an accumulation of disks very similar to those now piling




FIG. I.

Shelly Disk of *Orbitolites complanata*, showing concentric rings of chamberlets, arranged round a central nucleus.

themselves up near its Antipodes. I was supplied, moreover, with a series of smaller disks (chiefly picked out of shore-sands), down to an almost microscopic minuteness, but agreeing with the larger in this fundamental feature of their structure,—the arrangement of their mutually connected 'chamberlets' in successive circles round a central 'nucleus,' their plan of growth being thus *cyclical*. This plan is most fully carried out in typical specimens of the

large *Orbitolites complanata* (Fig. I); in which the 'sarcodic nucleus,' consisting of a flask-shaped 'primordial segment,' *a*, Fig. II., and of a 'circumambient segment,' *b*, *b*<sup>1</sup>, *c*, is at once surrounded by a complete ring of sub-segments, separately budded-off from it; successive rings, with constantly increasing numbers of sub-segments, being in like manner budded-off around the outer border of their predecessors, sometimes to the number of 100. The shell, moulded upon this composite body, thus acquires the very regular discoidal form shown in Fig. I.; and its vertical thickness usually increases from its centre towards its circumference. A vertical section of the disk (Fig. III., 2) shows that the chamberlets visible on its two surfaces form two superficial layers, which communicate with continuous annular galleries that lie just beneath them (Fig. III., 3, *d*', *d*''), every chamberlet, *a*, opening at each end into one of these galleries; whilst the intermediate part of the disk is occupied by columnar chamberlets (*b*, *b*), which open at either end into the annular galleries, and are connected with each other by several ranges of oblique passages (*e*, *e*, *f*, *f*). The passages proceeding outwards from the last-formed ring, open on the margin of the disk as pores arranged in more or less regular vertical series (Fig. III., 1); and these pores constitute the only means of communication between the complicated cavitary system of the disks, and the surrounding waters from which the animal that inhabits them draws its nutriment. The substance of this animal is apparently altogether protoplasmic. Notwithstanding this complexity in the structure of the disk, there is not the least trace of differentiation in the contents of the several series of chamberlets. On the contrary, there is every reason to believe that a continuous interchange must be always going on between the proto-




FIG. II.

Central Portion of Animal  
Body of *Orbitolites complanata*.

plasmic substance of the central and that of the peripheral parts of the disk ; so that the nutriment taken in by the 'pseudopodial' extensions which the latter puts forth through the marginal pores, may be diffused through the whole multiple series of sub-segments, of which the body




FIG. III.

Structure of Shelly Disk of *Orbitolites complanata*.

1. Edge of Disk, showing multiple series of marginal pores.
2. Vertical Section, showing two superficial planes of chamberlets, separated by intermediate columnar structure.
3. Internal Structure:—*a*, superficial chamberlets; *b, b*, columnar chamberlets of intermediate layer; *c*, floors of superficial chamberlets, showing the opening at each end into the annular gallery beneath; *d*, annular galleries cut transversely; *d', d''*, annular galleries laid open longitudinally; *e, f, f'*, oblique stolon passages of intermediate layer.

of this organism consists. This I characterised as the 'complex' type of *Orbitolite* structure.

The minute disks picked out of shore-sands, however, were found to present a much simpler plan of structure; the chamberlets being arranged in a single plane around the central nucleus, those of each ring being connected by a single annular gallery, and their openings at the margin




FIG. IV.

Disk of Simple Type of *Orbitolite*.

1. Surface of Disk, showing later growth of concentric rings of chamberlets around a first-formed spire.
2. Central portion enlarged.
3. Edge of Disk, showing single row of marginal pores.
4. Vertical Section, showing succession of chamberlets communicating with each other radially by passages in the annular partitions, and laterally by the annular canals, whose sections are seen as dark spots.

forming but a single row of pores (Fig. IV., 1, 3, 4). The arrangement of the first-formed chamberlets, moreover, presented a singular departure from the cyclical plan, showing a distinctly *spiral* disposition (Fig. IV., 2); the

mouth of the spire, however, rapidly opening out by successive additions, so as to enclose the 'nucleus'; after which all succeeding additions were complete rings, so that the cyclical plan came to be completely established.—This I designated as the 'simple' type of *Orbitolite* structure.

I was further able to show that these two typical forms were connected by a gradational series of connecting links; the formation of disks of the 'complex' type often commencing on a plan resembling that of the 'simple'; and the change from the latter to the former taking place, not at any fixed epoch of growth, but after a variable number of rings had been formed, sometimes abruptly, sometimes more gradually, in the manner to be presently detailed. And I also found that the inner rings of even the largest 'complex' disks, if their early growth had taken place on the 'simple' type, were not complete, but showed a tendency to one-sided and therefore spiral growth, like that seen in Fig. VI., 3.

Reflecting on the relations of these highly specialised Foraminiferal types to the simpler forms of the *Milioline* group, to which (in virtue of the 'porcellaneous' character of their shells) I referred them, I ventured to construct a hypothetical pedigree; tracing their descent (Fig. V.) from the particle of protoplasm that forms the spheroidal chamber in which every Foraminiferal shell begins, first to an open undivided spiral (1); then to a type in which the spire is constricted at intervals (2); then to a type in which it is completely divided into chambers by transverse partitions (3); then to a type in which the spirally arranged chambers are divided by longitudinal partitions into chamberlets (4); then to the 'simple' type of *Orbitolites*, in which the spiral plan of growth gives place to the cyclical (5); then to an 'intermediate' type, in which the original spiral almost disappears (6); and finally to the 'complex' type, in which the plan is cyclical from the beginning (7).

This hypothetical pedigree has found its complete confirmation in a deep-sea *Orbitolite* of extraordinary delicacy

and beauty, which was brought up in the *Porcupine Expedition* of 1869. For this little disk, about the size of a fourpenny piece, while for the most part truly cyclical,




FIG. V.

Diagram illustrating the Pedigree of the Complex type of *Orbitolite*.

1. Simple undivided Spire of *Cornuspira*.
2. Partially interrupted Spire of *Spiroloculina*.
3. Spire of *Peneroplis*, divided by partitions into chambers.
4. Spire of *Orbiculina*, its chambers divided into rows of chamberlets.
5. Disk of 'simple' *Orbitolite*, showing first-formed spire, surrounded by concentric rings.
6. Disk of 'duplex' *Orbitolite*, showing earlier passage from spiral to cyclical plan of growth.
7. Central portion of Disk of 'complex' *Orbitolite*, in which the chambered nucleus alone shows an abbreviated spire, the very first row of chamberlets forming a complete ring.

has a long succession of inner chamberlets arranged upon the *spiral* plan, as in *Orbiculina*; these, again, arise from expanded but undivided chambers, like those of a *Peneroplis*; and these chambers are the continuation of a spiral tube, with occasional constrictions, resembling that of a *Spiroloculina*, coiling continuously round a primordial chamber, as in *Cornuspira*. Thus, in this interesting organism we find *permanently represented* the whole developmental history of the 'simple' type of *Orbitolite* from the primordial jelly-speck. The large *Challenger* collection of *Orbitolites*, made on the Fiji reef, has furnished me with the means of still more completely working out the transition from the 'simple' to the 'complex' type; a distinctly intermediate type there presenting itself in great abundance. This, which I term the 'duplex' type (Fig. VI., 1), resembles the 'simple' in having its annular series of chamberlets disposed in a single plane, and in the connection of the chamberlets of each ring by a single annular canal; but differs in having its successive rings connected by a *double* series of radial passages, which issue on the edge of the disk (Fig. VI., 2) as marginal pores. The columnar sub-segments, *a a'*, *b b'*, of each ring are strung, as it were, on the annular cord, *c c'*; and this sends off an upper and a lower series of stolon-processes, *d d*, *d d'*, which pass into the upper and lower halves of the sub-segments of the next ring.—The plan of growth in the first-formed portion, shown in Fig. VI., 3, is singularly intermediate between that of the 'simple' and that of the 'complex' type. The regular spire of the former is now reduced to the single turn made by the 'circumambient segment', *b b*, round the 'primordial segment', *a*; but a partial continuance of the same plan is shown in the incompleteness of the first two or three rings of sub-segments; these being budded-forth from only *half* of the 'circumambient segment,' instead of from its *whole* periphery, as in the typical 'complex' *Orbitolite* (Fig. II.). Yet even in large disks, whose later growth is characteristically 'complex,' the nucleus and earlier rings



are often formed on the 'duplex' plan, which passes into the 'complex' in the manner to be now described.

Believing, with Sir James Paget, that "the highest laws of Biological Science are expressed in their simplest terms in the lives of the lowest orders of creation," I shall now ask





FIG. VI.

1. Disk of Duplex type of *Orbitolite*.
2. Edge of Disk, showing double row of marginal pores.
3. Central portion of Sarcodic body:—*a*, primordial segment; *b*, circum-ambient segment, budding off a half-ring of sub-segments, from which complete rings are afterwards formed.
4. Portion of the Sarcodic body of one ring; *a a'* and *b b'*, the two halves of the columnar sub-segments in connection with *c c'*, the annular cord; from this are given off the pairs of stolon-processes *d d'*, *d d'*, which connect it with the sub-segments of the next annulus.

you to follow me through a detailed examination of the transition from one type to the other; as shown in Fig. VII., which represents a vertical section, taken in a radial direction, of one of those large 'complex' disks whose life was commenced on the plan of the 'simple.' The first-formed series of chamberlets ( $m$ ,  $m^1$ ,  $m^2$ ,  $m^3$ ,  $m^4$ ) exactly correspond with those of the 'simple' type (Fig. IV., 4), constituting but a single plane; those of each series being connected together by a single continuous annular gallery (shown in cross-section at  $ac$ ,  $ac$ ), while those of each series are connected with those of the next by single radial passages ( $r$ ,  $r$ ,  $r$ ), which, as each annulus was formed, would open at its outer edge as a *single* row of marginal pores. But these are surrounded by rings ( $d$ ,  $d^1$ ,  $d^2$ ) in which, while the annular canal is still single, two radial passages ( $r$ ) go off from it obliquely, one into the upper and the other into the lower portion of each chamberlet of the next annular series, those of the last-formed annulus showing themselves at its edge as a *double* row of marginal pores. From this 'duplex' type, the first advance towards the 'complex' is shown at  $e$ ,  $e^1$ , in the splitting, so to speak, of each annular canal into two ( $ac$ ,  $ac'$ ), and the interposition of a columnar cavity ( $m$ ,  $m$ ) between its two halves. Now, in the inner (or earlier-formed) of the annuli which show this complication ( $e$ ,  $e^1$ ), the two series of chamberlets ( $s$ ,  $s'$ ) which lie between the two annular canals and the two surfaces of the disk, are continuous with the intermediate columnar chamberlets, and bear the same relation to their respective annular canals as in the 'duplex' type, each being connected with one canal only; and this stage of differentiation characterises the Orbitolites of the French Tertiaries, which seem to have attained their full growth without any advance upon it. But in the large Orbitolite disks of Australia and Fiji, I find this simpler arrangement giving place to a more complicated one ( $f$ ,  $f^1$ ,  $f^2$ ,  $f^3$ ); the chamberlets of the two superficial layers being separated from those of the intermediate layer, and being so shifted in position, that each annular series lies over the

FIG. VII.

Diagrammatic representation of the transition from the 'simple' to the 'complex' plan of growth, as shown in vertical section, from the primordial and circumambient chambers (*c p c'*) of the centre, to the margin, whose pores are shown at *mp*. The chambers *m*, *m*<sup>1</sup>, *m*<sup>2</sup>, *m*<sup>3</sup>, *m*<sup>4</sup>, are all formed upon the *simple* type (as in Fig. IV. 4), and show at *ac*, *ac*, the cross sections of the annular canals, which connect all the chamberlets of one ring, and at *r*, *r*, *r*, the radial passages connecting the successive annuli. The chambers *d*, *d*<sup>1</sup>, *d*<sup>2</sup>, are formed upon the *duplex* type; the annular canals *ac*, *ac*, being single, but the radial passages *r* being double. The chambers *e*, *e*<sup>1</sup>, show two annular canals *ac*, *ac'*, between which is interposed a columnar chamberlet, continuous with the two superficial chamberlets *s s'*. In the chambers *f*, *f*<sup>1</sup>, *f*<sup>2</sup>, *f*<sup>3</sup>, to the margin, which are all formed on the fully-developed *complex* type, the upper and under superficial chamberlets *s s*, *s' s'*, are completely cut off from the intermediate columnar portion, and, by a shifting of their position, each is made to communicate with *two* annular canals.



interval between two annular canals, and communicates with both of them ; while the sarcodic body which occupies this cavitory system thus comes to have the more complicated arrangement shown in Fig. VIII. With the increase in the thickness of the intermediate layer, the double row of marginal pores of the 'duplex' type gives place to the multiple series (Fig. VII. *mp*) of the 'complex.'

Now it seems to me impossible not to recognise the fact, that the evolution of this type has taken place *along a definite course* ; every stage being one of *progress*, and each being (so to speak) a preparation for the next. This, perhaps, will be most clearly seen by looking at the progressive complication in the structure of the sarcodic body on which the shell is modelled. First, we have a simple pear-shaped particle, extending itself into a cord that lies in a continuous spiral around it, with constrictions at intervals. This spire flattens out ; and then, by the formation of transverse partitions, traversed by pores, the successive additions become segmentally separated from each other, though mutually connected by sarcodic extensions. Next, these segments undergo a further division into sub-segments : all those forming each row being strung (as it were) on a continuous sarcodic cord, which connects them laterally ; while the successive rows are connected, as before, by radial 'stolon processes,' those of the last-formed row issuing forth through the marginal pores, as the *pseudopodia*, through which nutriment is absorbed for the entire body. Then, by the opening out of the spire, the lateral connecting cords become complete rings, from which the radial stolon-processes are given off ; and the future increase of the 'simple' type consists in the formation of new circular series of sub-segments, each strung, as it were, on its own annular cord. Now, the advance towards the 'complex' type is prepared-for, so to speak, by the sending forth of two sets of radial stolon-processes instead of one ; —a change which, taken by itself, is meaningless, since every one who is familiar with the variability of the Rhizopodal type (especially as exhibited in the tran-

sitional forms between *Peneroplis* and *Dendritina*) knows that it cannot make any difference to the animal whether its pseudopodia issue from the margin of the disk, through a single or through a double row of pores; but which is full of meaning when regarded as a preparation for that splitting of each annular cord into two, in which the transition from the 'simple' to the 'complex' type essentially consists. Every annulus of the body of the latter consists of a series of columnar segments (Fig. VIII., *e e*, *e' e'*), passing at each end into an annular cord (*a a'*, *b b'*), and communicating with the series internal and external to it, by oblique stolon-passages, the number of which is related to the length of the columns; this, again, determining the thickness of the calcareous disk which is modelled upon them. The sub-segments of the two superficial layers (*c c*, *d d*) do not communicate with each other; but those of each circlet are connected (as already described) with the two annular cords that lie beneath. And by this elaborate arrangement, every part of the minutely sub-divided protoplasmic body which occupies the minutely sub-divided cavity of these disks, is brought into continuous relation with every other part, and with the peripheral annulus whose marginal pores constitute the only access through which nutriment can reach it from without.

I might further illustrate my argument that we have here the obvious indication of a pre-arranged plan, by




FIG. VIII.

Portion of Sarcodic body of Complex Orbitolite:—*a a'*, *b b'*, upper and lower annular cords of two concentric zones; *c c*, upper layer of superficial sub-segments; *d d*, the lower layer; *e e* and *e' e'*, intermediate columnar sub-segments of the two zones, giving off oblique stolon-processes.

the remarkable provision made, not merely for the reparation of injuries, but for the restoration of the typical form when the disk has been so much broken as to destroy that form completely. Even a broken-off marginal fragment may give origin to a new disk; its sarcodic body extending itself all round it, so as to form a continuous band; and this forming a complete annulus of chamberlets, round which new annuli are successively added.

In the Life-history of the perfected type, then, we can clearly trace a sequence which runs exactly parallel to what we have reason to regard as its Evolutionary history, and, in addition, a provision for the maintenance of the *perfected* model; the reparative process being carried on—alike in the 'simple,' the 'duplex,' and the 'complex' types—upon the plan characteristic of each.

But my special reason for dwelling upon this 'instance' (as Bacon would call it) is, that the influence of Natural Selection would here seem to be excluded by the fact that the whole series of ancestral forms through which the most elaborately-constructed *Orbitolite* now existing may be assumed to have passed, continues to live and flourish at the present time. The very same dredging may bring up shells of *Cornuspira*, constructed upon the undivided spiral plan shown in Fig V., 1; shells of *Spiroloculina*, in which the spiral is partially interrupted by rudimentary partitions, as at 2; shells of *Peneroplis*, in which the partitions are complete, but traversed by pores, as at 3; shells of *Orbiculina*, in which the peneropline chambers are divided into chamberlets, the plan of growth still remaining spiral, as at 4; and shells of the three types of cyclically-growing *Orbitolites* 5, 6, 7. As already stated, the condition of the sarcodic body undergoes no corresponding advance; that of the most 'complex' *Orbitolite* being as homogeneous or undifferentiated as that of the simple *Cornuspira*. There is no evidence whatever of any 'struggle for existence' or 'survival of the fittest'; all showing themselves equally fit to survive. All 'variation' seems to have taken place in such a definite

direction, as to evolve calcareous fabrics of ever-increasing complexity; but this complexity can scarcely give any advantage to the organisms which have attained it, these being fully as incapable as the simpler forms of escaping from their enemies by movement, and showing no such differences of aspect as would enable them to elude observation. In fact, the Fishes and larger Crustaceans which would probably be their chief destroyers, would be likely to be most attracted by the larger disks of the 'complex' type; while the younger specimens of that type, being indistinguishable except by the Microscopist from full-grown specimens of the 'simple' and 'duplex' types, are not likely to be passed over by any hungry destroyer that might find these latter of more suitable dimensions.

The last remark I have to make in relation to this noteworthy 'instance,' is that its value is not in the least degree lessened by the fact that the evolutionary process seems to be dependent upon Physical agencies. The *Orbitolite* type (as at present known to us) flourishes best in tropical or sub-tropical seas; the largest 'complex' forms yet discovered being found on the Fiji reefs; while the smallest 'simple' forms only extend as far north as the Mediterranean,—with the singular exception of the deep-sea type found to the west of Ireland, which is probably a survival from the warmer climate of some former epoch. And among the specimens collected by the *Challenger* on the Fiji reef, I have found a marked difference; all the most highly-developed forms of the 'complex' type having been found near the surface, where the temperature is the highest, and the supply of food most abundant. But it can no more be said that these physical agencies *produced* the advance, than that heat can *make* a Chick out of the yolk and white of an egg, without a germ to appropriate and build up these materials. These Physical agencies supply only the conditions required for the evolutionary process,—the source or spring of which is in the Germ itself.



As Natural Selection gives no account of the *changes in the plan of growth* which constitute so marked a feature in the evolutionary history of the *Orbitolite*, so, as it seems to me, it gives no explanation of the appearance of *new organs*: the complete possession of which fits their possessors for a higher condition of existence, and accords with other modifications that enable them to take advantage of it; but which, in their rudimentary state, cannot be conceived to be of any service to Animals altogether framed upon a less advanced type, and continuing to live in accordance with lower conditions. And I shall take, as a suitable 'instance,' what is known as the 'swimming bladder' of the Fish, which is an earlier form of the organ that becomes a lung in air-breathing Vertebrata.

In the Vertebrate series we pass by a succession of stages from the Fish, with gills fitted only for aquatic respiration, to the Reptile which is fitted only for aerial respiration: the intermediate being the true Amphibia, which, as regards their respiratory apparatus, are fish in their early stage, and reptiles in the complete stage; some of them retaining their gills even after the development of their lungs, so as to be able to live either in air or in water. Now, the first rudiment of a 'swimming bladder' that we meet with in Fishes, is a little *diverticulum* or pouch opening off from the pharynx or gullet; and this extends itself in many cases so as to become a bag or sac, lying along the spine, but entirely cut off, by the closure of its neck, from any communication with the gullet. Such fish cannot take into it any air from the outside; so that the air which is found in the sac in some instances, would seem to have been secreted from the blood. It is commonly supposed that the fish uses this bladder for so regulating its specific gravity as to rise or sink in the water; but there is no adequate basis for this hypothesis. For there is no muscular structure in the bag to cause it to increase or diminish in size; and there is no outside arrangement of muscles that can be conceived to answer this purpose. Moreover, when deep-sea Fish, having a closed swimming bladder, are brought to the surface, their

swimming-bladders burst in consequence of the removal of external pressure, and the fish are killed. The most singular thing is, that there are genera of fish, the *Scomber* (or Mackerel tribe) for instance, of which some species have a swimming bladder, and others none; and it cannot be affirmed that the latter are less able to swim at different depths than the former. This swimming bladder, in certain other forms of fish, retains its original communication with the pharynx; and air can then pass into it from the outside. Carp in ponds are often seen to swallow air; and you may occasionally see gold-fish, which are a kind of carp, coming to the surface of the water of the globes in which they are kept, discharging air-bubbles and taking in a fresh supply. It seems pretty certain, then, that there are fish which use this rudimentary lung really for the purpose of respiration; certainly the Ganoid fishes do, which are a most important group in the evolutionary series, connecting Fishes with Reptiles.

Now, of the first appearance of this organ, and of its development into a closed air-bladder, it seems to me that Natural Selection gives no account whatever. Let it be supposed that the pharyngeal pouch 'formed itself' in some ancestral Fish as an 'aimless' variation; how can it be conceived to have been of such service to the animals which possessed it, that they beat others in the struggle for existence,—when we do not find this to be the case even with the fully-developed swimming-bladder? And how can we account for the progressive elongation of the pouch into a closed swimming bladder, if, in this condition, it is of no use to its possessors? To me it seems as if the whole evolutionary history of this organ plainly points to its ulterior development into an organ for atmospheric respiration; and is unmeaning if not so viewed.

So, again, we may trace a remarkable uniformity in the line of progress from the lower to the higher forms of Pulmonary apparatus. The purpose which the Lung has to serve being the exposure of the blood to the air over an extended surface, that extension must be proportionate to

the demand for aëration set up by the muscular activity and temperature-standard of the animal. The swimming bladder of the Fish, even when used for atmospheric respiration, is a simple, undivided sac, or, as in the Ganoids, a pair of such sacs. The lung of the Frog has its internal surface increased by its extension into a number of little pockets in the upper part of the principal cavity. The same is the case in the Snake, and in many other Reptiles; each lung having a large undivided cavity, with diverticula in its walls, over the extended surface of which the blood-vessels are minutely distributed. In some of the higher Reptiles, as the Crocodile, the cavity of the lung exhibits an incipient subdivision. In the lung of Man, as of Mammals generally, an extraordinary increase is given to the extent of aërating surface, by the excessively minute subdivision of the cavity into air-cells; of which thousands are clustered round the end of each terminal twig of the bronchial tree. But this increase would be without effect, if there were not at the same time a most elaborate provision in the Skeleton of the trunk, in the disposition of its Muscles, and in the mode in which these are acted on by the Nervous apparatus, for alternately filling and emptying the lungs, so as to take in fresh supplies of oxygen for the aeration of the blood, and to get rid of the carbonic acid which it gives off. The chief feature in this provision is the enclosure of the lungs in a distinct cavity (that of the chest) cut off from the abdomen by a muscular partition—the diaphragm; the contraction of which, by increasing the capacity of the chest, produces an in-rush of air down the air-passages, which penetrates to the remotest parts of the minutely-subdivided cavity of the lungs. By no other action could the air contained in that cavity be so effectually renewed. Thus the pulmonary apparatus of the Mammal is the most perfect form that could be devised for obtaining the highest amount of respiratory power within the smallest compass.

But the Bird requires a yet more active respiration than the Mammal; being far higher in point of animal activity.

It must put forth far more muscular power in proportion to its size, in order to raise itself in the air; and it must be able to sustain that power for a great length of time. Its animal energy can only be kept up by the maintenance of a higher temperature. All this involves a much larger consumption of oxygen, and a greater production of carbonic acid. Hence you would suppose that if 'natural selection' had in any way worked out the respiratory apparatus of a Bird, it would be a more highly organised instrument than that of a Mammal. So far, however, is this from being the case, that the lung of the Bird is really formed upon the lower plan of the lung of the Reptile. Instead of having the minutely subdivided air-cells of the Mammalian lung, the lung of the Bird is an aggregation of little lunglets, each resembling the entire lung of the Frog; and instead of the provision made in the general structure of the Mammal for the constant renewal of the air in the cavity of the lungs, we find the diaphragm absent, and the bony framework of the trunk so firmly knit together (thus affording fixed attachments for the powerful muscles of flight) as to be incapable of the movement which our ribs and sternum perform in aid of the action of the diaphragm. How, then, is the more active respiration required by the Bird provided for? Just as in the Insect, to which Birds have so many analogies,—by the extension of the respiratory surface through the body generally. The long bones, instead of being filled with marrow, are hollow; and their cavities are connected with each other and with that of the lung on either side: there are also air-sacs disposed in various parts, which probably take a share in the same action. Further, by the elasticity of the framework of the trunk, the lungs are kept full of air, the state of emptiness being forced; so that when they have been compressed by a muscular effort, they fill themselves again spontaneously as soon as the pressure is relaxed.

Thus, looking at the general plan of the Respiratory apparatus, we find it undergoing a uniformly progressive *elevation of type*, as we pass from the Fish to the Reptile, from the

Reptile to the Bird, and from the Bird to the Mammal. But if there was no pre-ordained plan, if this advance resulted from mere 'accidental' variations, we should have expected that some Bird would have been evolved by 'natural selection' with the lung of the Mammal; and that this form, by the survival of the fittest, would have established itself to the exclusion of the lower type. On the contrary, without any advance on the lower plan of Ornithic structure, an *extension* has been given to its respiratory surface, which supplies all the needs of the most actively flying Bird, and makes that apparatus as *perfect*, in its relation to the general plan, as if that apparatus had been exceptionally raised to a higher grade of development.

Here, then, as in the preceding instance, we seem justified in the conclusion that, as the doctrine of Natural Selection out of an endless diversity of 'aimless' variations, fails to account for *that general consistency of the advance along definite lines of progress* which is manifested in the history of Evolution (the two cases I have brought before you being merely samples of an immense aggregate, whose cumulative force seems to me irresistible), it leaves untouched the evidence of Design in the original scheme of the Organised Creation; while it transfers the idea of that Design from the particular to the general, making all the special cases of adaptation the foreknown results of the adoption of that general Order which we call Law.—As Dr. Martineau has pertinently asked, "If it takes *mind* to "construe the World, how can it require the negation of "mind to constitute it?" Science, being the intellectual interpretation of Nature, cannot possibly *disprove* its origin in Mind; and, if rightly pursued, leads us only to a higher comprehension of the "bright designs," a more assured recognition of the working of the "sovereign will" of its Divine Author.

WILLIAM B. CARPENTER.

### MODERN QUAKERISM.

“**W**HAT is Quakerism?” asks the industrious bibliographer of Friends’ literature, in the brief Preface to his *Bibliotheca Anti-Quakeriana*. He owns that it is a question which “seems to have puzzled many members of the Society of Friends of late years;” and while deciding for his own part with William Penn that it is “primitive Christianity revived,” he makes the strong admission that considering the existing divisions among the successors of George Fox, touching matters of principle as well as of practice, this “old or primitive Christianity may be said to be scarcely known” in the house of its Friends. This is the judgment of one who, from the exceptional fulness of his acquaintance with the writings of Friends ancient and modern, is perhaps better qualified than any other man living to form a well-instructed estimate of the amount and the drift of the various changes which have taken place in Quaker opinion, since the rise of the denomination amid the ferment of religious life in the golden days of England’s Commonwealth.

Joseph Smith does not step out of the neutral place of the accurate and diligent collector of materials. He leaves his exhaustive catalogue of Quaker books, tracts and broad-sheets to speak for itself; only expressing a hope, in the prelude to his accumulation of the multifarious bibliography of writings opposed to Quakerism in its successive developments, that his labours “may prove one means of opening the eyes of some.” But there have been others, with eyes at length opened, who have felt the burden of the task of recalling Friends to their ancient landmarks, and have

conscientiously endeavoured, though with humble means and on an obscure scale, to present in their own persons a spectacle of primitive Quakerism revived.

Few, perhaps, are aware of the existence in this country of a small but earnest body, which for the last fifteen years has assembled half-yearly as a General Meeting of Friends, in complete independence of the London Yearly Meeting. Such as it is, it was gathered mainly by the quiet exertions of a remarkable man, who from the year 1860 was the subject of an increasing "exercise," to use Friends' phraseology, leading him to correspond with like-minded Friends, with a view to bringing them together in regular conference, on what he conceived to be the original lines of Friends' testimony. Of his decease no tidings reached the outside public, dependent for its religious intelligence upon the newspapers. Nor has his life and work found any chronicle as yet, except in the modest "Testimony" of his immediate coadjutors. There is a hope that from his correspondence and his spiritual writings a fuller portrait of his mind may at some time be given to the world by his widow. But, meanwhile, to those who study with reverence the complex manifestations of the religious life of our time, it may be of some interest to make the acquaintance of this conscientious Friend, and to learn something of the meaning of the movement of which he was the originator and the centre.

John Grant Sargent (1813—1883) was a birth-right member of the Society of Friends, his parents being Isaac and Hester Sargent. He was born at Paddington, and apprenticed to a draper at Leighton Buzzard; but his early business life was spent in Paris, where he worked under his father, a carriage builder, and the owner of a brick-field. Isaac Sargent sat somewhat loosely to Quakerism, and it is not surprising that his son, as a youth in Paris, soon dropped the associations and left off the distinguishing practices of Friends. But the influences of his Quaker bringing-up were only in abeyance. While yet at Paris he was drawn within the power of Friends'



principles] by a stronger claim than that of a mere birth-right membership. He shared the same experience of the Light Within, which shook the soldiers and shoemakers of the old Commonwealth time, and made them, as Gervase Bennet said, "Quakers;" quivering beneath the influence divine, though never shaking before the face of man. He became "convinced" of the truth as held by Friends; and his conviction made the Friends' livery of dress and speech no antiquated and meaningless usage to him, but a badge of honour and conscience. Again he sat in the silent waiting upon the Spirit, which is at once the opportunity and the life of the faithful worship of Friends. No matter that oftentimes there was no one to join him. They who truly wait upon the Spirit are ready, if need be, to wait alone. It is a beautiful glimpse of calm resolved sincerity, this picture which we have of the London lad, true to the quickenings of his conscience in a strange land, and, unattended by a sympathising associate, holding amid the great world of Paris a reverent and joyful communion with the Source of life and light, unseen, but inly felt.

Returning to England about 1844, he was for some time a farmer in Essex and Surrey, and subsequently the proprietor of a wood-turning mill in Derbyshire. This led him to travel a good deal, for the purpose of disposing of his bobbins. Moving about on business errands, his spirit gradually burned with the desire to be of service in the Gospel ministry, and he became a preacher among Friends. It is a common, and, considering the quietude which for so long a period cast a chill over the mission aspects of Quakerism, it is perhaps an accountable misconception to suppose that the Society of Friends is a Church without regular and recognised ministers. But no error can be more fundamental than that which, while aware of the absence of an order of priests or preachers trained for the performance of professional functions at stated intervals, ignores the presence of a distinct class of heralds of the Gospel, who obey a call not of men nor by man. The number and the activity of such ministers is regulated not

by the economic laws of supply and demand. They are in vigour and in plenty when the Supreme Speaker, who deposes them, needs and employs a human voice; their diminished band, and the infrequency of their ministrations, are signs that God wills silence rather than speech. Among such ministers Sargent at length found his place. From about the year 1851 he exercised his gift in meetings. And it is characteristic of his absolute reliance on the Inward Witness, that he neither sought nor obtained any official recognition of his claims as a preacher among Friends. There are indeed two classes of Friends' speakers. When a speaker's word finds acceptance, he is by tacit consent permitted to use all opportunities of declaring it which arise; were he unacceptable, he would be "stopped." A further step is taken when a speaker is officially placed upon the list of recognised ministers. In this case he has his certificate, to be read in the meetings which he visits on a missionary journey, and the expenses of such journey are defrayed by the Meeting which authorises it. Not even from the distinct Society which he was instrumental in forming did Sargent take with him on his travels any official credentials. He was a minister of the Spirit, pure and simple.

As with the Friends' ministers from their earliest days, the mission laid upon him was international in its range. Twice did he specially visit America (the last occasion being in 1882); several times, when his business journeys took him to the Continent, he found occasion for spiritual labours under the burden of his call; to Ireland he paid a missionary visit, speaking in Friends' meetings. But during the last five-and-twenty years of his life his main work was internal to the quiet circles in which his own views of Friends' principles prevailed. For while working to extend the influence of those truths, to maintain which Friends are bound together, he found reason to believe that another work was equally if not more necessary, namely, to recover among Friends themselves the purity of their original testimony. His object was to unite such Friends

as thought and felt with him in a closer bond of sympathy, and to furnish a common expression for their convictions.

In April, 1860, he addressed a circular letter from Cocker-mouth to several likeminded Friends, inviting them to meet in conference. There was no immediate result, but on October 17, 1862, the first conference took place in London, and was attended by seventeen persons. For seven years similar conferences were held about every four months in different places up and down the country, the attendance averaging some twenty-five persons. In 1868 Sargent with two others went to America, to visit the little groups of Friends, known as the Smaller Bodies, which had already made a decisive stand for primitive Quakerism as they understood it. On the voyage home, these three Friends were strongly impressed with the duty of separating themselves in like manner from the tendencies of the London Yearly Meeting. The last conference was held on October 10, 1869; and in January, 1870, its place was taken by a General Meeting for Friends in England, initiated at Fritchley, in Derbyshire, where Sargent and some of his associates resided and kept up regular meetings for worship. This General Meeting has since been held twice a year, usually at Fritchley or Belper, and has maintained an official correspondence with kindred bodies in America. Sargent was the Clerk of the Meeting, and remained its leading spirit until his death on December 27, 1883.

The *British Friend* for July, 1884, contains a report of the last May Meeting at Fritchley, communicated by a member of the Larger Body. He describes the small Meeting-house as well filled, and bears testimony to the excellence of the spirit which prevailed. "Neither in meeting nor out of it, did I hear one word approaching a want of Christian love towards those from whose views they differ." The membership of this independent organisation is not exclusively composed of seceders from the Larger Body; it comprises also some who have joined themselves to it on becoming Friends from "convincement," a proof of the vitality of this little flock.

But now comes the consideration of the grounds of the secession, and the question how far the seceders are justified in their contention that modern Quakerism, as exemplified in the spirit and practices of the London Yearly Meeting and bodies in correspondence with it, has forfeited the true character of the original Society of Friends. Some of those who are in sympathy with the seceders hold very strong views on this last point. On 20th May, 1871, Thomas Drewry, of Fleetwood, a member of Preston Monthly Meeting, addressed a written Protest to the London Yearly Meeting and to the Charity Commission, in which he maintains that "what is called the Society of Friends" has undergone fundamental changes in faith and doctrine, and is now properly speaking "a body of Separatists," and has consequently no right to retain "Trust Property, which belongs not to it, but belongs to those who adhere to the original faith of the Society of Friends, for whose sole use and benefit the several Trusts were created, by their predecessors in religious profession."\* The London Yearly Meeting took no notice of this Protest; and the Charity Commissioners probably regarded it as *brutum fulmen*, for, though strongly worded, it specifies none of the innovations of which in general terms it complains. Yet to those acquainted with Quaker usages it is a very significant document. The Friends when they express dissent from a position advanced in their Meetings, as not being in accordance with Friends' principles, do not argue, do not give their reasons. They simply state how it affects their own feeling. They say: 'I do not feel comfortable about this; I do not feel easy in my mind under it.' A condition of things which produces so decided a discomfort and uneasiness in the mind of any recognised member as is indicated by Thomas Drewry's Protest, is a serious matter among Friends. Their constitution knows nothing of the rule of majorities; they never take a vote; the harmony of sentiment is everything with them; if a member feels and says 'You are out of accord with your true principles,' and if he

\* See this Protest in W. Hodgson's *The Society of Friends in the Nineteenth Century*, 1876, vol. ii. pp. 394-7.

is not at once lopped off as a false accuser, the rise of the feeling which he expresses is of itself, from the Quaker standpoint, sufficiently condemnatory of the existing position of the body.

We cite Drewry's protest because it is an English document, but it will be observed that we quote it from an American source,\* and to America we must look for the most numerous and the clearest expressions of revolt from the modern drift of the Quaker body.† John Wilbur's *Journal* (1859) is a storehouse of valuable testimony on the subject; and the two remarkable volumes of recent denominational history published in 1875 and 1876 by William Hodgson, of Philadelphia, lay the whole case very fairly before the impartial reader. These publications have been ignored by the official representatives of the Society of Friends in this country; yet they constitute a startling indictment of the modes of thought which now find shelter beneath the retrimmed mantle of Quakerism. In England we have Daniel Pickard's *Expostulation* (1864), and a not inconsiderable number of tracts and pamphlets, uttering warning notes in a similar spirit; but the main body goes on its way unheeding them.

This apathy under remonstrance, this quiet determination neither to cope with the damaging criticisms directed against them nor to retrace their course, which is characteristic of the existing leaders of Quaker opinion, is one of the great difficulties in the way of those who are anxious to fulfil their part in reasserting the ancient principles of the body. They may say what they like; it excites no controversy, and produces no movement. Quakerism has hung up its broad brim and turned down its collar, the writings of its founders lie dusty on its shelves, it speaks a new language and adopts unwonted ways, and to the call of the old prophetic voices, which charmed its younger ears and roused its fresher heart, it is mute.

\* It was published as an advertisement in the *British Friend* (a Glasgow monthly) for September, 1871.

† See *Modern Quakerism Examined, and Contrasted with that of the Ancient Type*, 1876, by Walter Edgerton, of Indianapolis.

Another serious difficulty experienced by Friends of the old stamp is that the very things which they feel it their duty to oppose and denounce, as fatal to the real spirit of Quakerism, are contributing to a certain accession of outside interest and favour extended to the denomination by other bodies of Christians. No doubt the people called Evangelicals hail with increasing satisfaction the new departures of the people called Quakers. They regard them as moving in the right direction, and gladly hold out a fraternising hand, which those who have so long meekly dwelt in the cold shade of popular neglect are gratified to accept. Yet one would think it must be apparent to all but the blind, that not as Quakers is their co-operation welcomed by the outside sects ; but they are acknowledged as brethren on the precise ground that what is essentially distinctive of Quakerism they have practically abandoned. Their inconsistency is praiseworthy in the eyes of the successors of their ancient opponents ; and just because they are inconstant to the teachings of their founders, they are admitted to fellowship. In the height of the Beacon controversy, that shrewd and strong Evangelical thinker, Dr. Wardlaw, addressed to Friends some remarkable congratulations on an evident revolution in their sentiments. " I have given," he says, " in copious extracts, the views of J. J. Gurney on the doctrine of justification. They are clear, simple and Scriptural. But—are they Quakerism ? " He details, with the skill of a practised theologian, the discrepancies on this head between Gurney and Barclay ; and he adds, " And, indeed, on this and on various other points, it cannot fail to strike the most superficial reader, what a perfect contrast there is between the writings of Mr. Gurney and those of the early Friends." \*

A third and perhaps the most formidable difficulty with which those jealous for the ancient principles of Friends have to contend is the unquestionable fact that the introduction of the new régime has been followed by symptoms

\* *Friendly Letters to the Society of Friends, on some of their distinguishing principles.* By Ralph Wardlaw, D.D., 1836, p. 367, &c.

of denominational prosperity and success. The chronic leakage from Friends' families to the membership of other bodies has been appreciably checked. While not increasing, or even holding its ground relatively to the population, the Society of Friends has been able to stem the process of further decline. Much new activity prevails within its borders. Though not activity of a kind which approves itself to those who prize the spirit of the ancient testimony, it is evidence which cannot be gainsaid of reviving zeal, stirring life, and earnest religious occupation. Lovers of the Society's foundation truths shake their heads, and think and say that it is all wrong, that it is going on a false tack, that it is encouraging the tacit substitution of the world's religion for the Spirit's teaching. Nevertheless, the experiment produces what to the experimenters are satisfying results, and so the change goes on.

Of this change, by his industrious writings and his great personal influence, Joseph John Gurney (1788—1847) was the prime mover. With the exhibition of Gurneyism, in its principles and results, Wilbur's *Journal* and Hodgson's history are largely occupied. The names of J. J. Gurney and Elias Hicks are the danger signals on either hand of the true Friend's course. Both are rationalists, in the sense in which Robert Barclay speaks of the "pretended rational" Socinians of his day; and their followers divide between them the characteristics which he condemns. One set, the Gurney party, are "all for literal Scriptures;" the other, the Hicksian schismatists, are for "natural light." Describing them equally as "fundamental departures from Quakerism," Hodgson is, if anything, somewhat more lenient in his handling of Hicksism than of Gurneyism, though he has not an atom of sympathy with the doctrinal point of view of either. Nor is this unnatural. An outsider, especially one who had not reached a clear apprehension of the difference between the Light of Christ within, and the innate light of nature and conscience, would be inclined to say that Gurneyism is false to the Quaker method, while Hicksism employs it to the production of results foreign to



Quaker habits of thought; Gurneyism is wrong root and branch, Hicksism grafts wild olives on the original stem.

We have nothing to do here with Hicksism. It has never been a power in this country. The Barnard schism, which weakened the Society in Ireland at the beginning of this century, is chiefly remarkable for having been the occasion which gave the Rathbones of Liverpool to the Unitarian body. It left no independent witness, and when Hannah Barnard died, in 1828, she had already survived the memory of the intended separation. Other movements of similar character in more recent years have possessed no inherent vitality, and have rapidly withered away.\* But Gurneyism is in full swing; modern Quakerism is Gurneyism.

The fundamental postulate of pure original Quakerism is the supremacy of the Spirit, speaking within, as the only infallible source of doctrines of faith and rules of practice. Take away that, directly or indirectly, and you dig up Quakerism by the roots. In the *Theses* of his famous *Apologia*, the Scottish laird, Robert Barclay, as is well known, formulated the teaching of Fox in such a way as expressly to confront the positions of the authoritative document of Scottish religion, the Westminster Confession of Faith. The Confession states (i. 10) that "the supreme Judge by which all controversies of religion are to be determined, and all decrees of councils, opinions of ancient writers, doctrines of men, and private spirits, are to be examined, and in whose sentence we are to rest, can be no other but the Holy Spirit speaking in the Scripture." 'Nay,' says Barclay—echoing in his scholastic style the study of uncouth utterances of the Midland seer—"other there can be, other there is." The Voice that speaks mediately in Scripture speaks immediately in the soul of man. The Scriptures of Truth "are only a declaration of the fountain, and not the fountain itself, therefore they are not to be esteemed the

\* The best account and defence of Hicksism (and cognate movements up to 1828), from the pen of one of its more Evangelical representatives, is to be found in Samuel M. Janney's *History of the Religious Society of Friends, from its Rise to the year 1828*, 4 vols., 1859—67.

principal ground of all truth and knowledge, nor yet the adequate primary rule of faith and manners." "They are and may be esteemed a secondary rule, subordinate to the Spirit." "By the inward testimony of the Spirit we do alone truly know them." "The Spirit is the first and principal leader."\*

It is customary with modern Quakers to decry Barclay, partly on the ground of the scholastic form in which he cast his propositions and his elaborate logical deductions from them. True it is that he captivates the mind rather than entrances the heart; we do not always experience in his pages the same rare sense of spiritual refreshment, as from the gushing streams of a living fountain, which constitutes the abiding charm of Fox's *Letters* or the tracts of Nayler and Deusbery. But in the statement of the fundamental thing in Quakerism he does but put into transparent and solid sentences, crystal clear, the unalloyed substance of the daily teaching of his great predecessors and coadjutors. Rejecting Barclay, Friends must necessarily reject along with him those in whose spirit he speaks; and this they do. With the exception of Fox, whose name is surrounded with a sentimental reverence which few Quakers are hardy enough to disturb,† there is not one of the founders of the Society whose most express statements are not repudiated by the present members.

It is not a case of development, but of laying a new foundation; perhaps it would be better to say it is a desertion of the Quaker foundation for that of the so-called Evangelical sects. The doctrine of the Spirit, in vogue with the majority of Friends at the present day, reaches no higher than the level attained, as we have seen,

\* Barclay's *Apology*; *Theses Theol.* prop. 3.

† Yet see George Fox, *his Character, Doctrine, and Work*; an Essay by a Member of the Society of Friends [Edward Ash, M.D.], 1873. In this able pamphlet George Fox's doctrine of the Inward Light in all men is explicitly denied; and it is maintained that there has been no such thing as immediate revelation since the days of the Apostles. The reply by George Pitt, *Immediate Revelation True, and George Fox Not Mistaken*, 1873, is a fine piece of genuine Quaker theology.

in the Westminster Confession. The independent testimony of the Spirit, as supreme judge of the meaning of Scripture and first-hand expositor of the mind of God, is becoming, or has become, an extinct factor in Quaker theology. Those who were once pre-eminent for their allegiance to the direct word of the Spirit have succumbed to a bibliolatry, all the more helpless as it is tempered by no internal school of biblical criticism. It is the ancient Quaker doctrine of inspiration, that the spiritual writings of their own founders proceed from the same fountain as the teachings of Holy Writ, and are inspired in the same way; but that for the true understanding and profitable reading of either, the Spirit, the only lawful judge and interpreter, is necessary. The modern doctrine has lost the width of the one position, and missed the depth of the other, and is indistinguishable from crude servility to the letter that killeth. When the London Yearly Meeting put forward in its General Epistle of 1836 the statements that the sacred Scripture is "the only divinely authorised record of the doctrines of true religion," "the appointed means of making known to us the blessed truths of Christianity," "the only divinely authorised record of the doctrines which we are bound as Christians to believe, and of the moral principles which are to regulate our actions," the *raison d'être* of the Society was gone. William Southall, of Leominster, was warranted in declaring that this language "went to the subversion of the very foundation of Quakerism."\* For, as Hodgson truly says, the principle always promulgated in the writings of early Friends is "that 'the appointed means' for the soul of man to obtain a saving knowledge of God, is a being taught in the school of Christ, through obedience to the 'Inspiring Word,' and faith in the revelations of His Holy Spirit immediately in the heart."

From this shifting of the base, every other doctrinal change has proceeded. Wardlaw, with a true instinct, seizes upon the altered aspect of the doctrine of justification, as affording the most conspicuous proof that what is

\* Hodgson, i., 305—7.

now held and taught among Quakers is not Quakerism; and Wilbur, in three brief sentences which put Gurneyism into a nutshell, concentrates his opposition upon this particular point.\* The true Friend is saved by the work of Christ within, with which he must co-operate in the persistent self-abnegation of faith and obedience. But the modern Quaker, like the ordinary Evangelical, throws himself upon the work of Christ without, to which he attaches himself by the act of credence, and which justifies him *simpliciter*, without respect to obedience. Here we have the atonement by a work done for us, in place of the atonement of a work wrought in us. "Instead of submitting, therefore, to die with Christ, and to abide the painful struggle of yielding up the will and wisdom of the flesh, these," says John Wilbur, "have moulded and fashioned to themselves a substitute, by professedly extolling and claiming the faith of Christ's incarnate sufferings and propitiatory sacrifice upon the cross without the gates of Jerusalem, as the *whole* covenant of salvation, and by him thus accomplished without them."†

Hence, on the one hand, there is little trace in modern Quakerism of the broad doctrine of the Light of the World, of Christ as the spiritual illuminator who visits every soul in every age, in every clime, in every religion and non-religion, and abides with those who will receive him and obey him, quite independently of the intervention of historical knowledge, or of a written Word of Truth. To the spiritual grandeur and the redeeming efficacy of this old conception the modern Quaker is strangely dull. He cannot trust himself to teach his ancient principles in the full sweep of their original power.

And, on the other hand, the high doctrine of Christian perfection, on which Barclay is so nobly strong, is faintly heard if at all, scarce believed in, never preached with the unction and vigour of vital experience, among present-day Friends. Mr. Stopford Brooke's powerful plea for the

\* Wilbur's *Journal*, p. 286.

† Wilbur's *Journal*, p. 273.

possibility of sinlessness as a practical aim of living men,\* which recently startled the decorous believers in "One God and twenty shillings to the pound," takes a position which would flutter if not horrify the elect of modern Quakerism. They betray no sign of yielding an inward response to the doctrine, at once humble and bold, of Barclay's eighth proposition, in the exposition of which he maintains that "there may be a state attainable in this life, in which to do righteousness may become so natural to regenerate souls, that in the stability of it they cannot sin. . . . Or is Christ unwilling to have his servants thoroughly pure?" To have reached this stage, Barclay makes no personal pretension, but the presence of its ideal is a perpetual inspiration to him. And when even the hope of it has vanished, the glory of the Christian consummation is undreamed of. Among the successors of Fox and Barclay, salvation is reduced to a minimum, and not only the Quaker breadth but the Quaker height is shrunk away.

Altered views lead to altered methods. And the adoption of the new methods has produced what is called a revival. But it is not a resurrection of the original Quakerism, either in form or in spirit. The revival is the astonishing spectacle of the introduction of nearly everything which the first leaders of Quakerism distrusted, rejected, denounced, and abhorred. Set sermons, constructed prayers, religious services prearranged as to time, mode and circumstance, hymns sung to order, Scriptures read by measure, a limping congregationalism intruding on the trustful rest which waited patiently for the Spirit, a deliberate effort of missionary endeavour doing duty for the rush of the old freedom when the power of the Truth came upon all—this is the new picture, this is what Quaker periodicals put on record, sometimes with misgiving, often with satisfaction. Let it be granted that these are all very excellent things in their own way. This, however, is not the way in which we expect to see the people called Friends walking. It is not the way of their birth, their strength, or

\* *What Think ye of Christ?* Unitarian Association Sermon, 1884.

their testimony. It may be thought a better way; but the plain English of this is, that the quondam Quakers have hit upon something which they conceive to be better than Quakerism.

This, at any rate, is the opinion of some among their own members. The innovations do not go on without wavering voices. Among the most remarkable for their outspokenness, and their thorough saturation with the old uncompromising spirit of the Quaker protest, are the incandescent tracts of W. B. S. [Sissison] of Plumstead. He does not directly attack the Society or its members, but there is no mistaking who are intended to come in for a share of the denunciations heaped upon so-called revivalists in general, on those who "preach on heavenly things from a natural ground only," on "blind guides and lying chattering prophets, with your horn-blowers of the press," on "the fleshly arts of continual singing, mumbling, and 'praying,' to make up for this absence of the *manifest* presence of the blessed and glorious God." We have quoted only some of his mildest words; the direction in which they point is evident. What is to be said on the other side?

The inheritor of a great name, himself a man of rare conscientiousness and self devotion, who consecrated his studies to a radical investigation of the sources of the Quaker movement\*, and gave his soul to Gospel labours, Robert Barclay, of Reigate (1833—1876), has left behind him a volume of sermons, written for delivery in the mission meetings of Friends.† His biographer explains his position as that of one holding with Friends, "that God does enable His ministers effectually to preach His Gospel

\* The historical acumen, combined with elaborate research, displayed in Barclay's *Inner Life*, &c., must excite the admiration of every competent reader. But how little it is accepted by Friends of the primitive type as justly appreciating the significance of the Quaker movement, may be seen in an able *Examen* of the work, published, in 1878, by Charles Evans, M.D., of Philadelphia.

† *Sermons* by Robert Barclay, author of the *Inner Life of the Religious Societies of the Commonwealth*, with a brief Memoir. Edited by his Widow, 1878.

without any previous meditation or preparation," and also as holding, "with the majority of Christians, that God does *equally* bless the word preached when this blessing has been asked on the diligent study of the Scriptures" (p. viii).<sup>\*</sup> This is, in effect, to place the ministry of the Spirit on precisely the same level as the ministry of the letter; and, whatever else may be said about it, the position is incompatible with the first principles of early Friends. Barclay's sermons were doubtless very effective in delivery, and they are markedly superior to many utterances of the same school, in the stress they lay on the progressive nature of sanctification. But, after reading them carefully, we have failed to find in them a single Quaker sentiment, distinctively such; and have encountered ample proofs that the changed spiritual atmosphere is one in which the original Quakers could have scarcely breathed.

To Barclay of Ury, Plato, Pythagoras and Plotinus "had a knowledge and discovery of Jesus Christ inwardly, as a remedy *in* them,"<sup>†</sup> while Barclay of Reigate can only speak of "invisible rays of light, for a moment perchance rendered invisible in the intense moral darkness in which a Socrates or a Plato lived and died."<sup>‡</sup> If there is any truth which shines clear in the Apologist's pages, it is that of the identity of the guidance under which all true Christians act with that which constituted the inspiration of the Apostles; and that such has have to-day the call to the Gospel ministry, "preach not in speech only, but also in power and in the Holy Ghost," and "cannot but be received and heard by the sheep of Christ."<sup>§</sup> Yet his namesake affirms that "this 'demonstration of the spirit and of power' was vouchsafed or given to the Early Church, not only as at the present day in the general preaching of the Gospel, but in a way wholly diverse—in a way which enabled the Apostle to say—what none of the most gifted preachers of the Gospel since apostolic times has ever dared to say—'If any man think himself to be a prophet, or spiritual, let him

<sup>\*</sup> The italics are ours.

<sup>†</sup> *Sermons*, p. 227.

<sup>‡</sup> *Apology*, props. 5, 6, sec. 27.

<sup>§</sup> *Apology*, prop. 10, sec. 24.



acknowledge that the things I write unto you are the commandments of the Lord.' " \* To George Fox, such an expression of his conviction that he was but a mouthpiece of the Spirit which filled and swayed him would have been as natural as it was to the Apostle Paul. †

Like Mr. Gurney, Mr. Barclay may be fairly regarded as representing more than individual views and aims. Comparing the position of the one with that of the other, there is a difference to be observed. A perceptible advance is in progress. Mr. Gurney succeeded in altering the religious standpoint. In him, the theory of birthright membership bore its natural fruits, when uncorrected by the sedulous inculcation of Friends' primitive principles. But now the object is to give a deliberate wrench to the outer life of the body, so as to make its type of activity correspond with its remodelled ideas.

Mr. Barclay's position within the Quaker fold was perfectly sincere and consistent with itself. He regarded the Society of Friends (with Mr. Herbert Skeats) as a Home Mission Association; Fox he valued as a great religious organiser; and the Quaker testimonies to which his heart responded most clearly were those against oaths, war, and entrusting the work of evangelisation to a State establishment. It was his hope and belief, says his biographer, "that by a fuller development of their principles, the Society of Friends might regain its position as an aggressive Christian Church" (p. 39). Yet it is evident that the tendency of his efforts was in the direction of leading the denomination of the waiters upon the Spirit to follow in the wake of the Dissenting Churches, whose success in laying hold of the masses had very strongly impressed his mind. This programme sketches a future for the Quakers, but is it not a future which is to be realised by the obliteration of the essential Quaker testimony? Wars, oaths, and

\* *Sermons*, p. 368.

† See what George Pitt says (*Immediate Revelation True*, p. 19): "George Fox's silver trumpet spoke with no uncertain sound. He boldly said, 'I deliver messages direct from God.' 'God has come to teach his people himself.'"

establishments are testified against by other sects in these days; but on general humanitarian grounds, whose force is derived ultimately, no doubt, from the progress of Christian sentiment. If the Quaker is driven to combat evils with these common weapons, and can no longer plead the Immediate Voice of the living Christ in the heart, what differentiates him from the religious public about him; and where is the inward note of his spiritual succession from his forebears of the Commonwealth?

It may be thought that in this article we are dealing with a matter of no public interest, and touching upon affairs with which we have no just concern. But the Quakers have a history which is of moment to the world. They have done great things in their day for us all. They have been a power in the development of the English people, both here and in the United States. Their power sprang from their principles; we cannot hope that when these have faded the influence should remain. Their fathers lived not by ephemeral methods, nor for imitative and passing results. They knew where strength lay, and were content to be passive when the way of the spirit was not opened for them.

Few in numbers, resolved of heart, those have the real future of Friends' principles in their keeping, who will have nothing to do with modern Quakerism. John Barclay revealed the secret of their confidence when he wrote: "Yet the blessed Truth shall outlive it all, and emerge out of the very ruins, if it must come to that."

ALX. GORDON.

## CONVERTS TO ROME.

WHEN Dr. Coplestone was Provost, it was customary at Oxford to call the "Oriel set," "noetic"; no exuberance of flattery can apply that epithet to the arrangement of names in Mr. Gordon Gorman's book.\* The compiler says "it may astonish some to know that this work contains more than one thousand names which did not appear in the fourth edition;" but surely we have much more reason to be astonished at the information that "the Rt. Hon. W. E. Gladstone's suggestions as to the arrangement of the names have been carefully followed." "Redistribution" is so frequently the mental aspiration of the reader, that he becomes unconsciously the echo of Lord Salisbury, and begs for redistribution before the appearance of the next edition.

The work is useful, is attractively got up, and we only detect a few errors almost impossible to avoid in such a collection. But the arrangement is troublesome. Surely names ought to appear in the division with which they are popularly identified. Thus for forty years Kenelm Digby has been an honoured name amongst the lovers of mediæval story, yet it has to be sought in a Cambridge College and not in the list of literature to which he lent his treasures of curious lore, beautified by the unrivalled charm of his character.

Again, the most eminent convert to Roman Catholicism is, unquestionably, Cardinal Newman, and in his opinion

\* *Converts to Rome.* A list of over 3,000 Protestants who have become Roman Catholics since the commencement of the Nineteenth Century. Compiled by W. GORDON GORMAN. London: W. Swan Sonnenschein and Co., 1894.

(as we have reason to know) the most suggestive conversion was that of Hope Scott. The latter was for years the most trusted legal adviser of the Anglican leaders, and one of the most successful pleaders in railway business before Committees of the House of Commons. He was also a man of high social position. His name does not, however, appear in the list headed "the legal profession," or in that of "the nobility and gentry." He is entered under Merton College, Oxford, into which society he was, when still a young man, elected a fellow.

Cardinal Newman—who was brought up at Trinity College, Oxford, and became the most distinguished clerical leader of his time, and an author of the highest mark, and who after a memorable Roman Catholic career has recently been, by a graceful act, elected an hon. Fellow of the College whence he graduated—is not entered in the list of clergymen or literary men, or of the College of which he was an *alumnus* and is a Fellow, but under the name of another College of which for many years he was fellow and tutor.

Cardinal Manning was a distinguished clergyman before his conversion, but his name does not appear in the Clerical list or in the Literary list, though not unknown to literature, but as former Fellow of Merton.

Recognising the names of some respectable shopkeepers, as also the sons and daughters of such, we wished to learn the names of others belonging to a section so important as the trading class, but to our disappointment we found these thrown into the list of the aristocracy and gentry, thus confusing alike both lines of entry. On the other hand, the list entitled "Relatives of Clergymen" contains the names of Ryder, Ch. Manning, Watts Russell, and Vansittart, which fairly belong to the Gentry. The compiler has also been in some cases betrayed into the mistake of inserting as converts the children of converts. This error will doubtless be corrected in a future edition, for Mr. Gordon Gorman obviously wishes to make his list accurate. His errors are made *bonâ fide*, in many cases apparently following the interesting but uncorrected work on the "Tractarian Movement," by

Mr. Kirwan Browne, a convert who, thirty-nine years ago, resigned his Anglican curacy, and has testified to his conscientiousness through many privations and sufferings. A list like Mr. Browne's, compiled from newspaper items, unless carefully verified, partakes of the inaccuracy of all current news ; and Mr. Legges' compilation, utilised and enlarged by Mr. Gorman, bears traces of a like origin. Some names, *e.g.*, Messrs. Ffoulkes, Proctor, Hargrove, &c., &c., are now properly omitted. A list of converts supposes those deceased to have died in communion with the Roman Catholic Church, and those still living not to have dropped out of its pale. Verification might be desirable as to some members of the Queensborough, Ellenborough, and Simeon families ; also as to the continued insertion of the names of Miss Gladstone, Lady Duff Gordon, and Messrs. Hemans, Capes, Palgrave, Case, Paley, Renouf, Wordsworth, Buckle, Rawson, Isaac Butt, Thomas Cooper, Goldsmid, and others. Father Ignatius Lyne has never left the Anglican Church.

The list contains some persons who were baptized as infants in the Roman Catholic Church ; and though the names of the Duke of Norfolk, his sisters and brother, are now omitted, yet we find the mistake of inserting Lord Beaumont and other members of his family. Also is there not similar mistake as to other names, such as Chichester, Grimshaw, Biddulph, and, perhaps, St. George Mivart ? But these slight blemishes do not materially affect the numerical importance of the list, or its general trustworthiness.

When the Tractarian Movement had been in existence for a few years, causing unbounded expectations amongst all zealous members of the Papal party in France and Rome, M. Jules Gondon published a work entitled "*Conversion de cent cinquante Ministres Anglicans*," wherein he analysed the causes of these conversions ; and in the year 1866 M. Chevé published in the series of M. Migne a large 8 vo. of 1,671 pages, a work entitled "*Dictionnaire des conversions, ou Essai d'encyclopédie historique des conversions au*

Catholicisme depuis dix-huit siècles et principalement depuis le Protestantisme."

It would be interesting to possess similar lists of converts to Protestantism and also to Rationalism during the last 350 years, tracing causes and results.

M. Gondon and M. Chevé thus investigate the question of the progress of Catholicism in England. They attribute the commencement of the reaction to the period of the French emigration. "In the year 1765, it was estimated that England, Scotland, and Wales contained only 60,000 Roman Catholics, whereas an official report presented to the House of Commons in 1828 assigns to London and its suburbs as many as 133,110. In 1843 the Roman Catholic population of London and its suburbs had risen to 230,000; and the Roman Catholic population of Lancashire to 26,000. In all the large towns, as in all the manufacturing and mining districts, a similar increase has continued up to the present time, in consequence of the Irish emigration. Foreign writers seem generally ignorant of the fact that the vast numerical increase of Roman Catholicism is due to the Irish element. Conversion from the Church of England has contributed to the English Papal cause, leaders, writers, wealth, and social prestige. Nonconformity has hardly provided the Roman Church with any converts. Some members of Nonconformist and also of Presbyterian families can be enumerated, but these have for the most part come to the Papal Church after a few years in the Church of England, or in the Episcopal Church of Scotland.

But unquestionably the first influence resulted from the French emigration. It is estimated that 8,000 French priests came to England in consequence of the French Revolution, and a still larger number of monks and nuns. Also legitimists whose social position and misfortunes obtained for them a welcome amongst our county families, and in the wealthier homes in nearly all our provincial towns. The Tory sentiment of England overpowered hatred and dread of Romanism. It became a political and patriotic duty to relieve French priests and to fraternise

with French emigrants. The heretofore flourishing latitudinarianism of the clergy and instructed classes was frowned down into extinction. It became a national duty to profess Christianity, if only as a testimony against the Revolution. Thus amongst the gentry, "Antichrist" became almost popular as a symbol of Christianity.

It may be easily supposed that the Roman Catholic gentry were not behindhand in an effusion of hospitality towards those who were their brethren in faith, and whose sufferings reminded them of long years of devotedness which left a halo of heroism and romance over many of the ancient homes of England. These words are written beneath the portrait of one who thus threw open his country house, making it the abode of half a dozen priests who officiated daily in his domestic chapel. A young boy of that same family, riding on one occasion towards an adjacent town, recognised as he thought a priest under the guise of a cattle-drover, dismounted, brought back the émigré on his own pony, to be the sharer of a like hospitality.

Priests were scattered over the whole of England, as teachers of languages, becoming frequent guests in households wherein an English priest could not have set his foot. It is a singular but certain fact that in not a few cases, canons and other dignified ecclesiastics who were thus in exile and poverty for their faith, were and had for years been Voltairian in their private opinions. But others, especially among the humbler clergy, were men full of faith and zeal. These became the founders of Roman Catholic missions in a considerable number of places. Sometimes a French priest shared house and chapel with an English missionary priest, obtaining for the latter a forbearance and even consideration which he would not otherwise have received.

A few, but very few, converts can be directly traced to these French priests. They founded minute congregations near the residence of some Roman Catholic family. Foreigners of distinction visiting the neighbourhood



would frequently cause the presence of English political sympathisers. Thus the ground was prepared, the seed was cast into it, but as yet the English gentry were utterly unprepared even to entertain the idea of conversion. It needed other causes to produce the harvest, which if slightly exaggerated by a few trifling mistakes, is, as presented by Mr. Gorman, one sufficiently noticeable and replete with consequences of which we, as yet, see only the beginning.

The ground had been prepared by the Tory party, which meant nearly the whole of the gentry, aided by the War party, which was an overwhelming majority of the nation. The Liberal party, small in number, but with plenty of talent and vigour, became the incidental abettors of the Roman Catholic cause. Inspired with the love of liberty and of justice, they during many weary years advocated the restitution of political rights to all without distinction of religion. Roman Catholic controversialists, anxious to conciliate their countrymen, and to aid on their own dawning hopes, presented the Roman Catholic faith shorn of all its most objectionable features, until the bugbear of Englishmen looked like the meekest of all lambs. This produced two curious effects: 1st, the gradual secession of a very considerable number of the aristocracy and gentry, who conformed to the Church of England during the very years when they were recovering their due status in the country; 2nd, the Liberals, to aid their efforts for religious liberty, circulated in the Houses of Parliament, and amongst the clergy and laity of influence, such productions as Sydney Smith's vivid letters on the Catholics, "by Peter Plymley to my brother Abraham, who lives in the country." To palliate Roman Catholicism was to contend for the rights of conscience, and the attainment of liberty.

Thus two great political movements, one connected with hatred of the French Revolution, the other connected with the Liberal battle for Roman Catholic emancipation, without producing any converts to the Roman Catholic faith, yet served to remove many of the prejudices which

oppressed them and disfigured them in the eyes of their countrymen. The soil was thus prepared ; it remained for an ecclesiastical movement within the Church of England to produce the harvest.

It may well excite our surprise that the Roman Catholic Church should, in England, have obtained during this century so few converts, except those produced by the Tractarian Movement identified with Dr. Pusey and Dr. Newman. A Church so powerfully organised, so ardent and skilled in proselytism ; a Church possessing so many sources of attraction, legendary, historic, artistic ; a Church which may fitly boast to have existed since Pope Gregory announced its distinctive claims, 1,280 years ago, unless with questionable reason we admit its origin as a Papal monarchy claiming jurisdiction over all Christians to be counted from the Pontificate of Leo in the fifth century—Antiquity itself might be expected to win for it many converts : for though its doctrines have changed greatly during those centuries, it ought to be counted as the Roman Catholic Church from the period when the claim of a universal Papal spiritual supremacy was first distinctly made and accepted throughout Latin Christendom. Such are amongst some of the attractions which might be expected to induce conversions. But in spite of all, in spite of its claim (so captivating to timid minds) of being the one only Ark of Salvation, it does not succeed in Asia and Africa nearly so well as Mahomedanism, and in England, it does not obtain so many converts as does Methodism. It has left almost untouched all but the classes which were socially affected by the Tractarian Movement in the Church of England. Previously there had been hardly more than two noticeable lay converts, Kenelm Digby and Ambrose Lisle Phillips ; but these were in every respect men calculated to attract to any communion. The former by his charming books of Mediæval legend, presented, to those prepared to believe, a vision of sanctity and singleness of heart, which, though historically deceptive, was autobiographically true. The latter, De Lisle (as in later

years he became) endeavoured to create in Leicestershire the modes of life which Kenelm Digby pictured from the past, and gathered into his Gothic home foreigners, priests, and nobles, Anglicans, and Inquirers, who saw, during a few brief years, a pastoral neighbourhood inspired by the enthusiasm of one man.

Protestants were surprised to see an English squire acting as cantor at Mass, or assisting to carry the canopy over the Blessed Sacrament in processions along country roads, or kneeling amidst peasants before the image of a Mater Dolorosa erected on a hill top. A Trappist monastery arose amidst the rocks of Charnwood Forest. A Roman barrister who had become a priest of the Order of Charity, Dr. Gentili, was to be seen on village greens or in the market places of the country towns of Leicestershire, a man of striking presence, with large crucifix on his breast, with impassioned eloquence depicting the horrors of hell, the terrors of the judgment day, and mercy flowing forth from the sacramental wounds of Christ. It was openly stated and firmly believed that the church at Grace Dieu Manor had been visited by angels, that devils had been seen approaching the sedilia, that the soul of one of the damned had come from hell, and outside the porch of the church revealed to De Lisle a secret for his instruction.

For a time it seemed as if Methodism and all other forms of enthusiasm must yield to this new and unwonted spectacle of impassioned earnestness united to the highest culture and the most attractive human qualities, supported by miracles, by supernatural voices from heaven, and other portents firmly believed by men to whom imposture and hypocrisy were impossibilities. It sounds like a tale of the Middle Ages to describe how De Lisle actually led on a band of rustics, inspired by hatred of Paganism, to destroy a statue of Venus in his father's grounds. The remarkable fact is that, as a popular movement, no results endured. The monastery remained, the chapels remained, but with congregations, in course of a few years, reduced to small dimensions. But De Lisle indirectly did not a little—not only by his

work in Leicestershire, but by causing the introduction of the Rosminian and Passionist Mission Services throughout England—to attract a portion of the Tractarian movement towards the Roman Church; though when those who knew and loved him have passed away, he will be chiefly remembered as one of the characters in D'Israeli's "Coningsby." One of De Lisle's converts was a clergyman, afterwards known all over the three kingdoms as the Hon. and Rev. Father Ignatius Spencer. The almost solitary important convert from Evangelicalism, with the simplicity of a child, and the fervour of a saint, he, for nearly a quarter of a century, went about begging everywhere for prayers for the conversion of England. All the other converts may be regarded as the result of the Tractarian movement. The Tractarian writers revived belief in priestly powers, and the absolute need of sacraments which only priests could confer. Doubts as to the validity of the Anglican orders drove some into the Roman Church. Others were influenced by the notion so enforced by the writers of the new school, that absolute unity of doctrine was essential to salvation, and flying from the salutary divergencies of Anglicanism they sought the unity of submission. It is a grave error to attribute these conversions to love of vestments and ceremonies. It was a movement of profound earnestness, thrilled with emotion by the poetic sympathetic genius of Newman. The men were so much in earnest, that many anticipated their unconscious leader, parting from those they loved and revered.

It is the joy of Religious Rationalism to be able to honour goodness and devotedness in the most opposing systems of belief. The disruption of the Kirk of Scotland in the year 1843 has caused the existence of a sect in which Religious Liberalism is less possible and less frequent than in the Established Kirk, yet we honour, nay, revere those 474 ministers who, in obedience to conviction, broke through the associations of years. From 1847, for ten or a dozen years, similar sacrifices were being undergone in England. We are not members of the Anglican Church,

but we regard the Anglican Church as greatly superior to the Roman Church in its influence on character, on the family, on the State, and on mankind. We regard the Roman Church as inculcating graver and more dangerous errors. But Natural Religion embraces both the Calvinist and the Romanist, and enables either to be appreciated. Pages might be written descriptive of the conscientious sufferings endured by many of the converts; clergymen like Dean Maclaurin and many others, leaving their happy parsonages to embrace poverty and isolation. It is a mistake to suppose that these sufferings always ceased after conversion. Kirwan Browne tells us of clerical converts saved from starvation by presents of broken meat. To others, and those not few, came at length a trial greater than poverty, *disenchantment*. In some cases it was disenchantment accompanied with courage to disbelieve; then life had to be commenced afresh, with health and spirits broken. In other cases, it was disenchantment accompanied with a permanent impression that they had sacrificed every thing for an illusion, and yet without courage to reopen the question; life passed on clouded and without hope.

It may be asked, What have been the results? My own opinion is that the Roman Catholic Church has not gained much amongst the mercantile classes, or amongst the classes of skilled artizans. But that, as sufficiently proved by Mr. G. Gorman's list, it has gained greatly amongst the classes interwoven with the clergy, and that it will become ere long still more powerful in the House of Peers. Most of the aristocratic class have some relative, generally a lady, in the Roman Catholic Church. I believe that if the Anglican Church had been separated from the State, and therefore enabled to have enforced uniformity along the lines of the Sacramental system, that there would have been but few secessions to Rome. Or, barring that, if years ago Dr. Overbeck had succeeded, and prevailed on the Eastern Patriarchs to authorise in England a Church in communion with them, that there would have been no conversions at

all to Rome. The Eastern Orthodox Church has greater antiquity than the Papal Church, has undoubted Orders, and possesses a Faith which, however far apart from the teachings of Christ, is not exposed to the logical, historical, and moral objections bound up with Papal absolutism.

Probably we have not much to apprehend of numerical increase of English Roman Catholics, but they will become powerful auxiliaries to the Anglican Church in the education question. Their power has been much increased by the changed attitude of the Government, the Court, and Society. Cardinal Manning, with singular ability, has by the Temperance movement gratified the Irish by organised displays of numbers, whilst utilising successfully the homage rendered to his ecclesiastical rank by the leaders of fashion.

In America, the Irish emigration keeps feeding the Roman communion, and though their clergy lament over enormous losses, yet their Church increases year by year; and not unfrequently we hear of an Irishman who has pushed up from the ranks and amassed great wealth. It is said that it is rare for native Americans to become Roman Catholics, unless through the frequent absurd inconsistency of sending young people to Roman Catholic places of education.

The conversion of an American Bishop does not seem to have obtained imitators: and the great intellectual gifts of Brownson did more to stimulate Roman Catholics than to obtain converts.

But Mr. Gordon Gorman's list has led us to consider only the past. The old controversies are hastening away to the background. Those who now chiefly attract educated attention, are not treating questions as to the validity of Orders and the Grace of the Sacraments: but God, Duty, Immortality.

Roman Catholicism is obtaining an ally far more dangerous and far more effectual than Anglicanism: that ally is Agnosticism, the offspring of ecclesiastical dogmatism, its enemy, and its restorer.

Once let persons be induced to suppose that there is Nothing to believe, Nothing to trust, Nothing to serve, Nothing to hope, Nothing worth a sacrifice or an aspiration : and minds which have become the weary victims of intellectual effeminacy will crowd into the Papal Church, without conviction, without enthusiasm, seeking in vain a shadow to guide them through darkness.

ROBT. RODOLPH SUFFIELD.



### LIBERAL OR SOCIALIST?\*

MR. HERBERT SPENCER lays against the modern Liberal a charge which will rankle in his breast. The epithet Radical, which his fathers resented, already has to him a pleasant savour. To be called Communist, Anarchist, Nihilist, he is well accustomed. Cardinal Manning's amiable syllogism, stript of verbiage, runs thus : One prominent Liberal is an Atheist ; all Liberals demand for him the rights of citizenship ; therefore, all Liberals are Atheists. The modern Liberal is galled by this logical jugglery not at all. But when Mr. Spencer declares that "Modern Liberal" should be writ "New Tory," he must look for angry repudiation of the charge indeed.

Yet the charge is soberly brought and is supported with all the knowledge and the fertility of illustration at the command of our foremost living social philosopher, himself every inch a Liberal up to a certain point. Observing the legislation accomplished within the last quarter of a century by Liberals, observing also the legislation demanded more loudly and more extensively every day by those who declare themselves Liberals still, Mr. Spencer pronounces the nominally Liberal idea and ideal current in our time to be compacted of principles and aspirations essentially Tory in their true analysis. If this be so, it is a profoundly interesting and vastly momentous social fact, and one which no social student can afford to pass over without note.

\* *The Man versus the State*; containing "The New Toryism," "The Coming Slavery," "The Sins of Legislators," and "The Great Political Superstition." By HERBERT SPENCER. Reprinted from the *Contemporary Review*, with a Postscript. London : Williams and Norgate. 1884.

It is not the function of this Review to throw itself into the conflict of political parties; but it is entirely germane to its purpose to inquire into the fundamental nature of great social forces and to estimate the relations of such mighty currents of opinion as the Liberal and the Socialistic.

Mr. Spencer's indictment of latter-day Liberalism—his allegation that it is in fact a new and subtle form of Toryism—is based on that remarkable infusion of Socialistic conceptions into professedly Liberal opinion which is patent to every observer of the dominant political and social thought. With striking ingenuity he brings the species Socialism under the genus Toryism, a feat of classification which must bewilder disciples of either school, yet is not without its justification. Sufficiently generalise the meaning of the historic epithet which Lords Salisbury and Churchill seem not unwilling to revive and to adopt, and "Democratic Toryism" is not a contradiction in terms. The great lexicographer's definition of a Tory as "one who adheres to the ancient constitution of the state and the apostolical hierarchy of the church of England," is not much more philosophically exhaustive than that other famous definition of his: "WHIG, the name of a faction." The real essence of the Tory conception has never changed from the time when Bolingbroke associated it with "divine, hereditary, indefeasible right, lineal succession, passive obedience, prerogative, non-resistance, slavery," to the time when it dreads the enfranchisement of the County Householder without "a wise scheme of redistribution" which shall not rashly "let loose" the new voters. It has always contemplated some artificial and compulsory order of society as distinguished from an order of society evolved by the great natural forces which act upon communities of men. It is true that the old-fashioned Tory conceives that this order of society should be one in which the land-holder, the state clergyman and the inheritor of high title shall be guaranteed a secure dominance over the masses of men; while the new-fashioned Socialist,

on the contrary, conceives that the order should be one in which the masses of men shall be guaranteed in many comforts and enjoyments secure from all pretensions to dominance on the part of squire or priest or lord. But each looks for national welfare to the realisation of his ideal order through such legislative guarantees and securities; and each distrusts the action of the natural forces of industrialism, individualism, and voluntary combination unchecked or unsupplemented by the artificially generated forces which kings, parliaments, or plebiscites may contrive.

Liberalism, on the other hand, confronts both Socialist and Tory with a long record of fidelity to a precisely opposite principle,—a fidelity which Mr. Spencer declares, however, to have suffered many breaches in our own day, and to the complete abandonment of which he looks forward with despondent certainty. Liberalism in the old days stood for distrust of artificial legislative checks, balances, restraints or interferences, and enthusiastic trust in the working of unhampered, unhindered individualities for the greatest good of the greatest number. Before Evolution had been heard of, Liberalism blindly, passionately believed in Evolution. It believed that the best order of society would unfold itself, if only society were sufficiently let alone; and it spent its strength and fervour through many a hard-fought day in compelling meddlesome hands to unloose their grasp on the domestic, the commercial, the religious lives of the people.

Mr. Spencer runs through a long list of legislative measures, from the Habeas Corpus Act to the removal of fiscal burdens from the press, all illustrating this essential feature first of Whig and afterwards of Liberal Law-making and Law-repealing. Within the period of fully developed modern Liberalism, the period since the first Reform Bill, a like list might be drawn out which would cover many pages. In all the four great departments of legislative activity the characteristic feature predominates in measures of the first importance. In the constitutional

realm, the two Reform Acts themselves and the third attempted Reform Bill may all be regarded as movements for the abolition of restraint, the cancelling of monopoly, the sweeping away of "checks and balances"; they have all tended towards the universal enfranchisement of the individual, so that no one class shall exercise despotic control over any other. In the social sphere, the emancipation of the West Indian negroes was a magnificent advance in the like direction. In matters ecclesiastical, the Irish Church Disestablishment, the Burials Act, and the opening of the Universities have all proceeded on the same principle. In matters commercial, the abolition of the Corn Laws and the whole Free Trade movement have been conceived on precisely the same lines. It is needless to enumerate minor statutes. Every one feels that these Acts have been characteristically and typically Liberal by whatever Government actually carried; and every one perceives that they are so because they remove the power of one section of society to restrain another, set free individual initiative, and rely on the natural forces energising in the community to do more and better for it than forces cunningly contrived by conceding privileges here and entailing disabilities there.

But it is unquestionably true that that great wave of Liberalism which has swept over the nation and with its mighty energies washed to one level the sand hill of lordly prerogative and the pit of abject servitude, has to some extent receded before, or at least encountered cross-currents from a stream of legislation of a different type, and that too by the initiative of the party claiming to be Liberal.

We can but summarise in briefest fashion Mr. Spencer's own summary of this restraining and protective legislation. In 1860, under Lord Palmerston we have extension of Factory Acts to bleaching and dyeing, provision for municipal analysts, for inspection and regulation of gas-works, for further mine inspection, for prevention of juvenile labour; in 1861 follow extension of Factory Acts to lace-

works, enforced vaccination, increase of regulative powers of local boards; in 1862, further restrictions on bleach-works and coal mines, restraint on unauthorised Pharmacopœias; in 1863, compulsory vaccination extended to the whole kingdom, provision for employing men out of work and for municipal regulation of open spaces, minute regulation of bakehouses, and magisterial inspection of food; in 1864, extension of Factory Acts, regulation of chimney-sweepers, of beer, of cables and anchors, and also the Contagious Diseases Act; in 1865, compulsory relief of vagrants, further regulation of public-houses, regulations for extinguishing fires; in 1866, under Lord John Russell, regulation of cattle-sheds, of hop-growers, of lodging-houses, and an enactment for compulsory provision of books. In 1869, under Mr. Gladstone, we have telegraphy, cabs, beer-houses, cattle-disease, and sea-birds all taken under Government regulation; in 1870, we have the Education Act and a further Factories and Workshops Act; in 1871, merchant shipping, factories, pedlars, and vaccination receive paternal attention; in 1872, babies out to nurse, factories, spirit-shops, and passenger steamers are regulated; in 1873, children engaged in agriculture and once more merchant shipping. Coming to the present Ministry, in spite of Mr. Warton, many regulative Bills have passed safely through to the estate of Acts.

We have, in 1880, a law which forbids conditional advance-notes in payment of sailors' wages; also a law which dictates certain arrangements for the safe carriage of grain-cargoes; also a law increasing local coercion over parents to send their children to school. In 1881 comes legislation to prevent trawling over clam-beds and bait-beds, and an interdict making it impossible to buy a glass of beer on Sunday in Wales. In 1882, the Board of Trade was authorised to grant licences to generate and sell electricity, and municipal bodies were enabled to levy rates for electric lighting; further exactions from rate-payers were authorised for facilitating more accessible baths and wash-houses; and local authorities were empowered to make bye-laws for securing the decent lodging of persons engaged in picking fruit and vegetables. Of such legislation during 1883

may be named the Cheap Trains Act, which, partly by taxing the nation to the extent of £400,000 a year (in the shape of relinquished passenger duty), and partly at the cost of railway proprietors, still further cheapens travelling for workmen: the Board of Trade, through the Railway Commissioners, being empowered to ensure sufficiently good and frequent accommodation. Again, there is the Act which, under penalty of £10 for disobedience, forbids the payment of wages to workmen at or within public-houses; there is another Factory and Workshops Act, commanding inspection of white-lead works (to see that there are provided overalls, respirators, baths, acidulated drinks, &c.) and of bake-houses, regulating times of employment in both, and prescribing in detail some constructions for the last, which are to be kept in a condition satisfactory to the inspectors.\*

But the indictment of the neo-liberals is not yet complete. They have done much: they would do more. Further Factory Acts are threatened. Vast interferences with the building-trade are urged for the sake of the better housing of the poor. Food for the body as well as for the mind is suggested as properly pertaining to compulsory education. Research is to be further endowed with public money. Compulsory insurance is vigorously urged, and still more eagerly compulsory abolition of the trade in alcoholic drink, and at least compulsory cultivation of land if not the assumption of all the lands of the country by the State itself.

If Liberalism is indeed in its proper principle solely the removal of legal restraint, then truly we have here a prodigious catalogue of anti-liberal Acts and aspirations on the part of Liberals falsely so-called. It is, however, not to be too easily believed that the most vital party in the State, inheriting and cherishing a magnificent tradition, nurtured in passionate adhesion to a far-reaching principle, has turned its back on its own training and is working against all for which its fathers fought and suffered. It becomes necessary to ask whether Mr. Spencer's analysis of historical Liberalism really goes to the bottom of the matter.

\* Pp. 11, 12.

Mr. Spencer variously defines and describes the true Liberals and the true Liberalism, but always much to the same effect. The Liberal is "one who advocates greater freedom from restraint, especially in political institutions." Toryism stands for "the *régime* of status," Liberalism for "the *régime* of contract," "the one for that system of compulsory co-operation which accompanies the legal inequality of classes, and the other for that voluntary co-operation which accompanies their legal equality."\*

There is no doubt that the historical outward working of Liberalism is here quite accurately described. But it is possible that the effective motive of Liberalism lies deeper than the particular form of these external manifestations. So wedded is Mr. Spencer, however, to his formula, that he rebukes both "Liberal statesmen and Liberal voters" for conceiving "the welfare of the many" to be "the aim of Liberalism."† According to him, "the gaining of a popular good" was but "the external conspicuous trait common to Liberal measures in earlier days," the essence of the Liberalism lying solely in "the relaxation of restraints"; and it would almost seem that, in his view, the relaxation of restraint is in itself enough to endow a measure with the true Liberal character even though "the gaining of a popular good" do not fall within the purpose of the legislator.

Surely we have here, not only a pedantry, but a very real confusion of method with aim. "The welfare of the many" has been from first to last the avowed and animating "aim" of Liberal legislation,—and emphatically of "the many." A dividing line between the Tory and the Liberal, running all down the page of history, has been this. To the Tory mind it has seemed that the welfare of the section of the community which the Tory especially befriended might best be served at the cost of other sections; and that on the whole the stability of the State was best secured by insisting on this price. To the Liberal mind, on the contrary, it has rather seemed that the true welfare of

\* P. 17.

† P. 7.



each section of the community might best be served by securing the happiness of the whole and that such good of the whole was the true guarantee of a stable State. And, therefore, the Liberal, with whatever blunders, has aimed from first to last—and it is a strict characteristic of his Liberalism that he has aimed—at the welfare of the many.

In spite, however, of the specific motive of the Liberal in seeking the good of the masses of the people, in a broad sense the good of the nation at large must be recognised as the ultimate purpose of the conscientious Conservative and the conscientious Liberal alike. A still more specific purpose must be found animating the energies of the great historic social force called Liberalism, before we can feel that we have done with the matter. The tenour of Liberal legislation for two centuries has been, as Mr. Spencer says, the relaxation of restraint. That relaxation of restraint may, no doubt, be logically contemplated as an end; but it may also be contemplated as a means, as the method adopted in pursuit of a further end. And this is what it has been in the minds of "Liberal statesmen and Liberal voters." In the minds of the majority of Liberal voters we cannot but suppose that even Mr. Spencer will admit, if pressed, that the relaxation of restraint has been a means or method towards "the gaining of a popular good." But in the minds of Liberal statesmen it has been a means or method towards a clearly defined object intermediate between itself and that ultimate "good" which is the supreme purpose of all statesmanship. This intermediate object has been *the enfranchisement of the individual*.

We contend that any truly philosophical analysis of Liberalism yields this result, that it seeks *the enfranchisement of the individual*. To the Tory the individuals in a State are subordinate to the whole. They are head, hands, feet, members one of another, justified in their specific privilege, in their pursuits, in their existence, only as they are "of the body" and serve the body,—a noble conception—at the high level of which indeed Toryism does not always maintain itself, yet a conception fit to inspire a sublime and devoted

patriotism. It is a conception proper to certain stages of civilisation, the conception which created and sustained Hellas and Rome, though doomed to give place to that yet higher conception in which the individual becomes the most sacred entity of all. It is this latter view which Liberalism consistently maintains. In the Liberal view the State is subordinate to the individuals who constitute it. It is an instrument for their convenience. It fulfils its functions in the measure in which it secures to them the conditions necessary for their full and free development.

It is in fact absurd to say that the aim of Liberalism is the relaxation of restraint. Why relax restraint save for the sake of something which is to come of the relaxation? It is manifestly inconceivable that men who gave energy and life that restraint might be relaxed looked for no benefit to accrue from that relaxation, and toiled for no such result. Men strike fetters off the wrists of slaves that the slaves may be set free for the legitimate activities of manhood. And the high thought that by their measures they were setting men hitherto restrained by unjust law free to be and to do in the world for their own happiness and the world's good has always been the inspiration of the great Liberals who have laboured for the emancipation of the people.

Naturally enough when first the Liberal idea rose upon the world (the idea of the enfranchisement of the individual), they who conceived it found their main work in undoing restraining laws, laws of compulsory co-operation, laws maintaining artificial status. Hitherto the State had been conceived as supreme over the individual, and laws had been shaped accordingly, which pressed the State authority rudely and roughly on men. The statute-book showed little care for the liberties of persons; and the Whig, and the Liberal after him, had a vast clearing to effect of old and pernicious laws which artificially restrained the individual from the proper activities of manhood.

Yet it was not long ere the statesmen of the new time took in hand legislation for the enfranchisement of the

individual which did not consist in any direct removal of positive legal restraints. It was not enough to forbid ancient interferences with individual rights in industry or religion. Fresh classes of men must be endowed with the positive powers of citizenship; and one after another Reform Bills came upon the arena and were universally recognised as typical in their conception, beyond all other measures, of the Liberal idea. Liberalism stood and stands for the *making of citizens*, the producing of units in the State endowed with all powers and opportunities of individual initiative and building up by various and spontaneous energies a happy and efficient people.

Turn now to the mass of recent laws in which Mr. Spencer sees the progeny of a "new Toryism." In specific instances such laws may be wisely or foolishly enacted: what concerns us is to consider whether the animating conception to which they are due is Liberal or Tory. And we conclude without hesitation that it is Liberal. Liberalism aims at the enfranchisement of the individual, at making him as efficient as possible for himself and for society. To this end it sees that he shall receive such rudiments of knowledge as shall enable him to bring instructed intelligence to bear on the struggle of life. To this end also it takes measures that are intended to secure for him that healthy *habitat* without which the upgrowth of an efficient and energetic personality is improbable. To this end it does what it can to prevent either his food or the conditions of his labour from undermining the health and strength of his body or his mind. To this end, by the mouths of an increasing number of its professors, it proposes to check the supply of that which of all agencies most disastrously unnerves the body, paralyses the will, and saps the individuality of men—alcoholic drink.

For he who aims at the largest possible enfranchisement of individuals soon discovers that his aim is hindered not only by old oppressive enactments restraining individuals from natural vents for their physical and mental energy, but to the full as effectually by oppressive forces yielded in

the evolution of society without any intervention of the statute-book whatever. He finds that while it is well to secure the freedom of the press, to remove the duty from paper, to abolish the stamp on newspapers, that goes but a little way in enfranchising the individual if it so happen that his parents have prevented him from learning to read. He becomes aware that, while his fathers did wisely in blotting out those crude statutes which forbade artisans to travel, the matter is but half carried through if he permits companies possessing a practical monopoly in the provision of accommodation for travelling to refuse to carry the artisan at a fare which it is possible for him to pay. He perceives that, while freedom of contract is indeed the breath of commerce and the condition of all industrial welfare, there is no freedom of contract where one party dictates and the other is compelled to accept or to starve; and so he gives the Irish peasant a chance of rising into a genuine citizenship by insisting on certain conditions in his behalf when the bargain is struck. He sees that children bound to the factory wheel for thirteen hours a-day from the time they are seven years old have no reasonable chance of developing an individuality worthy of human beings; and so he secures to them the leisure and the rest which are the conditions of juvenile health. In all things he seeks to enfranchise the individual, by securing to him the elementary conditions without which neither body nor mind can attain its proper growth.

Tens of thousands of English children are born and reared under conditions which negate individualism. They have no chance of developing spontaneity, initiative, the will-faculty, those qualities which constitute an independent, self-reliant personality. Restraints of heredity, restraints of environment are laid upon them. The true Liberal recognises it as his part to counteract or remove those restraints no less than such as spring directly from the bad laws made by kings or senates. The one mode of action is as necessary as the other if men are to be truly free. The slave of drink, the slave of ignorance, the

slave of disease is as truly enslaved as the subject of human tyranny. The tyranny which monopolists of land or wealth find themselves able to exercise over the helpless is as literally a tyranny as that of crowned despots. Liberalism has for its function the emancipation of all slaves, the resistance of all tyranny. Its office is to secure to each man, so far as in it lies, "a fair field and no favour." Mr. Spencer sometimes seems to be strong for the "no favour," but indifferent about the "fair field."

Surely it lies in the mouth of Mr. Spencer least of all men to hold the denizens of our city slums to the responsibilities that are proper to the developed citizen. Yet it is he who meets the cry of pity wrung from us by recent revelations of the condition of the dwellers in London dens, with the remarks that they are in large measure the "undeserving poor" "bearing the penalties of their own misdeeds," that there is "an immense amount of misery which is a normal result of misconduct, and ought not to be dissociated from it," that a large proportion of those for whom we are concerned "are simply good-for-nothings, who in one way or other live on the good-for-somethings—vagrants and sots, criminals and those on the way to crime, youths who are burdens on hard-worked parents, men who appropriate the wages of their wives, fellows who share the gains of prostitutes."\* And with that Mr. Spencer warns Liberals off, and gives them to understand that any meddling is sure to turn out muddling after all.

Now it is Mr. Spencer above all men who has taught us how largely each unit amongst us is the product of heredity modified by environment. It is he who teaches us to understand how it is that these "good-for-nothings" have come into the world with moral sense distorted, with the craving for strong drink over-mastering, with all that is base and mean and foul in men, rank and luxuriant. Yet it is he who applies to this hideous growth the doctrine of *laissez faire* in its most naked and uncompromising form. A large part of his third chapter is devoted to the contention that

the attitude of one section of society towards another can and ought only to be that of competition and antagonism; that an extension of the sentiments and sympathies proper within the little circle of the family beyond those limits, except on the part of individuals, must tell against the good of the race."\* He would press upon the wretched and degraded the full responsibility of their own condition; as they have sown, he would have them reap.†

But the Liberal would be false to his own essential principle if he followed the guidance here offered to him. It is his aspiration and his office to enfranchise the individual, to put him and those who come after him under conditions in which they shall have a chance of attaining to effective citizenship. To this end he must modify, if he can, his environment. He must, if he can, cut off the evil entail from his children. He must, if he can, remove or counteract that social pressure which holds him down. He must, if he can, while denying him all exceptional favour, secure to him the fair field without which he cannot rise into an equipped individuality.

Liberalism then does not consist in undoing the restraining laws of human legislatures and then leaving human greed and the relentless natural laws of society to press upon the individual and crush him, if so hap, all undefended. A human being is precious in the eyes of the Liberal as in those of the Christian. He sees in each man born into the world a possible citizen of individual initia-

\* Pp. 64-69. *Social Statics*, pp. 322-5, 380, 1 (edition of 1851).

† Mr. Spencer attempts to identify those who have been moved by "the bitter cry" with the persons who "are angry if, to maintain our supposed 'national' interests or national 'prestige,' those in authority do not promptly send out some thousands of men to be partially destroyed while destroying other thousands of men whose intentions we suspect, or whose institutions we think dangerous to us, or whose territory our colonists want," and who "then look on with cynical indifference at the weltering confusion left behind, with all its entailed suffering and death." P. 70. Such an identification falls below the height alike of Mr. Spencer's logic and of his chivalry. Mr. G. R. Sims and the Congregational Union must indeed be confounded to find a writer in the *Contemporary Review* violently scolding them as Jingoists!

tive, spontaneous energy, active and creative will. He would develop *men*, and he knows that the manhood may be crushed out of those ground between the upper millstone of grasping landlord or employer and the nether millstone of the elementary wants of humanity. He knows, too, that childhood must be the preparation of manhood, and that true manhood cannot grow out of a childhood starved, stunted and oppressed. He will have neither childhood oppressed nor manhood or womanhood ground out of the adult. He will promote such a condition of society as shall secure to all a fair field for the development of independent being.

The stage of humanity in which a spontaneous individualism, an efficient personality can really be fully recognised cannot be reached except at a certain point in the development of the physical and mental organism and amid environments up to a certain point favourable. It is proper to the Liberal to endeavour that the conditions of life in the community shall be such that neither the organism normally produced nor the environment about it shall fall below that level.

And here it is that we reach the boundary line dividing the true Liberalism from Socialism in the bad sense of the term. Up to this line the paternal action of the State does not destroy or weaken individual independence; for it is expressly engaged in bringing about conditions under which the rise of such independence shall be possible. But the moment the Legislature advances beyond this point, the descent is begun, and at each further step the very individualism which all this legislation has kept in view is in redoubled danger of relaxation and enfeeblement. The dividing line is very fine. No palisade has been run along it to warn the legislator. He stops short of it, or steps beyond, and does not know it. Yet if he stop short, the greed of the strong together with the blind and awful forces that press upon society will bring upon his country the frightful evils of an outcast poor, ghastly extremes of wealth and poverty, epidemic drunkenness and debauchery; while if he overstep the line, he bids fair to find thrown upon his



care a people with will unnerved, self-reliance starved down, the vital spirit of enterprise sick unto death. The Liberal who learns truly to understand what Liberalism is and what it is not is far indeed from finding politics made easy ; but he has grasped a principle which is the norm of all wise legislation, a formula in which alone, as we believe, lies the solution of the most difficult problems presented in modern political discussion.

To discuss the particular legislation which does or does not pass the line we have indicated would far exceed our scope. In the mass of recent laws which Mr. Spencer has branded as "new Toryism," it is to be feared that many trespasses have been committed. Many others of these laws, though in intention within the line, are foolish in device and mischievous in practice. Our sole purpose has been to present an abstract principle to which legislation should conform and to indicate that that principle has underlain and underlies the conception known as Liberalism.\*

Doubtless even with the principle grasped firmly, legislation must still be largely empirical, though not so exclusively empirical as Prof. Stanley Jevons, in almost his latest essay, indicated.† With Prof. Sheldon Amos, we shall admit of paternal legislation for the protection of men from the powers exercised by land-holders, by confederated capitalists, by those who have control of the means of communication, by religious corporations.‡ But we shall so far accept the warnings of van Humboldt, of J. S. Mill, and above all of Mr. Spencer himself in the present and previous treatises,§ that we shall jealously exclude such law-making as is not content to secure to the individual a fair

\* Quite independently of the question whether Liberalism is good or bad, social students owe a debt to Mr. Spencer for inaugurating a discussion as to what Liberalism is. Surely it is capable of *some* philosophical expression. So likewise Conservatism. Yet the new *Encyclopædia Britannica*, presumably to escape polemics, follows the example of minor cyclopædias, and passes unnoticed both these terms so vastly important in modern speech and writing.

† The State in Relation to Labour. Chap. I.

‡ The Science of Politics. Chap. X.

§ Social Statics and Essay on Over-government.

chance of fighting his own way, but removes from him the stimulus to exertion by pouring upon him further benefits for which he neither toils nor spins.

We shall especially be jealous of the multiplication of that class of government officials against whom Mr. Spencer so eloquently warns us,\*—a class always dangerous and necessarily degraded in average quality as they are increased in quantity. We shall for instance throw on the owner of the mine or the factory a strict responsibility for accidents accruing through the inadequacy of his precautions; but we shall be chary of empowering men who have themselves failed to obtain appointments as managers, dressed in government authority, to insist on illusive safeguards of their own device. We shall, again, insist on many sanitary conditions in the habitations of the poor; but we shall be reluctant to place in the hands of a medical clique despotic powers, or to enforce on all men by State authority every new and untested sanitary device.

We take it then that the true formula of Liberalism is "Enfranchisement of the individual; the virtue of paternal legislation up to that point, the vice of all paternal legislation beyond." Often indeed the closest study will be called for in order to decide whether this or that proposal conforms to our formula or not. "Each case must be dealt with on its merits." But we shall at least be rescued from the chaos in which Mr. Shaw-Lefevre leaves us;† for we shall have a principle by which we shall know that the proposed measure ought to be gauged; and though the gauging may be very difficult, the worst confusion at least will be cleared away: we shall have a definite conception of our own aim and purpose. As it is, there are low-water marks of compulsory legislation which even Mr. Spencer

\* P. 28, &c.

† "Looking, then, for the future by the experience of the past, we cannot, I think, oppose to any proposal of legislation or to the extension of the functions of the State, any rigid doctrine of *laissez faire*, based on theoretic objections to the action of society in its corporate capacity, or on abstract views as to the inexpediency of interfering with individuals. Each case must be dealt with on its merits."—Presidential Address before the Social Science Congress, at Birmingham, September 17, 1884.

approves; for example, the taxing of all citizens, Quakers included, for the resistance of invasion.\* On the other hand there is a high-water mark of protective law-making to which not even Mr. Hyndman would have us rise, —say the presentation of a sovereign every Monday morning at the Home Office to every man who should give such proof of his need as would be afforded by his taking the trouble to call for it. Between these extremes there is room for an infinity of debate and doubt. Neither *laissez faire* nor its opposite, unqualified and absolute, is consistently advocated by any philosopher or politician in the world. It is no small thing to recognise in this labyrinth of bewilderment the clue of *some* principle covering all cases, however difficult to hold by.

Finally, the recognition of our canon does not weaken, but strengthens Mr. Spencer's most just and forcible indictment of the unprepared legislator,—the legislator who with a light heart votes sweeping laws, of the probable working of which he has made no study whatsoever.† We have not dispensed the law-maker from the necessity of intelligent, diligent, conscientious study. We have but suggested to him a clue for guidance in his research. Let him hold before his view the one great end of his craft, the *enfranchisement of the individual*, the *making of citizens* free, efficient, capable of securing their own good and serving their country well; he will find before him a range of study that will tax all his powers, but he will find the elements of a statesmanship by which he may promote the happiness and virtue of millions of human beings in his own and future generations.

RICHARD A. ARMSTRONG.

\* How Mr. Spencer reconciles it with his principles to compel the Quakers we cannot guess. It cannot, as his words would suggest, be merely because "having] done highly useful work in their time," they "are now dying out!"—P. 85.

† Pp. 44—64.

"CHRISTIANITY IN ITS CRADLE."\*

THE Jewish Christian party in the primitive church has of late years suffered many things at the hands of many critics. Paul, on the other hand, has been "exalted above measure," not by his own pride, but by critics and historians; the most "destructive" school only setting his life and work in a clearer and brighter light. But the Jerusalem Apostles have also their champion; and Paul, who threw aside the whole ceremonial law for the religion of the spirit, who so entirely emancipated himself and his converts that to him morality itself, from the simplest elements to the most heroic self-sacrifice, was no longer submission to a stern law but simply life in the spirit, the willing, natural life of the children of God, now receives his share of condemnation, and more than his share, that the conscientious conservatism of Peter and James may be defended, and even praised, at the hands of the author of "Phases of Faith," and "The Soul: Her Sorrows and Aspirations."

In his latest work, a little volume of 131 pages, Professor Newman reviews the history of the origin of Christianity, beginning with an introductory chapter on Judaism, coming down to the destruction of the temple, and concluding with a chapter on "Our Modern Problem." Each chapter is necessarily short, but we need scarcely say that the whole is powerfully written. But alas, the whole of the work from first to last is rendered valueless to students of the New Testament and the history and character of early Chris-

\* *Christianity in its Cradle.* By FRANCIS WILLIAM NEWMAN, once Fellow of Balliol College, Oxford; now Emeritus Professor of University College, London. London: Trübner and Co. 1894.

tianity, not by its conclusions, many of which we reject, nor by its spirit, which we must deeply regret, but by its method, which, to be frank, we must unequivocally condemn. To go in detail through a work of this kind, and deal with all the questions it raises, would be to write another book upon the same subject. This is the work of one who is an able man and a great thinker. So is Matthew Henry's Commentary, but it cannot satisfy students of the New Testament now. Will Professor Newman's little book be felt by them to be any nearer to the right *method*? Does he follow the lines of modern scholarship? Apart from the question whether we like his conclusions or not, have we any cause to accept them?

We will take first, as a fair sample of the manner in which he deals with the gospel narratives, the passage in which he discusses the questioning of Jesus concerning the payment of tribute, and his reply. We will quote in full from the first reference, which comes rather abruptly, to the beginning of the abuse which might, as Prof. Newman thinks, have been fairly heaped upon Jesus in reply. It is not necessary, nor would it be any pleasure to our readers, that we should give the whole of that.

The contrast established by him between the things of Cæsar and the things of God was valuable as limiting Cæsar's claims; but as enforcing Cæsar's right to tribute, the account is so very strange, that its quiet reception is wonderful. Christians hereby show how little thought they give to tales which are palmed on them as sacred. Of all difficulties pressing on a scrupulous Jew, most painful was the opinion that divine books forbade his recognition of an idolatrous and foreign prince. This opinion had in recent memory kindled a direful war, entraining Roman cruelties most horrible. The embers were still hot, and ready to flame anew. A solution therefore was requested in a peculiarly respectful tone, if our narrators tell truth. Yet they attribute to Jesus the fierce reply: "Ye hypocrites, why put ye me to proof?" As if it were not their obvious duty to put him to proof, and a thing to be rejoiced in by a prophet equal to the occasion; moreover, as if he had not himself solemnly warned, "Beware of false prophets." He proceeds (if we believe the

tale) to pronounce that a coin is Cæsar's property, if it bear Cæsar's image ! Does a Frenchman who by giving an equivalent has possessed himself of an English sovereign, account the coin to be Queen Victoria's property, or admit that he is justly *tributary* to her ? When the Queen or her Ministers parted with the coin, they did not *lend it* but *sold it*. If the Queen issued notes signed "Victoria," her signature, like her image, would guarantee something, but would not imply that without payment she could resume possession. — To call it *tribute money* (if it can be proved that at this era the Emperor accepted no other coin) does not alter the moral argument. Whoever doubted the lawfulness of tribute, doubted the lawfulness of allegiance. Cæsar's *command* (if there were such a command) could not establish his *right*. No solution, therefore, is given to those who need it.

If Jesus did really thus reply, we may be confident as to the effect. His questioners would say among themselves : "This man is an impostor," &c.\*

Such a scene as the one here referred to requires careful study ; and is not to be dismissed with accusations of "fierce reply," and an absurd solution of these terrible questions. And a careful study yields the following results—First : That all three evangelists agree in saying that the questioners were *sent to him by some third party, in order that they might catch him in talk*. They were not anxious and conscientious inquirers, but, as Luke plainly calls them, *spies*. Secondly : The party by which they were sent was formed (according to Matthew and Mark) by a combination of the Herodians and the Pharisees, a sinister combination, for, whatever the Herodians may have been, it is scarcely possible that the Pharisees can have been united to them by any true principle, though they may have conspired together to throw off the Roman power, or to make use of it to crush a reformer. Thirdly : Being sent as spies by two parties which, themselves almost undoubtedly at enmity in religion, have formed a political combination, for the sake of crushing a religious reformer, these men approach Jesus with professions of profound respect for him as one who *teaches the way of God in truth*. In this, again, all three evangelists are agreed.

\* Pp. 56. sq. In this, as in all our quotations, the italics are Professor Newman's.

Fourthly: All three evangelists agree that he knew their hypocrisy (so Mark; while Matthew says, "Jesus perceived their wickedness;" and Luke, "he perceived their craftiness"), an amount of knowledge which certainly demands no supernatural powers. It is frequently no difficult matter for a teacher to detect, among his questioners, pretended searchers after truth. So far, then, the three evangelists are in essential, almost verbal, agreement. And, surely, it would be a perfectly justifiable thing for a religious reformer, or a social, or even a political reformer (as some persons seem to consider Jesus, though, we think, quite erroneously) to tell such questioners plainly that they were hypocrites, and to decline to give any answer at all, or have anything to do with them. But now let us see what information we have as to the reply of Jesus. Mark, who is almost universally acknowledged by critics to approximate more closely to the 'original tradition,' which underlies all the synoptics, has "But he, knowing their hypocrisy, said unto them, Why tempt ye me? bring me a penny that I may see it," &c. Luke, who is regarded by some eminent critics at least (*e.g.*, Prof. Volkmar) as next in order, has, "But he perceived their craftiness, and said unto them, Shew me a penny," &c. And it is Matthew alone who attributes the "fierce reply," as Prof. Newman extravagantly calls it: "But Jesus perceived their wickedness, and said, Why tempt ye me, ye hypocrites? Shew me the tribute money," &c. We regret as deeply as Prof. Newman can do, that the tendency of the Christian Church was not to grow in love towards the Jews; the breach widened, the strife waxed hotter and hotter. We may blame Christians for much of this bitterness and uncharitableness, though it was not all on their side. But the fact remains, notwithstanding, that just because of this bitterness and uncharitableness, while the tradition regarding Jesus was still unfixed, it would be the most natural thing in the world that violent expressions should be put into his mouth, and added to the tradition; the most unlikely thing in the world that any word of condemnation that had been preserved, should be struck out by his biographers. And, again, we cannot help asking whether



there must not have been some ground for the remarkable feeling which, in all ages, has reappeared from time to time in the minds of the greatest and noblest, that somehow, whatever tradition said, it was because they had *lost* the spirit of the master that this bitterness and hatred remained. When Bernard of Clairvaux rebuked the monk Rodolph, who was urging on fanatical crowds to the persecution of the Jews, and even brought the indignation of the mob upon himself by ordering the monk off to the monastery, are we to say that it was the furious Rodolph who was carrying out the principles and following the example of Christ, and Bernard who was an unfaithful disciple?

And now for the answer that Jesus actually gave. He does not say that all the money with Cæsar's image on it belongs to Cæsar, or any thing of the kind. He simply points out that the very symbol of the *civil* government is stamped upon the coin itself. The payment of tribute is not a matter of religion either way. He directs them beyond, and far above, the unhappy, self-tormenting, and yet most trivial scruples of those who argued that the coin bore an image of the emperor, and images of the emperor were worshipped, therefore, in touching the coin they were touching an idol, and in paying it they were supporting an idolatrous government, and so forth; and who, in these and similar quibbles, were forgetting all the time the plainest and most important religious duties:—"Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and unto God the things that are God's."

We come, at last, to the strangest point of all in this remarkable passage: "We may be confident as to the effect. His questioners would say among themselves, This man is an impostor," &c. However "confident" we may be as to what they "would say," the evangelists are all agreed that they " marvelled " at his answer, and Luke adds that they "held their peace." But the questioners after all, as we must remember, were not genuine inquirers at all, but emissaries sent to entrap him—and grievously disappointed. And the Sadducees think it at least worth while to see how he solves their difficulty. And still the bystanders are not

weary of hearing him, but, according to Luke, certain of the scribes, answering, said, "Teacher, thou hast well said;" and, according to Mark, "One of the scribes came and heard them questioning together, *and knowing that he had answered them well*, asked him, What commandment is the first of all?" and receiving his reply, this scribe again says, "Of a truth, Master, thou hast well said," &c.

But, after all, one can only judge of the greatness or originality of a teacher by comparing him with others of his age. Any one who will refer to Dr. Oort's interesting article on the Talmud and the New Testament\* will see there how a question regarding the Sabbath is answered by the Jewish wisdom of the age. The answer is found in the Mishna, which was reduced to writing from oral tradition, probably within about twenty-five years of the date of the last book of the New Testament. We will not quote the passage, which our readers may refer to for themselves, but we will attempt to frame with perfect honesty an exactly parallel answer to the question of tribute. "If the publican sits in his booth, and the man (who pays the tax) stands outside, and the man puts his hand in, then he is guilty. And if the publican puts his hand out, and the man puts anything into it, then he is guilty. But if the publican puts his hand out, and takes the tribute out of the hand of the man, then he is not guilty." The case is simpler than that of Sabbath breaking by a Jew giving to a Jew, because here only one person's conduct has to be considered. The publican in any case would be hopelessly guilty, of course, in the eyes of a Jewish rabbi. Compare this sort of thing with the solemn and profound reply of Jesus, and we shall not think as Professor Newman appears to do (p. 59), that his hearers were astonished at the folly of his reply, but shall rather wonder how any one of ordinary intelligence can ail to see its wisdom.

Two more instances shall suffice. "If we believe our narrators, he threatened perdition to those who failed to give them [the twelve] free entertainment." Matt. x. 15.

\* *Modern Review*, July, 1883, p. 469.

See also x. 40 (p. 49). Of course, if we believe every word that any one of the evangelists records (does Prof. Newman?), we shall believe many strange things. But this denunciation is in Matthew alone, standing at the end of a speech which is complete without it, and which is without it in Mark and Luke? Which is the more probable that Jesus uttered it, and that Mark and Luke, spite of the increasing hostility between Jews and Christians which we have already spoken of, omitted it, or that the compiler of the First Gospel added it, or even that some still later scribe inserted it? Again, the whole chapter of denunciations in Matthew (chap. xxiii.), in which the Pharisees are called "sons of Gehenna" (a phrase which to a Jew was very different from what "children of hell," which Prof. Newman prefers, is to us), breaks into the narrative as found in Mark and Luke, having no evident connection with the chapter that precedes or the one that follows it, and is suspicious, to say the least of it. And yet Prof. Newman not only accepts it without question (p. 55), but afterwards proceeds (p. 80) to give a short account of the well-known generosity of Prince Izates and his mother, Queen Helena, to the Jews at Jerusalem in the time of famine, and concludes with the perplexing remark—"Since all this was *after* the death of Jesus, we are *not* forced to say that these three Jewish devotees [to whom their conversion was due] and their royal proselytes were accounted by him 'children of hell.'" Some of us, at least, would hardly have been forced to such a supposition, even if the dates had been reversed.

We must pass to Professor Newman's treatment of the question to which we referred at the outset, of the comparative merits of the Jewish and the Pauline party, or, as he puts it, of "Paul and James" (chap. x.).

There are, comparatively speaking, very few persons who are able to grasp a *principle* which shall enable them to judge fairly of the conduct of individuals. Personal feelings and convictions weigh too strongly. Every one knows that the change from another sect or party to that sect or party to which the speaker belongs is 'conversion,' the reverse is

'apostasy.' It is almost impossible to read Prof. Newman's attacks upon Jesus and Paul without feeling that his wrath is in a great measure due to their having brought about a rupture with that Hebrew Theism which he rightly esteems so highly. Paul, one would gather from the account he gives, forsook the pure spiritual theism of the prophets and psalmists of the Old Testament, and introduced an idolatrous worship of Christ in its place. But Paul did nothing of the kind, if only for the very simple reason that he was not brought up in the pure spiritual theism of the Old Testament. Surely Professor Newman is well aware that the teaching in the rabbinical schools at Jerusalem was as far removed from the teaching of the later Isaiah of whom he speaks so frequently, and with such just admiration, as the teaching of the Church catechism or the Westminster Confession is from the Sermon on the Mount. If he will refer to the articles by Dr. Oort already cited,\* he will find what it really was that Paul broke away from. He will realise the absurdities which circumcision involved; he will know how impossible it was practically to combine any real religious earnestness and simplicity with a religion which, whatever its origin, had degenerated into trivial ceremony and hair-splitting. A curious instance of the error that Professor Newman falls into as to what Paul had found in Judaism as he had learned it, and what he added to it, may be seen in the following passage:—

In the same spirit he teaches, in the first Epistle to Corinthians, that the Israelites in the wilderness were baptized unto Moses *in the cloud* and in the sea, and drank of that spiritual rock *which followed them*—(a rock followed them!! a fancy of his own, it seems) and that rock was Christ. Such argument can conjure up any amount of arbitrary mythology. It is the lowest type of Rabbinism (p. 86).

Now, if Professor Newman will turn to Wetstein's New Testament, to go no nearer to the original sources, he will find that whether this is "the lowest type of Rabbinism"

\* *Modern Review*, July and October, 1883.

or not, at any rate the idea of the rock following the Israelites is not a fancy of Paul's. And if it be "the lowest type," there must have been a considerable number of Rabbis thus degraded, for Wetstein cites no less than eleven distinct references to this fancy that the rock of Moses followed the Israelites. "It went up with them to the tops of the mountains. It descended with them into the ancient valleys. They sang, Spring up, O well, and it sprang up." "It was round like a beehive, and it rolled itself along and went with them in their journeys; and when the standards fixed the place of the camp and the tabernacle stood firm, then the rock also settled down (*consedit*) in the court of the pavilion. Then came the princes and stood by it, saying, Spring up, O well, and it sprang up." The rock, it seems, was the rock which Moses struck, but the spring that issued from it was known as Miriam's fountain, and when Miriam died it disappeared.\* Now all this is not "the lowest" but a very fair type of Rabbinism. Great minds rose superior to it, and none more remarkably than Jesus, for whom it could have few attractions. But it is no more to be expected that Paul should be free from all traces of it than that Professor Newman should show in all his writings no trace of the influence of Christianity, or of a nineteenth century university education, or of the forms of argument and treatment of history now current. What is peculiar to Paul here is simply the *spiritual interpretation* of a current Jewish fable. And what is characteristic of Paul's writings is not the Rabbinism which they share with the writings of almost every Jew of his age,† but the remarkable freedom from Rabbinism, the simple straightforward appeal of a man moved by a religious earnestness more powerful than the logic of any age.

But Professor Newman's chief accusation against Paul is not that his logic is defective and his arguments are unsound.

\* See Wetstein's note on 1 Cor. x. 4; and comp. Num. xxi. 17.

† Even the First Epistle of Peter, which Professor Newman contrasts with the Pauline Epistles, to the disadvantage of the latter, is by no means free from it. See 1 Pet. ii. 6 sqq.; iii. 20 sq.

He recognises with other scholars the important historical fact that Stephen was the forerunner of Paul, and he endeavours to ascertain what it was that caused them to be persecuted, and Stephen to be martyred by his own countrymen at a time when the party of the Twelve, with Peter and James and John at its head, lived in peace and security. The conclusion which he reaches is that Stephen was stoned for idolatry inasmuch as he worshipped Jesus as a god.

The last words ascribed to Stephen are an invocation of the dead Jesus as a god: "Lord Jesus! receive my spirit." We cannot suppose that Stephen now invoked Jesus for the first time. It must have been his habit, and it can hardly have been secret. The evident probability is, that *Invocation of Jesus* was the *main offence* imputed. . . . No plausible fantasies can set aside the fact, that men who implore aid from an unseen spirit, treat that spirit as omnipresent on this globe and indefinite in power. Thus they virtually raise it into a second god, who in their hearts dethrones the One Supreme. Hence the unrelenting attack on Stephen (pp. 74, 75).

It is a mysterious reproach which Paul casts on the Judaizers, that they teach circumcision *in order to escape persecution*. Thus too he says: "If I teach circumcision, why do I yet suffer persecution? Then is the offence of the cross ceased." Romans had no wish to promote circumcision. The Jerusalem church did not require it of Cornelius. Pharisees did not try to enforce it on proselytes; therefore, its *non-enforcement* by Paul *cannot* have been the main cause of anger against him. Some deeper collision is concealed under this talk about circumcision. Elsewhere the truth is manifest. That which may reasonably be held to be *Stephen's* offence was *Paul's* offence with the Jews. He not merely invoked a dead saint as an occasional act, but established an entire system of worshipping an inferior God (pp. 93 sq.).

Undoubtedly the Christians were early accused of exalting Jesus to the rank of God; though we have no evidence that in their own lifetime the Apostles were accused by the Jews of exalting the Messiah more highly than he ought to be exalted, but only that they were charged with exalting to the rank of Messiah one who had died under a curse. The Greeks and Romans seem to have wavered between accu-

sations of 'atheism' \* and of introducing new and unauthorised deities.† But when we find Professor Newman gravely maintaining that Paul "established an entire system" of worshipping Christ as God, we can only wonder when he last read Paul's Epistles, and what is the sound orthodox commentary in which he must place implicit faith. Is he not aware that the only remaining ground for maintaining Paul's belief in the deity of Christ at all lies in a very few isolated texts? Texts, moreover, of which such an interpretation is, to say the least of it, exceedingly doubtful—we should have thought impossible—to candid and impartial students of his theology.

On the other hand there is not the slightest necessity to look thus far for the causes of the persecution of Paul. That his preaching of the cross of Christ as the overthrow of circumcision (and all that it involved), was an offence to the Christians, is evident even on Professor Newman's own ground, and accepting his view of the meaning of circumcision to the Jewish Christians. They desired all converts to become, as he says, "fully graduated Jews," *because* they could otherwise only be "vassals and servants, bringing tribute and performing menial offices for the Holy People under Messiah's reign. . . . We cannot, therefore, wonder—we must almost take for granted—that a strong and powerful movement came forth from Jerusalem, *urging* in much love and seeking to *persuade* Gentile converts to adopt circumcision, the Sabbath, and the peculiarities of Mosaism" (p. 79). James, we are told, indeed, in another passage, would say, "A Gentile Christian is free to join our Hebrew nation, free also not to join: *whichever he*

\* See Athenagoras. *Apol.* v.

† See Acts xvii. 18. "Others [said] he seemeth to be a setter forth of strange gods, because he preached Jesus and Resurrection." Evidently, Jesus and Resurrection (both have the definite article in Greek and both should be without it in English) are regarded by these speakers as a new god and goddess preached by Paul. We almost wonder that Professor Newman who is inclined to receive any statement of the Book of Acts that is derogatory to Paul, does not bring this also in evidence of his idolatrous practices. How should they devise such a monstrous idea unless he really personified the resurrection and worshipped it along with Jesus?



*does, affects not his state before God.* You have no right to reproach him for desiring to join our community" (p. 89). But if it did not affect his state before God, it affected his treatment by the Jewish Christians; and, unless the whole of the first passage just cited goes for nothing at all, it affected the whole question of his admission to the Messianic kingdom. Professor Newman dismisses as "zealots" those who came down from Judea and taught the brethren, "Except ye be circumcised after the custom of Moses, ye cannot be saved"; but it is a curious fact that he has chosen for his contemptuous epithet the very name that Simon himself bore, and that Antioch was the very place where Paul and Barnabas were encountered by those who came from James, and by whom Peter was carried away, so that he withdrew from them and, altogether, undoubtedly, there was "no small dissension." \*

We are scarcely inclined to receive any of the statements of the Book of Acts with the implicit faith which Professor Newman appears to place in them, even when they confirm our own view; but we have no doubt whatever, that the passage we have just referred to is of much greater historical value than the account of the "Jerusalem Council" (Acts xv. 6—29), on which Professor Newman appears to rely,—with Peter's Paulinism and Paul's and Barnabas's rehearsal of the "signs and wonders" done by them among the Gentiles, James's suggestion of a letter from the twelve to Paul's converts and Paul's quiet acceptance of it. On Professor Newman's own showing, the Jewish Christians did insist on circumcision, and all that it involved, as a condition of full admission to the privileges of the Kingdom of Christ. What further cause of complaint could they require when Paul had declared against them, that in Christ there was neither Jew nor Greek (Gal. iii. 28); that neither was circumcision anything, nor uncircumcision (Gal. vi. 15)? And what further charge would an angry mob wait for,

\* Comp. Acts xiv. 26—xv. 1-5 with Gal. ii. 11-14.

when told that this man not only exalted to the rank of Messiah a man who had been crucified, but actually declared that this Messiah had abolished the law, and that henceforth Jews were no better than heathens?

There is a certain school of (may we say critics and historians?) who seem to have an infatuation for "Sun Myths." To them everything is explicable as a myth of the Sun. Is "Hero-worship" a safer "Key to all the mythologies"? It will not explain Paul, nor all the intricate history of the early Christian Church; but the nervous dread of it and readiness to suspect it may perhaps explain Professor Newman's treatment of Paul and of the early history of the church. Jesus, it seems, was crucified because he made himself his own hero, and exalted himself to the rank of God. Stephen died for hero-worship. Paul was persecuted and stoned for hero-worship. It was a thing that "could not be tolerated in the Holy City" (p. 95). And yet strange to say in this age of burning indignation against Hero-worship "James, like the Greek philosophers, was too high and pure for the age: he would not preach to it the worship of a dead saint" (p. 98). He however was stoned, and as in his case there could be no actual Hero-worship, it was probably to "imputed Hero-worship" that his martyrdom was due (p. 104).

We had marked other passages of this book for quotation and discussion, but those we have given will suffice to show its position and its character. Doubtless many readers will rejoice to find that they have the authority of so great a scholar as Professor Newman in support of their condemnation of Jesus and Christianity. A far greater number, if they read the book at all, will be overwhelmed to find how disastrous are the results of what they may perhaps take to be one of the last efforts of "modern" or "liberal" criticism. But the former will do well to moderate their joy; and we can assure the latter that, so far from being a product of what is commonly known as the

"critical school" of New Testament students, this little work could by no possibility have had any such source. It belongs entirely to the dogmatic school. Professor Newman is a man of literary culture and scholarship, and he is an historian. But the duty of an historian is to sift his materials first of all in the light of the very latest research. And nowhere is this more necessary or more difficult than in the case of the history of the early Christian Church. It must be confessed we have "ifs" enough (as may be seen in the passage quoted above, on the payment of tribute), but they clear up nothing, and only serve to cast doubt in a general way upon all our information concerning Jesus. There may no doubt be "much virtue in If," and sometimes much discrimination; but these "ifs" are not discriminating.\*

The constantly increasing number of rational students of the New Testament, who work upon scholarly critical lines, will feel that such a book as this never touches them or affects their conclusions. It is to be hoped that there may also be a continually increasing number among those who cannot be critics, nor even students of the original sources of information, who are yet willing to accept the results of the labours of such. They will find themselves saved from such unhappy conclusions as those of Professor Newman, and saved from them, not by ignoring facts or avoiding difficulties, but by the acceptance of the results

\* Indeed, Professor Newman in one passage definitely refuses to allow of any distinction between different parts (for instance) of Matthew's Gospel as it now stands. "No Unitarian can (with the late Dr. Lant Carpenter) gain credit for the rest of the book by cutting away the two first chapters as unworthy of credit. All comes out of the same mint" (p. 38). Of course no scholar now attempts to preserve the whole of the rest of the book, as it now stands, by simply rejecting the first two chapters. But at the same time, no critic of eminence will deny that the first two chapters stand on a perfectly different footing from the rest of the Gospel, or, to adopt Professor Newman's own metaphor, that if they come out of the same mint they did not come into the mint from the same mine. Gold and silver may come from the same mint (and silver at least these early legends are), but this does not reduce the gold to the value of the silver. The case is of course the same with the first two chapters of Luke, though possibly we may here separate again the finding of Jesus in the Temple.

of honest and careful investigation and unflinching fidelity to the rules of criticism and research. Their reverence for the holiness of Jesus will be unshaken, their admiration of the grandeur and power of Paul undiminished. Only they will find that these feelings rest on a firmer basis than before, and they will no longer fear lest "criticism" should overthrow that which the most searching criticism has established.

FRANCIS H. JONES.

## "TEACHING OF THE TWELVE APOSTLES."

### POSTSCRIPT.

SINCE contributing our tentative essay (*Modern Review* July, 1884) on the place in Christian literature to be assigned to the remarkable document discovered by Bryennios, we have received three German editions of the new-found treasure. That of Wünsche\* (who thinks the writer of the *Teaching* may have been in personal intercourse with some of the Twelve) is of interest as suggesting an inquiry into the dependence of the work upon Rabbinical sources; but the execution of the design is poor.

Hilgenfeld's Edition† is exceedingly handsome in its typography. It forms part of a reissue of the fourth fasciculus of his well-known collection of extra canonical writings, and the volume is dedicated to the University of Edinburgh. On looking through its pages one is struck with the richness of the many pearls of early Christian genius here collected. It is true these are the picked sentences, culled out of much inferior matter by the insight of the Fathers of the Church; yet all that is lost cannot have been rubbish. What breadth there is, for example, in the treatment by *Peter's Preaching* of the relations between Hellenism, Judaism, and Christianity. The germ of it is in St. Paul's speech at Athens, but the development is quite independent. And what a gleam of economic wisdom flashes in the sentence: "Imitate the

\* *Lehre der Zwölf Apostel nach der Ausgabe des Metropolitens Ph. Bryennios, mit Beifügung des Urtextes, nebst Einleitung und Noten, ins Deutsche übertragen von Lic. Dr. AUG. WÜNSCHE. Leipzig: Otto Schulze. 1884.*

† *Novum Testamentum extra Canonem Receptum. Edidit. . . ADOLPHUS HILGENFELD. Editio altera. Fasciculus IV. Lipsiæ: Weigel. 1884.*

evenhandedness of God, and no one will be poor." From the unlikely soil of the *Gospel according to the Hebrews* blooms this pure flower of mystic speech, opening the secret of the origin and testifying the bliss of the fruition of philosophy: "He that hath wondered shall reign, and he that hath reigned shall rest." And under the head of the *Gospel according to the Egyptians* we find a saying of the Saviour which almost self-authenticates itself as genuine: "Whoso is near me is near the fire; but whoso is far from me is far from the Kingdom."

Hilgenfeld traces Montanist influence in the *Teaching*, and thinks the combination of the Agape with the Eucharist is the solution of difficulties in regard to the Eucharistic Prayers.\* He would emend the difficult phrase *ποιῶν εἰς μυστήριον κοσμικὸν ἐκκλησίας* so as to read *μυῶν εἰς μυστήριον κοσμικῶν ἐκκλησίας*, i.e., "initiating churches of the worldly [*κοσμικοί* = *ψυχικοί*] into the mystery [of the end of the world and the coming kingdom of God]." In his *Addenda*, he makes the alternative suggestion of *πονῶν* for *ποιῶν*, and further allows that *ποιῶν* may be retained, with the sense of "working for the mystery of the church of the worldly." All this is but struggling with a difficulty, and accentuating the improbability of the proposed interpretation. Other emendations are suggested by Hilgenfeld, but do not seem necessary. For the irregular *καθῆσαι* he reads *καθίσαι* (so does Harnack), and he takes *σιτία* as equivalent to *σιτεία*. At the foot of each page of the *Teaching* he gives the passages of the *Apostolic Constitutions* derived from it, and adds concise and important notes. His reprint of the *Duae Viae* document from the Vienna MS. with the various readings of the Ottobonian and Moscow codices is of essential service.

Harnack's Edition † eclipses all others, including that

\* On both these points he is followed by Bonet-Maury, in his interesting *La Doctrine des Douze Apôtres. Essai de traduction, avec un commentaire critique et historique*. Paris: Fischbacher. 1894.

† *Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur*. VON OSCAR VON GEBHARDT und ADOLF HARNACK. Band II., Hefte 1, 2. Leipzig: Hinrichs. 1894.

of Bryennios himself. He presents, in parallel columns, the text (with various readings) and a German translation, subjoins copious notes, and appends a very complete dissertation on the work, which throws a flood of light upon almost every part of it. He shows, for example, that the precepts in Chap. i. of the *Teaching*, following the words: "Now of these sayings the teaching is this," and dealing with love of enemies, abstinence from personal lusts, returning good for evil, and freely giving to all, are a development not of love to the neighbour (*i.e.*, the fellow-Christian) but of love to God. Hence Chap. ii., dealing with prohibitions of vices destructive of love to the neighbour naturally opens: "Now a second commandment of the teaching [is]"; a connecting link which puzzles Hilgenfeld.

Harnack observes that the exhortation "My child" is prefixed only to those portions which touch home upon the deeper points of personal morality. The injunction: "Thou shalt not be in two minds whether it shall be or no," he refers, guided by the context, not to prayer but to judgment. This is probable, in spite of James i. 8. His punctuation: "In case ought thou hast through thy hands [*i.e.*, by thy labour]" is clearly right. He has convinced us that the rule about food does not refer to clean and unclean meats; but, considering the context, we understand it of abstinence from things strangled and from blood, rather than (with Harnack) of the ascetic refusal of flesh meat. From asceticism the *Teaching* is singularly free.

We must confess ourselves unconvinced on two points of Harnack's treatment of the third Eucharistic Prayer. "Hosanna to the God of David" can hardly, in view of the strain of the prayer, be an invocation of Christ. Nor do we think that Harnack gets rid of the anomaly of placing *after* celebration the words: "If any is holy, let him come; if any is not, let him repent," by interpreting them as an invitation to join the community who are watching for their coming Lord. For he admits that "holy" means "a Christian"; and it would be surely out of place to



say: "If any is a Christian let him join the Christians." Harnack's table of coincidences between the Eucharistic Prayers and St. John's Gospel is very striking; the question is, how to read it. The resemblances cannot be accidental; which, then, are we to reckon as source of these phrases, the Gospel or the Eucharistic Prayers? Or have we yet to seek a source in common? \*

Harnack's rendering (without emendations) of the *crux maxima* of the document: "der in Hinblick auf das irdische Geheimniss der Kirche handelt," is coincident with our own; he confines, however, the higher ideal of conduct here indicated to an ascetic doctrine of sexual relations, adducing patristic evidence in the line of St. Paul's: "This mystery is great, but I speak in regard of Christ and of the Church" (Eph. v. 33). Both Harnack and Hilgenfeld understand "the ancient prophets" of a former generation of inspired Christians.

Harnack's discussion (on Hatch's lines) of the omission of the term "presbyter" from the *Teaching* is valuable, but not, we think, conclusive. He treats the "presbyters" as not originally ecclesiastical persons at all; being a mere designation of the elders as distinct from the younger members of the Christian community, the term could have no place, he thinks, in an enumeration of office-bearers. Incidentally he throws unexpected light on the famous description, by Polycrates of Smyrna, of St. John as a "priest who bore the petalon." This he takes to be a mere paraphrase for "prophet"; he shows that Polycrates invariably avoided the word "prophet" (a discredited term since the outbreak of Montanism), and employed more than one paraphrase in substitution for it.

Harnack, like Bryennios, reëdits *Apost. Const.* vii. 1—32, and the *Canons Ecclesiastical of the Holy Apostles (Duæ Viæ)*, giving various readings to the latter document, not only from the codices, but from the Thebaic, Ethiopic,

\* A somewhat thin discussion of the bearing of the *Teaching* on the Canon, from the pen of Archdeacon Farrar, appeared in the *Expositor* for August.

Memphitic, and Syriac versions. Perhaps the most remarkable feature of his second part is the systematic proof pursued into minute detail that the interpolator of the Ignatius Epistles, and the fabricator of the Apostolic Constitutions are one and the same person, thus confirming the keen judgment of Ussher. Harnack demonstrates that this skilful manipulator of older documents must have been a Syrian or Palestinian bishop of the period 340—380 A.D., and he remarks that his methods of workmanship conclusively dispose of the assumption that no such phenomenon as an erudite and artistic forger could have been produced in the guileless age of the patristic writers. Indeed this Arianising operator, to whose reconstructions it may be remembered that Whiston fell a victim, may take rank with his later Catholic rival, pseudo-Isidorus. With regard to the date and birth-place of the *Teaching*, Harnack, after much discussion, assigns it to Egypt, between the years 120—140 A.D., with an inclination to the later date.

Harnack's dissertation is enriched by an addition by von Gebhardt, bringing to light the opening fragment of an early Latin form of the *Doctrina Apostolorum*, to which perhaps the quotation in pseudo-Cyprian may belong. Von Gebhardt treats his discovery as a translation of the *Teaching*, but though the relic consists of but sixteen lines, the first two of them contain matter belonging to a different school of thought from that of the *Teaching*. The two ways are not only ways of life and death, but also of "light and darkness" as in the Barnabas-appendix. Moreover they are presided over by their respective "angels"; whereas "angels," whether good or bad, are never alluded to in the *Teaching*. This Latin fragment is therefore something other than a piece of a translation; it betrays the existence of a distinct edition of the work.

We ought to mention Harnack's interesting excursus on the strong analogy between the early Waldensian Church order, and that described in the *Teaching*. A further modern parallel may be seen in the account of the organisation of the Strangers' Church at London by Jan Laski,

in Bonet-Maury's *Early Sources of English Unitarian Christianity*.

We may be permitted here to amend in two points the positions of our previous essay.\* Pages 460—3 (*Modern Review* July) require rewriting, and their argument, while modified in particulars, may be strengthened on the whole. A more careful scrutiny of the various forms of the *Duae Viae* document has led us to put decisively aside the misleading innovations of the Vienna MS., and we are satisfied (though the Germans are against us) that the Moscow MS. presents not only the shortest form, but the nearest approach to the original shape of the work. In this state it may well have been one of the sources of the *Teaching*, and we need not go beyond it to look for another document as a common source of both.

On the other hand, we must revise our estimate of the relative age of the *Shepherd* and Chap. I. of the *Teaching*. It is the *Shepherd*, not the Didachographer who is the corrector. Here again we have the authority of Hilgenfeld and Harnack as well as of Bryennios to contend with; but we think we can show reason for our recantation. Both Hilgenfeld and Harnack are struck with the apparent inconsequence of the italicised words in the saying: "In case any one take from thee thine own, ask not back; *for neither art thou able.*" Bryennios explains it of the inability of Christians to secure redress at the hands of heathen oppressors; but this would make the *Teaching* coin a shining virtue out of a leaden necessity; and, moreover, the improbability of *getting* back does not preclude a man from *asking* back. Hilgenfeld thinks it an interpolation; Harnack would so emend the phrase as to yield an opposite meaning. We think it is an emphatic way of saying that to keep this precept is beyond the powers of the ordinary Christian; and that thus it answers to the immediately preceding: "In case any one give thee a blow on the right cheek, turn to him the other also; *and thou shalt be per-*

\* The following errata also require correction: p. 455, l. 12, *for* 455 *read* 471; on p. 467 l. 28, *for* nowhere *read* however.

fect." The *Teaching* elsewhere (Chap. VI.) distinguishes thus between perfection and possibility: "For if thou art able to bear the whole yoke of the Lord, thou shalt be perfect; but if thou art not able, what thou art able, that do."

Now the *Shepherd* (in Com. 12, which begins, like the passage in Chap. I. of the *Teaching*, with a direction to put away evil lust) has this expostulation and reply: "I say to him, 'Sir, these commandments are great and fair and glorious, and able to gladden the heart of the man who is able to keep them. But I know not if these commandments are possible to be observed by a man, for they are exceeding hard.' He answered and said to me, 'If thou layest it down as certain that they are possible to be observed, then wilt thou easily observe them, and they will not be hard. But if thou comest to imagine that they are not possible to be observed by a man, then thou wilt not observe them. Now I say to thee, if thou dost not observe them, but neglectest them, thou wilt not be saved, nor thy children nor thy house, since thou hast already determined for thyself that these commandments cannot be observed by a man.'" Surely, this has the ring of an express rejoinder to the characteristic moderation of the *Teaching*.

In the same way we shall now see that the *Shepherd's* imperative insistence upon indiscriminate almsgiving is designed to counteract the cautions of the *Teaching*; and that the *Shepherd's* refusal to allow that any one speaks in the divine spirit except the prophet who takes no hire, is directed against the more extended view, both of inspiration and of the requirements of church order, which we find in the *Teaching*. Thus, we must date the *Teaching* anterior to the *Shepherd*. From Harnack we learn that Zahn (*Forschungen zur Geschichte des neutestamentlichen Canons*, pt. 3) and Funk (*Tüb. Theol. Quartalschrift* 1884, pt. 3) give priority to the *Teaching* over the Barnabas-appendix, as we have done. Harnack contests this position; and until it is clearly seen that the Barnabas-appendix is no integral part of the Barnabas-epistle, it cannot well be maintained.

## REVIEWS AND NOTICES OF BOOKS.

### LOTZE'S SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY.\*

THESE substantial volumes present in an accurate English dress, the two parts of the projected System of Philosophy which were all that Lotze lived to finish. The third part was to have treated of the main problems of Practical Philosophy (Ethics), Aesthetic and the Philosophy of Religion. Fortunately, there have recently been published in German, in separate *brochures*, the Outlines of Lotze's College Lectures on these latter subjects as well as on Logic and Metaphysic, and these Outlines are most valuable in giving in a small compass and with remarkable perspicuity all the more salient features of this great author's thinking. To those who read German we warmly recommend the careful study of these little pamphlets as a most useful preparation for the far more elaborate and detailed expression of Lotze's views given in the two volumes now before us. It is to be hoped that those gentlemen to whose philosophical insight and energy we owe these two important translations will also take care that these admirable schemes of Lotze's academical lectures may soon be in the hands of the British public. Lotze is pre-eminently the philosopher of the nineteenth century, for in him the craving for exact science on the one hand, and for the satisfaction of the artistic, ethical and religious needs on the other, co-existed with great intensity, and found, to some extent at least, a satisfactory reconciliation. It is a subject for rejoicing, then, that we have now in English his greatest works; for closely following the works which we are now noticing has appeared an English translation of what will probably always be the most popular creation of Lotze's genius—the poetico-philosophical *Mikrokosmos*. It lends an additional interest to the present translation (which is the work of many hands) that an important part of it was executed by the late Professor Green, who had indeed intended to take upon himself the revising and editing of the whole.

\* *Lotze's System of Philosophy*. Part I., *Logic*, in Three Books, of Thought, of Investigation, and of Knowledge, by HERMANN LOTZE. English Translation edited by BERNARD BOSANQUET, M.A. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press. 1884.

*Lotze's System of Philosophy*. Part II., *Metaphysic*, in Three Books, Ontology, Cosmology, and Psychology, by HERMANN LOTZE. English Translation, edited by BERNARD BOSANQUET, M.A. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press. 1884.

It is, of course, impossible for us in our narrow limits to give an adequate description of the contents of the thousand and odd closely-printed pages before us. We can only aim at giving to those of our readers who have not yet studied any of Lotze's writings some slight idea of the general character of his "System of Philosophy." It is to the *Metaphysic* that we shall naturally turn to learn the author's distinctive position among the world's great philosophers, but the earlier treatise, the *Logic*, has this strong interest for English readers that it discusses the same questions as Mr. J. S. Mill's well-known work, and a comparison of the two writers is most instructive. On the question of the possibility of deriving axiomatic truths from experience, Lotze's conclusion is the reverse of Mill's.

"It is clear, therefore" (he says) "that the attempt to derive the entire body of general knowledge from experience, that is to say, from a mere summing up of particular perceptions, breaks down. We have invariably to help ourselves out by assuming at one point or another some one of these self-evident principles, some principle to which, when once its content has been thought, we at once concede with intuitive confidence that universal validity to which it makes claim" (p. 465).

The merits of English writers on *Logic* and the methods of scientific discovery hardly receive due recognition from Lotze. Although in his chapter on "Universal Inductions from Perception" he goes over the same ground that Mr. Mill had traversed before, we cannot find that he ever mentions either that writer or Sir John Herschell, to whom Mill was indebted for his "Methods of Induction." There is, however, an elaborate note on Boole's Logical Calculus; and of Boole's "Investigation of the Laws of Thought" Lotze writes: "Though I freely admit that the author's ingenuity makes his able work very charming, I am unable to convince myself that this calculus will enable us to solve problems which defy the ordinary methods of logic." The quantification of the predicate is in Lotze's view a worthless refinement; and the calculus employed by the late Prof. Jevons is mentioned only to be summarily rejected:

"How often," exclaims Lotze, "have modern enterprises like these proclaimed the dawn of a wholly new epoch in logic and the fall of the contemptible system of antiquity! I am convinced that if the ancient logic were to be really forgotten for some generations and then rediscovered by some fortunate thinker, it would be welcomed as a late discovery, after long search, of the natural march of thought, in the light of which we should find intelligible both the singularities and the real though limited relevancy of the forms of logical calculus with which we have made shift so far" (p. 223).

The Darwinian theory is alluded to, but with greater cautiousness and less enthusiasm than is usually the case in either England or Germany at the present time.

"We cannot but remember," writes our author, "though happily as an error that we have outgrown, the wild caprice with which not long ago people would derive a word in one language from any casual word in another and call it an etymology; at the present day people need to be warned against proceeding in a similar way to satisfy the newly-awakened desire to conceive all the various kinds of organic beings as evolved from one another, all fixed specific differences being done away. But, whether Darwin has succeeded

or not in his attempt, we must at any rate allow that he has taken the greatest pains to point out the real processes of nature by which the transformation of one organic form into another which we can conceive in thought may have been actually brought about" (p. 186).

But we must leave the Logic, the value of which from the nature of the subject cannot be at all estimated apart from careful reading, and turn to the Metaphysic, from which we may gather and transmit some general notion of Lotze's position in respect to the ideas of God, of Nature, and of the Soul. The ruling idea which inspires all Lotze's theorisings, and to which all his teachings at last converge, is that the mechanical relations which pervade the kosmos, and which alone are apprehensible by science, are not the ultimate reality, but simply means to an end, that end being the realisation of the ideal of goodness and beauty to which ethics and religion, art and poetry are ever aspiring. Hence the universe comprehends the personal spirit of God, who pervades and directs all, and the world of personal spirits whom He has called into existence. Lotze does not, as Hegel does, pretend to deduce the actual universe of nature and humanity by necessary logical process from the Absolute. He holds all such projects as wholly futile. Science must, by observation and experiment, analyse the appearances of nature; philosophy, by reflecting on their appearances, may approximately penetrate to the realities on which they are grounded. Reflection on external and internal facts reveals to us, in Lotze's opinion, the existence of God and of an indefinite number of monads or psychical energies, the highest of which have self-consciousness and may be termed spirits. As to when and how the monads which constitute inorganic matter were produced Lotze does not speculate; he regards this as a subject which transcends our intellectual powers. There is a very tempting doctrine, which is becoming more wide-spread every year, that the psychical energies which correspond to what science calls imperishable atoms have been generated by the Eternal out of time, and therefore do not perish as the phenomenal compounds of them do, but pass through rising stages of development, having in them potentially from the beginning all the powers which are eventually awakened and exercised; that in their lower stages these monads exercise a blind volition in one particular mode, and so constitute, according to the nature of that blind volition (or, perhaps, we should rather call it "spontaneity," for "volition" implies intelligent purposive action) the various elements of the mineral world; that under certain favourable conditions these monads form an organism, a sort of democracy in the lowest organisms, and a constitutional monarchy in the higher ones, one monad in the latter case controlling the action of several and using these as its ministers in acting upon the outer world and in being acted upon thereby; that, as these organisms become more elaborate and the interactions between them and their environment more complicated, the presiding monad gradually develops its latent capacities for sentience and consciousness, till in man it becomes self-conscious, begins to exercise



intelligent volition, thus by degrees passing into such personal relation with the Eternal Being on whom its own being depends, that the necessary conditions of ethics and religion are at length realised.

Now this speculation is by no means identical with Lotze's theory of nature and man, yet there are such close affinities between the two that we do not feel sure that we could always clearly state the points of difference. One difference, however, is quite clear. The view we have described makes the human soul a further development from an animal soul; with Lotze, on the contrary, the spirit of man is an entirely new creation by God on occasion of the appearance in the course of zoological development of a fitting organism. Lotze, indeed, appears to hold that the soul or monad of every organism is an immediate and new creation by the Absolute, for he says:—

"We do not think of the presence of the Absolute as a mere uniform breath which penetrates all places like that subtle, formless, and homogeneous ether from which many strange theories expect the vivification of matter into the most various forms; but the Absolute is *indivisibly* present with the whole inner wealth of its nature in this particular spot, and, in obedience to those laws of its action which it as itself laid down, necessarily makes additions to the simple conjunctions of those elements which are themselves only its own continuous actions; simple additions where the conjunctions are simple, additions of greater magnitude and value where they are more complicated. Everywhere it draws only the consequences, which at every point of the whole belong to the premisses it has previously realised at that point. It is thus that it gives to every organism its fitting soul; and it is, therefore, needless to devise a way or make provision for the correct choice which should ensure to every animal germ the soul which answers to its kind" (p. 434).

So far does Lotze carry the idea that in God the soul "lives and moves and has its being" that he thinks it not improbable that in times of perfect unconsciousness the soul actually ceases to exist and is *created afresh* by God at the moment when it is usually said to recover consciousness. He says that many have argued that if the soul in a perfectly dreamless sleep is utterly devoid of sensations, thoughts, and volitions, "it *would* in such a case have no being"; and his reply is:—

"Why have we not the courage to say that, *as often as* this happens, the soul is not? Doubtless, if the soul were alone in the world it would be impossible to understand an alternation of its existence and non-existence; but why should not its life be a melody with pauses, while the primal eternal source still acts, of which the existence and activity of the soul is a single deed, and from which that existence and activity arose? From it again the soul would once more arise, and its new existence would be the consistent continuation of the old, so soon as those pauses are gone by, during which the conditions of its re-appearance were being reproduced by other deeds of the same primal being" (p. 534).

Probably many of our readers will feel with us that this view which makes the maintenance of the body a necessary condition of the soul's existence is exposed to serious objections, and, in particular, our moral and religious consciousness, to whose deliverance it is the characteristic of Lotze's philosophy to pay reverent heed, does not seem satisfied with the idea that at the dissolution of the physical frame the spirit wholly

ceases to exist and does not come into existence again until, in the natural course of evolution, the Absolute has produced a perfectly adapted physical organism. The notion that the soul passes into and out of existence concomitantly with certain bodily changes seems to us little in keeping with Lotze's own doctrine as to the separate reality of the soul. It is true that he undervalues what we consider to be the strongest evidence of the soul's independent existence, namely, its consciousness of its own moral freedom and responsibility; but he staunchly contends that, leaving Free-will aside, there remains an unassailable basis for the doctrine of the soul's independent metaphysical reality in the fact of the *unity of consciousness*. By reasoning nearly akin to that of Professor Green he shows that

"A comparison of two ideas, which ends by our finding their contents like or unlike, presupposes the absolute indivisible unity of that which compares them; it must be one and the same thing which first forms the idea of *a*, then that of *b*, and which at the same time is conscious of the nature and extent of the difference between them. Then, again, the various acts of comparing ideas and referring them to one another are themselves in turn reciprocally related; and this relationship brings a new activity of comparison to consciousness. And so our whole inner world of thought is built up; not as a mere collection of manifold ideas existing with or after one another, but as a world in which these individual members are held together and arranged by the relating activity of this single pervading principle. This, then, is what we mean by the unity of consciousness; and it is this that we regard as the sufficient ground for assuming an indivisible soul" (p. 423).

The question arises whether this indivisible soul can be correctly said to exist in Space and Time. Professor Green in his great work maintains, with Kant, that the metaphysical Ego cannot be regarded as present in space or as originated in time. Lotze's discussion of the psychological origin and metaphysical validity of the ideas of Space and Time constitutes perhaps the most valuable and original feature of the remarkable book whose contents we are examining. Particularly is this the case with Space. Here, as elsewhere, Lotze mediates between the transcendental and the experiential thinkers. In accordance with the former he contends that the psychological notion of space is a pure intuition undervivable from experience, and likewise that this intuition corresponds to no real objective relation. "There is no such thing as Space," he says, "in which things are supposed to take their places. The case rather is that in spiritual beings there is formed the idea of an extension, in which they themselves seem to have their lot, and in which they spatially present to themselves their non-spatial relations to each other." While, however, Lotze holds, with Kant, that the idea of Space is an *a priori* intuition, he still thinks that it is only after a very complex course of experience that the human mind reaches its present idea of an infinite spatial environment, and refers all its optical and tactual impressions to particular points in that spatial sphere. To explain the process of experience by which our present spatial knowledge is gained, Lotze expounds his now famous doctrine of "Local-Signs," which is fully presented in the present work. This doctrine has met with wide acceptance, and many experientialists carry it further

than the author himself carried it, for they regard it as a view which dispenses with the intuitional hypothesis, and by itself adequately explains the empirical origin of the spatial notion. But while Lotze sides in the main with Kant and Green as to the simply subjective character of the idea of Space, he takes a different stand from theirs in regard to Time. After a most thorough examination of Kant's position on this matter, he arrives at the conclusion that with our present mental constitution our idea of successive changes in time must be regarded as objectively valid, that is, as applicable to ultimate realities; and he concludes the profoundly interesting chapter on "Time" with the words:—

Though we are obliged to give up the hopeless attempt to regard the course of events in Time merely as an appearance, which forms itself within a system of timeless reality, we yet understand the motives of the efforts which are ever being renewed to include the real process of becoming within the compass of an abiding reality. They will not, however, attain their object, unless the reality which is greater than our thought vouchsafes us a Perception, which, by showing us the mode of solution at the same time persuades us of the solubility of this riddle. I abstain at present from saying more on the subject. The ground afforded by the philosophy of religion, on which efforts of this kind have commonly begun, is also that on which alone it is possible for them to be continued (p. 269).

This brief sketch of Lotze's general philosophical position will probably have suggested to some of our readers its close affinity with that of Leibnitz, and indeed Lotze may with some reason be called the Leibnitz of recent thought. Not only is his general theory of the constitution of the kosmos related not very distantly to that of the author of the *Monadology*, but also the constant aspiration to do full justice at once to science and to philosophy forms a common feature of the two systems of thought. In one respect, however, the modern monadologist has no sympathy at all with his predecessor. Leibnitz's monads had no power of interaction, and as a substitute for this we are presented with the suspiciously artificial theory of Pre-established Harmony. As Leibnitz himself says, his monads "are without windows," and he starts from the supposition of a relation of complete mutual exclusion between the simple essences on which he builds his universe. Lotze, on the other hand, while admitting that we shall probably never be able to completely explain how monads act on each other, declares that there is no doubt that they do so act; that the human will, for instance, acts as an efficient cause upon the monads which constitute the nervous system, and that, on the other hand, a physical change in the condition of the nervous monads produces a corresponding psychical change in the spiritual monad or soul. We hope we have said enough about this "System of Philosophy" to give some idea of its great importance; it seems to us that future students of psychology and metaphysics will more and more discover that in Lotze's writings there is a mine of philosophical ideas which will most richly repay diligent working.

C. B. U.

## HARTMANN'S 'PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS.'\*

THE rapid sale of ten or eleven German editions of this work is so exceptional a fortune in the case of a philosophical treatise that our English newspaper critics commonly describe the success of the book as quite "phenomenal," by which slang use of this adjective they simply mean to say that it is striking and unprecedented; but the question suggests itself whether the success may not be phenomenal in a more legitimate sense of the word, namely, as being transient and seeming merely, with no abiding ground in the intrinsic and permanent worth of the contents. When we compare the works of Hartmann with those of some of his contemporaries, such as Lotze, we cannot suppose for a moment that the relative immediate demand for the writings of these thinkers bears a direct proportion to their ultimate rank in the history of philosophy. Probably Hartmann's reputation as a thinker has already been greater than it will ever be again. Still, the public mind is not so devoid of judgment in matters philosophical as to persist for more than a decade of years in placing a worthless book on the highest pinnacle of fame; and we may feel sure that Hartmann's treatise is not only very fascinating, but that it contains some important truth which the present age recognises and welcomes. It was very desirable, therefore, that this book, which has enjoyed such popularity in its native land, should be made accessible to English readers also, and fortunately the work of translation has fallen into the hands of a gentleman eminently qualified for the task. The version is at once accurate and graceful, and the translator is evidently as familiar with philosophical thought as he is with the German language.

When we compare the work of Hartmann with that of his great predecessor, Schopenhauer, the chief thing that strikes us is that though Schopenhauer is by far the more earnest writer and the greater literary genius, he is nevertheless devoid of the historical sense, of that perception of the grand solidarity of all present and past events in the evolution of the kosmos, which is evidently the dominating idea in Hartmann's thought. This is one cause of the latter's brilliant success. Schopenhauer hit upon the true idea that the essence of all reality is Will, and Hegel showed that the universe is the manifestation in time and space of an eternal Idea. In Hartmann's book these two characteristics are amalgamated, and hence we get a theory of the whole system of things which, to say the least of it, has one marked superiority over Mr. Herbert Spencer's. In Hartmann's book the ontology and the cosmology stand in constant and living relation to one another; the "Unconscious" is not only declared to be the ultimate reality, but its activity is constantly being exhibited in, and forms the indispensable explanation of, the various

\* *Philosophy of the Unconscious.* By EDUARD VON HARTMANN. Speculative Results according to the Inductive Method of Physical Science. Authorised Translation by WILLIAM CHATTERTON COUPLAND, M.A., B.Sc. In Three Volumes. London: Trübner and Co. 1884.

details which make up the grand process of evolution ; whereas, in Mr. Spencer's system, the "Unknowable," when once proved to exist, occupies for all philosophical and scientific purposes as dull and uninteresting a sinecure as do the Gods of Epicurus and Lucretius. But after all that Kant and Darwin and Spencer have said, the old argument from Design, though it was for a season apparently upset by its metaphysical and scientific assailants, is rapidly recovering itself, and finds that it can easily take up a higher position which is quite invulnerable to all such assaults as these. Assuredly Mr. Spencer will find in the long run, even if he has not already found, that his sesquipedalian words do not really succeed in solving the riddle of the universe, and that the Unknowable must be recognised as Eternal Thought and Will ere the procession of cosmical facts can be adequately explained. It is not without good reason that throughout the ages the wonderful adaptations in the world around us have been referred to Divine Wisdom, and Hartmann's theory fully recognises and satisfies this inevitable and instinctive judgment of the human mind.

A very large part, indeed, of this present book may be justly described as only Paley and the Bridgewater Treatises brought up to the most recent date in scientific knowledge. It is true that the all-wise Cause of the order and beauty in the universe is represented by Hartmann as unconscious ; but if the Theist is convinced, as Theists naturally are, that where there is Will and an Intelligent Choice of the best means to compass an end, there must be something which, however it may transcend what we call consciousness, is certainly not *less* than conscious, then he may find in Hartmann's book the most conclusive evidence that in nature, in the human mind, and in the course of history, this all-pervading, all-directing, all-inspiring Intelligence and Love is ever manifesting its presence and activity. As this short notice is not intended to supersede the use of Mr. Coupland's admirable translation, but rather to tempt our readers to make acquaintance with it, we will not quote passages in justification of the above statement, but will refer to the very interesting chapters on "The Manifestation of the Unconscious in Bodily Life," on "The Unconscious in the Human Mind," on "The Unconscious in History," which form the first division of the treatise. In these chapters, which abound in original suggestions, Hartmann endeavours to show that the hypothesis of the Unconscious is most fruitful in contributing to the solution of the chief problems which we encounter in the fields of physiology, animal psychology, human psychology, aesthetics, and religious mysticism.

He then proceeds to what he calls "the Metaphysics of the Unconscious," and contends, in the first place, that consciousness makes its first appearance on the scene when the all-wise Unconscious has produced an animal organism ; hence he would agree with the late Professor Clifford that if God were conscious we should expect to find His brain. The fundamental idea of Hartmann's metaphysics appears to be that the primal Will, which is in its essential nature non-rational (alogical), experi-

ences a spontaneous impulse to put forth action, and accordingly begins to create, i.e., to express itself in innumerable atomic points of force, and, from a timeless and spaceless condition, time and space and the phenomenal world are now manifested. But latently present with the Will is the Idea (*Vorstellung*), and when the alogical Will begins to create, the all-wise Idea determines its actions into the best possible direction, and hence is evolved the best of all possible created worlds. The Idea being all-wise, though unconscious, aims at the very best end, and that end is to finally get rid of the creation which the non-rational Will has unwisely started, for in the omniscience of the Idea is involved the truth that this best of worlds is nevertheless a world that had better never have been, seeing that the pains in it preponderate over the pleasures. But there is only one way in which this undesirable creation can be brought to a close, and that is by the Will, which unconsciously and unwisely started it, consciously negating its own action, and so willing not to will. It is necessary, then, for this end, that those phases of the primal Will which through the formation of human organisms become conscious persons, should be developed by culture to such a degree that they obtain a thoroughly clear insight into the wholly unsatisfactory nature of this life, so that the minds of all men may be penetrated by the folly of volition and the misery of all existence, and wish individually and collectively to have done with life. In some way which is not clear to us, Hartmann reaches the conclusion that in process of time the personal or conscious element of volition in the universe will greatly preponderate in power over those unconscious phases of the Will which blindly seek to preserve themselves in existence, and so at length, by a grand collective vote of the enlightened conscious wills who have obtained predominance, the universe will cease to exist, and the primal Will return to its original condition of quiescence. +

There are serious difficulties in the way of clearly understanding Hartmann's meaning in regard to some portions of the above philosophical scheme. It seems that the Will, after it has irrationally initiated creation, experiences, notwithstanding its *unconsciousness*, a sort of *discomfort* during the process, for Hartmann says "The all-wise Unconscious, which thinks both end and means as one, has formed consciousness merely in order to release the will from the unblestness of its willing from which it cannot release itself—the final end of the world-process, for which consciousness serves as the last means, is to realise the greatest possible attainable condition of happiness, namely, that of painlessness." Hartmann, again, can give no security that the Will, after having been at length reduced to quiescence by the above conscious process of negating itself, may not again start this evolutionary cycle of creation. Of course, if it has a memory of the unblestness of the former experience, this may very well serve to keep it quiet in future; but in this case, what becomes of the fundamental doctrine of its unconsciousness? for of course after having willed all organisms out of existence, the Will must necessarily return to its wholly unconscious condition. X



*Life is worthless, it is given by Nature  
has accepted. Hence it's greater consistency than H.*

In Hartmann's general metaphysical theory of the Kosmos, it is evident that his account both of the beginning of the process and of its predicted end is purely speculative, if not wholly fanciful. The really substantial parts of his work—those parts, that is, in which the promise on the title-page of “results according to the inductive method of physical science,” is partly fulfilled—are to be found *first* in the early part of the book already described, in which he brings forward many facts in favour of the working around us and within us of an intelligent impelling and guiding principle quite distinct from our own intelligence and will, and *secondly* in that attempted demonstration of the predominant painfulness of life, which characterises both Hartmann's philosophy and that of Schopenhauer, and makes them the two prominent examples of modern Pessimism. In Hartmann's system it will be noticed that Pessimism and Optimism go hand in hand, for this world which the Will and the Idea have produced, bad as it is, is yet the very best that even Omniscient Wisdom could create. The main purpose, then, of Hartmann's book is attained or missed according as we see reason to accept or reject his thesis regarding the worthlessness of life. This thesis he endeavours to establish by several ingenious considerations which are urged and illustrated in a most interesting style. He first approaches the subject metaphysically by contending that it is in the very nature of the alogical will to be eternally restless and eternally dissatisfied. He then appeals to psychology, and although he disputes Schopenhauer's position that all pleasure is merely negative, being no more than relief from pain, he practically agrees with this philosopher that we are so constituted physically and mentally that all the satisfactions of will are of necessity transient, while its dissatisfactions are indefinitely prolonged. The proof, however, on which he most relies is the empirical one, namely, that from an actual survey of the real conditions and activities of human life it is seen that even in the most favourably circumstanced existence there is a preponderance of pain over pleasure.

If, however, men in general perceived that life is so unsatisfactory, they would gravitate downwards towards a low animal existence, and in that case the high culture and insight, which is the indispensable condition of the grand act of determining to will no longer, in which the redemption of the world consists, would never be attained. The all-wise Idea by its clairvoyant omniscience unconsciously foresees this, and so by a series of illusions it succeeds in blinding mankind to the real fact of its own essential misery. In the early stage both of the individual life and of the historical life of the race, the vigour of the spontaneous impulses to action and the marvellous fascinations of hope conceal from the unreflecting the disappointing character of life's experiences. In a very attractive chapter Hartmann attempts to show how this holds good in the case of love and other emotions. But as the individual and the race grow older and become reflective, this first stage of illusion passes away, and it is seen that in life as it is there is nothing to render it on the whole desirable. A second stage of illusion accordingly supervenes, and imagination, prompted



by the Unconscious, fondly depicts a transcendent life after death as the sequel and reward of high moral achievements here. By degrees, however, with the progress of science, man becomes diillusionised here also, for the belief in immortality is seen to be an unsubstantial dream. Still, the resources of the all-wise Unconscious are not yet exhausted, and a third web of illusion is woven, that, namely, in which Mr. Spencer and his followers are at present entangled; for the idea takes possession of the cultivated classes that although the world in its present condition is not to be desired, yet for the future of the race on this earth there is a glorious destiny, and the thought that we are contributing to this future Millennium of universal happiness is a powerful stimulus to press on to a higher civilisation in spite of all present discomfort and discouragement. Those, however, who have attained to that height of intelligence which Hartmann and his admirers represent, see through this illusion likewise, for they discern that life becomes more rather than less intolerable as culture advances. One wonders, then, how the clever Unconscious manages in the case of these advanced thinkers to keep them up to the mark in the noble endeavour after a higher and less selfish civilisation. At this point it seems to us that Hartmann's system attains to a certain dignity at the expense of self-consistency. When a man has passed beyond all illusions and clearly sees that no real satisfaction is to be got out of life, why should he not do as the Buddhists and Schopenhauer recommend, viz., seek to destroy in himself all those desires and aspirations which lead us to take an interest in life and prompt the will to live? In order to justify his contention that man ought not so to do, Hartmann appeals to our ethical consciousness. In his view Ethics naturally passes through three stages; the *egoistic* stage, in which people seek only their own pleasure; the *heteronomous* stage, in which conduct is governed by the recognition of an external authority, such as the code of the society in which we live; and finally the *autonomous* stage, in which man becomes a law unto himself, and in this highest ethical condition the sympathetic sense of corporate union with all other wills attains such strength that man feels himself morally bound to work in the interests of that universal Will of which he is only a particular phase. Hence it is seen to be immoral to seek only the extinction of one's own will to live, and to neglect to do our part towards that grand world-redemption which can only be realised when all mankind have by culture fully learned the worthlessness of existence. Accordingly Hartmann lays it down as the fundamental ethical principle, *To make the ends of the Unconscious ends of our own consciousness*. This is no doubt excellent morality; but is it not most probable on Hartmann's own principles that this lofty ethical ideal is itself only the highest stage in that process of illusion by which the ingenious Unconscious manages to throw dust in the eyes of us poor human innocents so as to induce us to sacrifice ourselves for the common good? Schopenhauer's egoistic principle is ethically far lower than Hartmann's lofty altruism, but we are inclined to think that the former philosopher was a more consistent Pessimist when he declared that the

wisest course for each individual is to strive to eradicate in himself all those appetites and desires which impel us to cleave to existence.

It would lead us too far were we to enter upon a criticism of the system of philosophy which we have here sketched. We will only say that if, as Hartmann maintains, each man is merely a transient phase of the Universal Will and therefore intrinsically incapable of moral freedom and true responsibility; if immortality be a dream; if the consciousness of sympathy and spiritual communion with the Eternal be an illusion; then we are inclined to think that Schopenhauer and Hartmann are not wrong in declaring that the necessary goal of all this faithless culture is pessimism and despair. In that case, however, we feel sure that Hartmann's notion of humanity's progressive advance in all the higher elements of civilisation is a Utopian fiction, for did this pessimistic mode of thought become universally prevalent, no moral or spiritual power would remain adequate to urge mankind forward to that conquest of unselfishness over selfishness which is Hartmann's ethical ideal and the prior condition of the world's release from its misery. To those who hold the Theistic position and find in the felt approval and sympathy of the Father within them a sufficient stimulus to noble endeavour as well as a constant source of strength and a well-grounded foundation for eternal hope, we feel assured that the perusal of this excellent translation of a very interesting book will lead to no conviction of the truth of Pessimism, but rather to an increased faith in that all-wise Reason whose eternal consciousness transcends all the limitations of time and space, and therefore is but imperfectly symbolised by such consciousness as ours.

C. B. U.

#### NEW AND OLD METAPHYSICS.\*

THIS is the work of a powerful and original thinker. It differs mainly from the earlier Scotch Metaphysics in that it embraces the psychology of animals as well as of man, and, therefore, supplies some answer to the questions which Evolutionists are now asking as to the true relation of the human to the lower animal consciousness. Our author's answer, however, draws far too sharp a distinction between the animal and the man to satisfy the school of thinkers to which Dr. Romanes belongs. We are inclined, however, to think that "Scotus Novanticus" is in the main correct. He finds some psychical states in the very lowest animals, and traces these states upward through the stages of Reflex Action, Feeling, Sensibility, Sensation, Consciousness. Very low down in the animal scale he discovers some vague feeling of *extension*, and as soon as the stage called "Sensation" is reached there is a feeling of the *outness* of confused and as yet undistinguished forms. That kind of

\* *Metaphysica Nova et Vetusta*. A return to Dualism. By SCOTUS NOVANTICUS. London: Williams and Norgate. 1884.

quasi-knowledge which the higher animals possess and which is generally ascribed to instinct and association this writer terms "Attuition."

In this stage "not only has Consciousness of the objective as a whole emerged from the condition of confusion in which mere sensation leaves it, so that total objects, *e.g.*, tree, stone, &c., are received as separate from one another; but in its most advanced development other characteristics are sufficiently visible."

Judging from this language one would think that the writer means the animals have proper knowledge of these objects, but later on in the book we learn that for real knowledge we must pass from "Attuition" to "Perception," and perception is peculiar to man.

When we next (he says) in our survey of animal life encounter Consciousness in its onward and upward progress, we find that a fresh momentum has carried it into the midst of an entirely new and, indeed, startling series of phenomena. The subject-individual has passed out of and beyond itself; it has passed beyond the mere reflex co-ordination of data; it has overleapt the stage of passivo-active Receptivity; it has disencumbered itself of the load of that which is not itself; it has become freely active. . . . The phenomena which characterise the outward are not now mere attitudinally received and reflexly co-ordinated, but by a spontaneous inner movement they are arrested in their irregular and devious courses, arranged and actively distinguished and co-ordinated. A Force advances out of what has hitherto been mere receptive attitudinal individuality, and prehends or seizes the presentation, holding it close to itself and contemplating it. This Force is Will (p. 12).

We are not to suppose, however, that when Will thus shows itself any new being or individuality has been created. The subject-individuality exists in the dog as in the man; but in the latter the attitudinal subject has become endowed with the spontaneity called Will, and is thereby transformed into an Ego. The writer properly emphasizes the truth, which the followers of Mr. Mill and Dr. Bain are always forgetting, that this Will or Ego, which is active in all knowledge, though immediately known, is not given as a phenomenon of sense, and that therefore a system of pure Sensationalism is impossible. With much force and freshness he describes the process by which the Ego attains a knowledge of Percepts, and then proceeds to the formation of Concepts or general notions. The most able portion of the book seems to us to be the discussion of the question of *a priori* truth, that is whether the Reason (which is defined as the Will and the forms under which the Will works) imports into our knowledge truths which are not derived through the senses. He finds that the ideas of Substance, Cause, the Absolute-Infinite, Law, and Duty have this noumenal origin, and he establishes conclusively, we think, against Kant, that these pronouncements of the Will or Reason are not merely subjective forms of our thinking, but have objective validity. He argues for Dualism, that is for the real existence of a Force external to our consciousness and which is the Cause of our sentient states. Animals, he appears to think, have an idea of Space, but not of the infinitude of Space; they have an expectation of coming phenomena, but not the proper idea of Cause. Man rises necessarily to the notion of an Absolute-Causal-Being, which, by the insight of the reason, is seen and affirmed in

and through the natural phenomena of which it is the spiritual verity. Our author's view of what can be known by philosophy of the nature of God is thus summed up: "If we endeavour to know more of the spiritual verity than that it is the ground and form of the universe, we shall fail. It is expressed or externalised for us, and it is only as so externalised that we can predicate anything further about it. It is the whole substance of the notion God, in so far as that notion is purely rational. It is illegitimate to say that it *has* Reason, for it *is* Reason; it *has* not Thought it *is* Thought. All that is left to us is to bow before the awe-inspiring mystery. God is in and through His own Creation, and it is only as so manifested that He is an object of further predications to human reason. Of Him as an extra-mundane entity we are not entitled to speak; and, yet, Him as *Ens realissimum* we do, Kant notwithstanding, truly know" (p. 129).

C. B. U.

PROFESSOR FLINT'S 'VICO.'\*

THE name of Giovanni Battista Vico has not hitherto in this country been much associated with philosophical thought. His reputation with us rests mainly on the fact that in his novel theory respecting the origin of the Homeric poems he anticipated the views which created so much sensation when they were enunciated nearly a century later in Wolf's famous *Prolegomena ad Homerum*, and that his ideas respecting the non-historical character of much of the early Roman history not only heralded many of the conclusions of Niebuhr, but in some important points where they were at variance with Niebuhr's views have since been confirmed by the later researches of Mommsen. Vico has, however, much stronger claims on our attention than these remarkable anticipations afford. As a writer on metaphysics he is the author of original and profound views which have not yet been fully absorbed into the current of general philosophical thought; but not even here lies the chief interest of his writings for modern readers. It is because he was founder of the philosophy of history, and of what Ueberweg calls the psychology of nations, that he deserves to be read in an age when sociological evolution is engaging so much attention. Professor Flint has then, we think, done a useful work in giving to English readers an interesting sketch of the life and doctrines of this remarkable Italian, who, in the opinion of some of the greatest of his countrymen, stands foremost among the philosophers of modern times.

The volume opens with a very vivid sketch of the social and literary condition of Italy, and especially of Naples (Vico's birthplace and usual abode) at the time, the last quarter of the seventeenth century, when Vico began to write. The biography is that of a self-taught and needy literary man, who has often, in order to obtain a living for himself and his

\* *Vico*. By ROBERT FLINT, Professor in the University of Edinburgh. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons. 1884. Philosophical Classics for English Readers.

family, to turn aside from his favourite studies in law, history, and philosophy, that he may flatter in elegant Latinity his living patrons, or after their death celebrate their virtues in suitable orations, epitaphs and biographies. After a while, however, his worldly circumstances were made easier by an appointment to a professorship of rhetoric in his native city; and then he began to put forth his philosophical views not only in introductory lectures at the commencement of the annual sessions of the University, but also in separate treatises. His two chief works, both of which are ably analysed and commented on by Professor Flint, are, an early treatise in Latin *De antiquissima Italorum sapientia*, in which "he endeavours to evolve a metaphysical theory from the analysis of the roots of the Latin language and from the general study of philology, which, according to him, embraces all the facts of historical experience"; and a later work in Italian *Principii di Scienza Nuova*, which really gathers up all that he thought most worth preserving of the results of his life's thinking, and is in the main a theory of the history of civilisation.

In the earlier work there is much fanciful etymologising which could well have been omitted, and the metaphysical ideas supposed to be evolved thereby are really the product (often very valuable), of the writer's own genius. In this treatise he attempts, what has often been attempted before and since, to lay down a Criterion of Truth, and his principle is that the mind can only know that which it can create through its own activity. Professor Flint shows that this principle when fully understood is original and important, and he thus applies it to theological science:—

Verifying spiritual truth is, according to Vico's view, only possible through producing or making it within our own experience. And certainly the importance of such verification can hardly be exaggerated. The chief reason why ethics and theology are in so backward a state is, that spiritual experience and experimental evidence have not been rigidly enough demanded for their doctrines. The measure of their success or failure in the future must mainly depend on the degree in which those who cultivate them feel or forget that no spiritual truth can be certainly known which has not been experimentally realised (p. 111).

The most important speculation in this philosophical treatise is the theory of "Metaphysical Points," which "points," or centres of energy, he conceives to be the first outcome of God's creative energy and to lie midway between the Creator and the visible creation. It is not probable that this theory was suggested by the monadology of his older contemporary Leibnitz, for Vico's points are not psychical principles like the monads of Leibnitz, but are simply forces, such as Boscovich and Faraday imagined. This theory as described by Professor Flint deserves consideration. We should like to give some account of Vico's great work, "The New Science," but Professor Flint's description of its contents is already so compressed that it seems undesirable to abridge it, and we heartily recommend it to our readers, feeling sure they will enjoy it, and will see that Vico is in some important respects a sociologist quite

abreast of present thought, if indeed he is not in advance of it. Nations, in Vico's view, pass through three great stages: (1) The age of the Gods: (2) The age of the Heroes: (3) The age of Men or the historical age; and then by a process of decay recur to a state not far removed from their primitive condition. He takes the history of the Roman people as the type of a process which he regards to be common to all nations. The period of decay, however, is followed by a period of new life, and another cycle of change is entered upon which in its main features resembles the former. It is to be noticed, however, that he exempts Christianity from the law of cyclical change which involves the decay of all other human institutions. It is no detraction, we think, from the merit of Vico's *rationale* of history that he considers the facts inexplicable apart from the assumption of an overruling Providence. Professor Flint's account of Vico's attitude in regard to theology, on the one hand, and social science, on the other, is well worth quoting:—

As in contemplating history he perceives clear traces of the action both of God and man, his New Science is conceived of as both a theology and a sociology, but he does not confound these two. He recognises that they are distinct, and takes on the whole a correct view of their relationship. He neither makes sociology dependent on theology, nor does he allow it to displace it. He was fully aware that historical events ought not to be explained theologically; that merely to assert that God caused these events for such and such a purpose was futile; that there was no science in that, and if any theology, only theology of a bad kind, always arbitrary and arrogant in relation to God, and generally unjust in relation to men. On the other hand, he was not one of those who suppose that when the world of nations has been shown to be a product of the ideas, feelings, and volitions of men, it has been fully explained; on the contrary, he thought that the explanation itself as much needed explanation as what it had explained. He saw, or thought he saw, that what was realised in the course of the ages by the millions of individuals which compose humanity was a system of order so vast, comprehensive and excellent, as to imply a Supreme Will pervading, controlling, and using human wills,—

'A divinity that shapes our ends, rough-hew them how we will' (p. 196).

C. B. U.

#### SOURCES OF ENGLISH UNITARIAN CHRISTIANITY.\*

**A** WORK which bears on its title-page the name of James Martineau, if only as the author of its preface, stands in little need of any other recommendation; and Professor Bonet-Maury is not likely to meet with any criticism of his "Early Sources of English Unitarian Christianity," at once more appreciative and more just, than that which Dr. Martineau supplies in the preface which he has written for the English translation. That preface expresses so exactly, in a small compass, what

\* *Early Sources of English Unitarian Christianity*, by GASTON BONET-MAURY, D.D., Professor of Ecclesiastical History in the Faculty of Protestant Theology in the University of France. Revised by the Author and translated by EDWARD POTTER HALL. With a Preface by JAMES MARTINEAU, LL.D., D.D. London: British and Foreign Unitarian Association. 1884.



one feels, after reading the book, requires to be said, both in the way of praise and of warning against too ready and complete an acceptance of the author's conclusions, that the temptation is necessarily strong simply to transfer it to our pages. As, however, it cannot be expected to do a double duty, both as introduction where it stands, and as a critical notice here, a few words must be accepted from a much less competent judge. That Unitarian Christianity is a phenomenon of no small importance in the history of religion in England, is not likely to be any longer seriously denied, however strong may have been the disposition in past times to pass it by as a thing of no account; as such, it must, of course, have come to be what it is through a certain process of growth and development; its sources must lie somewhere, and to discover these sources—whether they are to be looked for at home or abroad, in a remote and uncertain past or near at hand—must be a task of very great interest. That such a task has been undertaken by a foreign scholar, who evidently looks at the Unitarian movement with a most friendly eye, is itself a fact of no small significance; and there is no one connected with that movement who will not be grateful to Professor Bonet-Maury for a work in which he has so ably laid bare the first beginnings, and sketched the early pioneers, of a rational Christian faith. The writer begins his work with an attack on the received view that Protestantism is uncongenial to the populations of southern Europe who are supposed to demand a religion that appeals to the eye and the imagination, while they leave reason and conscience to their more serious Teutonic neighbours—a view to which, it may be admitted, he opposes some rather strong facts—and all through he seems to take something of a racial pride in showing that for our English Unitarianism we are indebted to men of Latin origin. Yet if this book proves anything it is that Unitarianism was one of the inevitable results of the Reformation, and of the free use of reason in relation to the dogmas which Protestantism ultimately found itself compelled to accept as an inheritance from the Roman Church. Erasmus, who threw out so many doubts and hesitations, declaring that in the Bible “the Father is very frequently called God, the Son sometimes, and the Holy Spirit never;” Luther, who objected to the use of the word Trinity on the ground that it does not occur in the Bible, and deliberately omitted the invocation to the Trinity from the Kyrie Eleison; Melancthon, who evidently had his doubts on the subject, and foresaw what troubles its discussion would some day excite, were all, though not Unitarians, at least causes of Unitarianism. That Unitarianism, in fact, is simply the “natural residue of faith,” which is left over after the Trinity has been discarded, is well pointed out by Dr. Martineau, and must be clear to every one; and from this point of view to look for any other source may seem almost a superfluous labour. It is not, however, of course, denied that English thought was, at the time of the Reformation, variously influenced from abroad, and it is therefore with no little interest that we follow our present guide to the Strangers' Church in London, which he desires us to regard as the



seed-bed out of which the Unitarian idea grew. This church—founded by the Polish baron John à Lasco, patronised by Cranmer, in spite of the jealousy of some of the clergy, under Edward VI., broken up in the Catholic reaction under Mary, but restored to all its rights by Queen Elizabeth—was the centre to which there came refugees from all parts of Europe, but especially from Flanders, Spain, and Italy, carrying with them the freer speculations of Continental Protestantism, and something, it may be, of the rationalising spirit of the scholar of Rotterdam, whose countrymen, in fact, formed a considerable proportion of the exiles. Erasmus, it is here shown, exercised, in this way, an important influence in England. It is not, however, on the Dutch Erasmus, it is on the Italian Bernardino Ochino, that Professor Bonet-Maury fixes as, apparently, the true founder of English Unitarianism; as having been, in his own words, “to England, what Servetus, the Spaniard, had been to Italy: the initiator of the Unitarian movement.” Of the eloquent Franciscan, our author draws a most graphic picture, which we will give ourselves the pleasure of inserting here, but with this thesis regarding him, it must be said, his dates hardly agree.

“Born at Siena, the home of St. Catherine, in 1487, four years after Luther and twenty-two before Calvin, Bernardino, son of Dominico Tommasini, a resident in the *contrada dell’oca*, received the surname of Ochino (gosling), which in Italian has the same meaning as Hus (goose), in Czech. . . . The general tendency of the Franciscans, whether Cordeliers or Capuchins, was in Ochino’s time singularly evangelical. . . . This tendency was unquestionably due to the blessed task, imposed on them by their founder, of preaching repentance and the gospel of forgiveness to the people. Our author by no means escaped this influence; in his mission preachings he speedily developed a talent for oratory, all the more efficacious with his teachers, as his life accorded with his word, and his outward man was but the genuine expression of the attitude of his soul. He was never seen to go otherwise than on foot, staff in hand, clothed in a woollen frock; he slept on a plank bed, and eat only bread and vegetables. His visage pale and wasted, his whitening hair, his snowy beard, which descended to his breast, all proclaimed him an ascetic, a worthy emulator of St. Benedict; while his gleaming eyes, upturned to heaven, revealed the sacred fire which burned in his heart. He was at that time the most docile, the most humble servant of the Roman Church, which he believed infallible, nay, historians have made him, in error, the confessor of Pope Paolo III.” (pp. 138—141).

It was in December, 1547, that Ochino arrived in London, and there he remained till August, 1553. This long residence, we are told, “does not seem to have produced any appreciable development of his thought.” The question then arises, what exactly was his position with respect to the doctrine of the Trinity previous to his visit to England? It is thus summed up by our author:—

“The fruitful idea which dominates his whole theology is, that God is Love; it is through love that He created us in His own image, and it is also through love that He resolved to save us, at the price of His unique and well-beloved Son. This God is unique, eternal, necessary, infinite and immutable. As Father He is uncreate, but He has procreated the Son, and has endowed him with all perfections. The Father and the Son, by the exertion of their wills, have in their turn produced the Holy Spirit,

and have endowed him also with every perfection. Thus the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit, are one in substance, in person several" (p. 144).

This statement, if it may be verbally pressed, might be described as Arian, so far as it affirms, as it seems to do, the priority in time of the Father to the Son; but, as affirming a Trinity of persons in unity of substance, it is Athanasian. It is true it was before his English residence, and after he had received from Calvin a certificate of orthodoxy, that Ochino became acquainted at Basel with the free-thinking Castellio. There is also the statement of Père Guichard that Ochino "began in England to 'preach a refined Arianism, which awakened the curiosity of lovers of novelty,' and that several of his followers were prosecuted"; but it is freely admitted that the ultimate developments of Ochino's thought did not take place till a subsequent period, his *De Purgatorio Dialogus* not having been published till 1556, and his *Dialogi* xxx. on the Messiah and the Trinity, not till 1563. While, therefore, it cannot be doubted that Ochino gave an impulse to English thought in the direction of Antitrinitarianism, even after we have taken into account his indirect influence through his disciples Acontius and Corranus, his claim to be regarded as the *fons et origo* of English Unitarianism seems a little precarious.

Professor Bonet-Maury does not, of course, overlook the somewhat later influence of the Sozzini, and of the Socinian literature, with which, he says, perhaps with some exaggeration, Great Britain was inundated, in the earlier half of the seventeenth century; but we cannot follow him farther in his historical survey. We shall only quote his own testimony that John Bidle, sometimes regarded as the father of English Unitarianism, "experienced his first doubts concerning the Trinity, while reading the Bible, without having, as yet, opened any Socinian book."

It is, if we mistake not, the decided impression of the Unitarians of England that the faith they hold to-day is the natural fruit of the emancipation from dogmatic bondage which was accomplished at the ejection of the two thousand in 1662, and of the free use of the Bible which was then secured, with only a slight influence from any foreign source. The English Unitarians have always been peculiarly jealous of the name Socinian, which they have been careful to repudiate on the two-fold ground that there is no clear historical tie connecting them with the Socinian school, and that they were never pledged in any way to the theology of Cracow. From this position they are not likely to be dislodged, nor is it probable that the name Ochinian will be looked on with more favour than that of Socinian. The sources, then, of English Unitarianism—are they not simply the Bible and Reason? Such seems to be the view of Dr. Martineau, and it is one in which we think most thoughtful people will agree with him. At the same time, we heartily join with him in recognising the conspicuous merits and great interest of this little volume which we trust will obtain the large circulation it so eminently deserves. The work is issued by the British and Foreign Unitarian Association, and has had the advantage of being annotated by the Rev. Alexander

Gordon, whose minute knowledge of the history of Unitarianism in all its phases has enabled him occasionally to supplement or correct the statements of the author. Mr. Gordon has also contributed a remarkably full and accurate index. Indeed, the whole work is such a model of typographical accuracy—no small praise where there is such a profusion of names staggering to orthography—that it seems almost worth while to point out, as perhaps the only speck that can be detected by the most microscopic eye, that the Agathias Guidaccerio of the text (p. 80), appears in the index as Guidaccerio, Agattia. The index, of course, gives the most correct (Italian) form.

R. B. D.

#### DR. WEISS'S LIFE OF CHRIST.\*

IN the second part of his *Life of Christ*, which extends from about the middle of the first volume to the end of the third volume, which completes the work, Prof. Weiss treats of the actual history of Jesus. Those of our readers who remember the account we have already given of our author's view of the origin of the gospel narratives, his willingness to acknowledge that the first and third are compilations, that the writer of the fourth does not claim literal accuracy for his reports of the speeches of Christ, and that the memories of the eye-witnesses of the life of Jesus were not free from the conditions of forgetfulness and exaggeration common to men, will be surprised to find that the "history" begins with the narrative of the annunciation; and that it embraces the miraculous conception, the genealogies of Matthew and Luke, the birth at Bethlehem, the Magi, the flight into Egypt, &c.

It is, indeed, difficult to find any event of importance in the gospels, or even any saying attributed to Jesus, which Professor Weiss does not regard as historical, and we are somewhat puzzled to understand how it is that this being the case he declares so emphatically that the days of "Gospel Harmonies" are past. Certainly, the refusal to attempt to "harmonise" the gospels, facilitates the retention of the individual acts and sayings recorded, especially in the narratives of the infancy of Jesus. No doubt the temptation to accept some statements and reject others on arbitrary grounds, to draw from the gospels, by a process of alternate acceptance and exclusion, an ideal Jesus, is one that critics do well to be on their guard against. Yet it is impossible to avoid the feeling that our author is unconsciously dealing with primitive Christianity, and not with Jesus alone, when he retains essentially the whole of the four gospels. Notwithstanding this, however, the value of this portion of the work exceeds that of the purely literary introduction which deals with the sources. After all, even the things that Jesus did not say and do are all the better for a loving and appreciative interpretation. They will yield most when dealt with by a writer who takes the best side of them, and with

\* *The Life of Christ*. By Dr. BERNHARD WEISS. Vols. II., III. Translated by M. G. HOPE. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark. 1883-4.

Keim or Volkmar as a safeguard against too ready an acceptance of myth, or legend, or later modification, as history, Dr. Weiss will undoubtedly prove of great value to the student of the Life of Christ and the spirit of early Christianity. Of the calm and reverent tone of the whole of the three volumes it is impossible to speak too highly. "Orthodox" critics may be shocked at the absence of many conventional theological phrases, and may fear the results of the admissions that are made regarding the imperfections of the gospel narratives, and the limitations of the power and knowledge of Jesus himself; but the unofficial reader, if we may use the phrase, however sensitive, and whether he agree with all he may find in the book or not, can find nothing that will shock his sense of true reverence and the decorous treatment of the most sacred of all biographies.

Dr. Weiss's view of the nature of Christ is pretty much the same as that which was taken by many of the earlier Unitarians in England, and which, while they have passed beyond it, now seems to be making way in other sections of the Church. He does not regard Jesus as God, nor is he satisfied with the opinion that he was a mere man, not even though his be regarded as the highest and most unattainable human nature, and though he should be admitted to have had the purest ideas of God and divine things, and to have set forth a living example of a new religious life. Jesus is to him "the Christ, whom the Christian Church has worshipped from the beginning as her divine mediator and saviour," vol. i. p. xi. He does not regard him, however, as omniscient. His knowledge of men and his foresight are natural, and they are limited. But, on the other hand, they are such as arise from deep spiritual insight into human nature and the order of providence, not such as are acquired by varied experience and keen observation of the characters and actions of men and the course of events. The miracles narrated of Christ, again, are not properly speaking performed by him, but are performed by God for his sake or in answer to his prayers. In regard to the healing of the centurion's son at Capernaum, for example, "the current idea that Jesus healed the sick boy by an omnipotent action proceeding from himself or from his word is contradicted both by the narrative itself and by the express declaration of Jesus as to the means whereby his miracles were produced (John i. 52). For the words of Jesus, whether in Matthew (viii. 13) or in John (iv. 50), are not a command, but a promise; and this promise is fulfilled by God who alone worketh miracles. But that Jesus is able to utter this promise in unconditional confidence in its fulfilment is the clearest sign of his unbroken communion with the Father. In this communion he can do all that he will, because he only wills that which is in harmony with that will of God which is always immediately and with certainty known to him" (vol. ii. p. 50). Hence, in the case of the Canaanitish woman, "We must not suppose, as is now generally done, that Jesus was overcome at last by the woman's persistent entreaty. . . . He was obliged to wait until God made it clear to him that His

grace would make an exception to the rule. . . . Not he, but God, was overcome by the woman's prayer of faith" (vol. iii. p. 40).

Notwithstanding his acceptance of the evangelical narratives of the birth and infancy, Professor Weiss does not regard Jesus as having from the first a direct knowledge of his own Messiahship. This he must have reached gradually. The full possession of this Messianic consciousness must, however, have been attained before Jesus began his public ministry, otherwise some indication, at least, of the time and circumstances of its attainment would appear in the records of his life. The scene at Cæsarea Philippi, which is commonly regarded by the more recent critics of the gospels as giving us this very thing, requires accordingly a different interpretation. Jesus has already been acknowledged by a considerable popular party as the Messiah. It is in consequence of the rupture with the Pharisees, and with the Hierarchy, and the falling away of the multitude who are disappointed in their expectations, that Jesus has retired to Gentile territory with his disciples. Here he asks them, what is *now* the opinion of the people about him? and then, again, what do *they* say? Are they still faithful, and is their belief in him, as the Messiah, still unshaken? In order to support his view, Professor Weiss is compelled to suppose that Mark misunderstands the true state of things, and that John has wrongly introduced in a different context, and with some inaccuracy, what really belongs to this scene, viz.: "Upon this many of his disciples went back, and walked no more with him. Jesus said therefore unto the twelve, Would ye also go away? Simon Peter answered him, Lord, to whom shall we go? thou hast the words of eternal life. And we have believed and know that thou art the Holy One of God" (John vi. 66 sqq.). All this we are very far from endorsing, but it is ably argued (vol. iii. pp. 48 sqq.).

What was really, in Professor Weiss's estimation, a new point now reached by Jesus, was his conviction of the "historical necessity" of his death. This death upon the cross is not part of a "scheme of salvation" to be played out, but in the course of events gradually became an impending certainty. It was not Herod, filled at the very time with remorse for the murder of John the Baptist, that Jesus feared; but after the rupture with the Pharisees and the Hierarchy, and his desertion by the disappointed multitude, Jesus plainly saw that the course of events was tending inevitably to a violent death. This had now become an absolute certainty to him, and it was at Cæsarea Philippi that he made it known to his disciples (iii. p. 72).

On reaching the question of the date of the last supper and the crucifixion, Professor Weiss accepts the account given in the Fourth Gospel. Indeed, his view of the origin of the gospels compels him in all cases in which there is an historical difference to accept the account given in the Fourth Gospel rather than that of the synoptics. At the same time he regards the supper itself as being the Paschal supper, and supposes that it was eaten on Thursday, the 13th of Nisan, "the day before it was due;" a somewhat violent assumption to be made for the sake of a partial recon-

ciliation of Mark and John by one who has declared that the days of the "harmonists" are over. That the evangelists are inconsistent with one another as to the dates of the events they record, or the context in which given words were uttered, or the occasion of given acts or sayings, Professor Weiss is always willing, if necessary, to admit; but any given act or saying of Jesus recorded in them he appears to feel himself bound to retain and explain somehow. Thus, for example, he accepts Matt. xvi. 17, 18; xviii. 15-17 as historical, finds no difficulty in the mention of "the church," and simply takes it as showing that Jesus had relinquished, for the present (though not permanently) the hope of gaining the whole community of Jehovah, and resolved to content himself with a community of his own followers. Luke's statement that the commission in x. 1-16 was given to the seventy, instead of to the twelve, as in Matthew, is passed over with the explanation that, having already found this in Mark as addressed to the twelve, when he comes to it later in "the older source" he represents it as addressed to a "larger circle of seventy disciples;" but however much Luke may have been mistaken as to the *number*, the words attributed to Jesus must it seems have been uttered, and even so evident an interpolation as Luke x. 6 receives an explanation, and a somewhat curious one. The disciples are to remain in whatsoever house they enter, whether they find themselves welcome or not, and quietly to claim the hospitality of the house, not to offend the family by seeking a better lodging, and so win them over at last (ii. p. 815).

We cannot help hoping that, while those who are already acquainted with Keim's *Jesus of Nazara* may learn much from Dr. Weiss, the work of the latter may, on the other hand, be to many a stepping-stone to a more fearless, though, we trust, not less reverent criticism. Professor Weiss indeed seems to regard "the critics" as the born enemies of historical Christianity. But, surely, he is himself a New Testament critic so soon as he admits the question of the comparative value of the Gospels, or investigates the nature of the sources from which the writers drew; and the duty of criticism is to reveal to us so far as is possible what is history, and what is legend, or the accretion of tradition, or the interpolation of a scribe; not to show us by what arguments we may retain the maximum amount of the Gospel narratives as they have come down to us.

The various publishers in England and Scotland, who have during recent years brought so much German and Dutch scholarship within reach of English readers by means of translations, have deserved well of their country. The work of the translator himself is for the most part painful and unsatisfactory. It is seldom that any one who can read a work in the original is satisfied even with his own translation, to say nothing of any other translator's. It is consequently always a matter for genuine regret to be obliged to condemn a translation, and we expressed a hope, in our first notice, that the latter volumes of Professor Weiss's work might be better than the first, which was most unsatis-



factory. Unfortunately this is not the case, and we must in justice both to Professor Weiss and our readers warn the latter that it is not safe to trust the translation in any point. It may be read with profit and its statements may be taken for what they are worth, but they can never be relied upon as being Professor Weiss's. Even in the passage quoted in our former notice (*MODERN REVIEW* for July, 1884, p. 595) there are so many blunders that we wished, too late, after seeing the original to strike it out altogether. A translator who can render *Herrlichkeit*, "Lordship" (i. 131); *es handelt sich um*, "it deals with" (ib.); *gleichgültig*, "relevant" (i. 139n.); *die beiden einzigen Stellen*, "the two individual passages" (i. 152n.); and who goes out of his way to translate *freundlich* "ironically" in order that he may reserve "friendly" for the *feindlich* which follows (i. 186),—is certainly capable of being improved upon. But the translator of the second and third volumes, who as a rule renders the auxiliary *dürfen* by "dare" (making occasional exceptions in favour of "ought" or "could"), who apparently does not care to translate such insignificant words and phrases as *solcher*, *mittlebar* (ii. 207), *ihm stets unmittelbar gewiss* (ii. 51, line 6, of the will of God); and who renders *werde*, "must be"; *wieder in erzählender Form gegeben*, "not given in narrative form" (ii. 208); *ohne Alles bereitwillig zu opfern*, "without being prepared to sacrifice everything"; *dem johanneischen Bericht entgegen*, "where he [Keim] attempts to extract from John's account" (iii. 320), must surely be in the same form as his predecessor. And when we find him rendering *offenbar aber würde eine tendenziöse Aenderung der älteren Ueberlieferung sich viel directer zur Geltung gebracht haben*, "a harmonistic alteration of the older tradition would evidently have been of far more direct value" (iii. 278), and *Die Kritik hat in ihrem extremsten Junger\* noch gemeint*, simply "Critics thought" (iii. 289n), we can only suppose that he was in the position of many an unhappy young translator, wishing that he knew "what on earth it was all about." But enough of this; it soon ceases to be amusing, and we have said sufficient to show that we are justified in warning our readers that the translation is utterly untrustworthy. Such errors as these abound from beginning to end of the three volumes. The translators may have done their best, though it is difficult to avoid suspicions of carelessness in addition to ignorance. They, however, are responsible to the publishers. It is the publishers who are responsible to the public. In the case, indeed, of a book published and sold in the ordinary way, the publisher may plead *caveat emptor*; but we must ask, Is it quite fair, is it quite honest, to invite subscriptions promised before publication and then to supply this sort of work? Would not subscribers be justified in returning the volumes and demanding their money, on the ground that this is not Professor Weiss's Life of Christ?

F. H. J.

\* Viz. Prof. Volkmar, the passage referred to being in his *Evangelien*, p. 555.



## DR. RÉVILLE'S HIBBERT LECTURES.\*

IN these lectures the accomplished Professor of the Science of Religions at the Collège de France, sketches with charm and vivacity the outlines of the religious beliefs and usages of Mexico and Peru. The results of a large array of reading are condensed into a small space with admirable skill, and account is rendered with a firm hand of the chief phases of faith and ritual. The conditions of the work hardly admit of novelty. The evidence has been sifted by a succession of historians and anthropologists; what is demanded now is a presentment of the chief facts in the light of some philosophical conceptions of the general course of religious development. This demand Dr. Réville proceeds to satisfy as far as the limits of his too brief course permit. His book is a most felicitous series of illustrations of a principle which we find thus stated—viz., that “the same fundamental logic asserts itself across a thousand diversities, and reappears under every conceivable form in every climate and every race. Only let us look close enough and with the requisite information, and we shall find in every case that all is explained, that all holds together, that all is justified by some underlying principle, and that ‘that idiot of a word,’ *chance*, is never anything but a veil for our ignorance” (p. 208).

There are many reasons which render the religions of Mexico and Peru peculiarly suggestive when viewed under this light. Each country had attained independently a high material civilisation, and had developed a complicated social system. In each country the primitive animistic beliefs had been carried forward towards an organised polytheism, in which the results of the fusion of different peoples had modified the notions of the earlier animism, while this, in its turn, was occasionally exposed to higher philosophical criticism. Each country had a priesthood taking a leading part in its affairs; temples on the vastest scale; an elaborate ritual of public worship, and private offices bearing singular resemblance to baptism, communion, and confession; convents and religious orders; and even regular provision for the poor and the sick. And all this was beyond doubt indigenous. Every attempt to find points of historical contact with other lines of religious development—through the lost Ten Tribes of Israel, through Buddhist missionaries, or shipwrecked Englishmen, or what not—has broken down. Dr. Réville is perfectly justified in the happy comparison with which he sets out. The religious evolution of Mexico and Peru was as remote from the influences of the Eastern hemisphere as if it had taken place upon another planet.

The study of such a development cannot fail, then, to be in the highest degree interesting and instructive. Dr. Réville clearly recognises its roots in that view of the world known as Animism, which interprets the

\* *The Hibbert Lectures*, 1884. *Lectures on the Origin and Growth of Religion as illustrated by the Native Religions of Mexico and Peru*. By ALBERT RÉVILLE, D.D. Translated by PHILIP H. WICKSTEED, M.A. London: Williams and Norgate. 1884.

phenomena of nature like those of human agency, and, regarding every event as a manifestation of power, identifies that power with that which is first and best known, viz., the self. Accordingly, each object—the tree, the stream, the mountain, the wind, the sun—exists, grows, moves, animated and conscious like man. When the nature of man is at last analysed into two parts, capable of separation, body and spirit, a like analysis is accomplished for external things, and each visible form is credited with a spirit, which acts through it. A whole system of beliefs and usages has grown up on this foundation, and while some religions have advanced considerably beyond it, all still retain many traces of the modes of thought from which they sprang, and show survivals of practices true to the conceptions of an earlier stage. Many of these are pointed out from time to time by Dr. Réville in his survey of the institutions of Mexico and Peru. It would perhaps have helped still more clearly to fix the place of these religious phenomena if they had been somewhere grouped together as the real basis on which the rest of the edifice was reared. He seems to us, however, curiously to misrepresent the proper relation when he speaks of nature-worship "*engendering animism*" (p. 39). Animism cannot be said to have sprung out of nature-worship. It is an attempt at primitive philosophy, a search into the causes of things and an explanation of them. It does not appear either to produce or to be produced by worship. That arises, we believe, from another impulse, but at once fits itself to the prevailing view of the universe, because there is no other on which it can rest. The interpretation of nature as animated and conscious would precede rather than follow the worship of nature, at least in order of thought. But in these remote processes we can hardly talk of chronological priority: all that can be said is that animism is, properly speaking, only an interpretation of the phenomena of the world, beginning with those nearest home; viz., the consciousness and activities of man. It is not a religion at all, and does not rise out of it: rather, as a mode of thought, does it shape and control the beliefs and practices of religion.

How far the philosophy of nature may ascend on an animistic basis is seen in the tendency of so many religions—*e.g.*, in Africa, Northern Asia, India, China—to find a unifying principle in the sky conceived as living and personal. Dr. Réville observes that in this respect religion in Mexico and Peru presents no parallel to its counterparts in the Eastern hemisphere. There are, however, some signs of search for an ultimate goal of thought and faith. Over the whole Mexican pantheon, as some dreamed, reigned one who was, *par excellence*, *Teotl*, God, supreme and invisible. He was *Ipalnemoan*, 'he through whom we live'; he was *Tloquenahuque*, 'he who is all things through himself.' Dr. Réville alludes very briefly to the attempted reform of *Netzahuatcoyotl*, the royal poet and philosopher, who built a huge terraced temple in the usual Mexican form, to the unknown God, the Cause of Causes. He died in 1472, and 'as far as we can see,' says our author, 'his reformation

made no progress.' Alas, the secret of its failure is not far to seek : it was marred by one fatal insincerity. He taught his children in secret not to worship idols, but he bade them conform to their adoration in public *por complimiento* ! Of the remarkable collection of Mexican devotions reported by Father Sahagun, Dr. Réville says little. He plainly thinks them untrustworthy, for the kindly father, anxious to make out as good a case as possible, put the best form on what he imperfectly understood. Still we meet here and there with phrases that seem so far removed from medieval Catholic conceptions, that some credit may be allowed to them. When Tezcatlipoca, for example, is addressed as 'able to penetrate stones and trees,' and therefore to 'see and know what is within our hearts and read our thoughts,' do we not approach a doctrine of the divine immanence in nature very unlike the Christian mythology of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries ?

It is impossible to discuss the numerous topics at which Dr. Réville glances in the course of his comprehensive survey. His remarks on the significance of different rites, especially on the underlying meanings of sacrifice, are often full of illumination, though occasionally his inferences seem to us rather strained. Thus he lays it down that sacrifices were originally intended to provide the gods with food. The viands chosen were those supposed to be most acceptable, and as the worshipper had no clue to the taste of his deity except his own, he offered the kind of meat he himself liked best. From this position Dr. Réville argues back that the wide prevalence of human sacrifices in antiquity implies an equal prevalence of cannibalism (p. 87). We cannot say that this appears to us at all necessary. Other gifts besides food were made to the deity. He might require retainers for his court, or slaves, or, as Dr. Réville's own pages show us, a bride (p. 37).—Our author's judgments on Buddhism appear to us also widely at fault. He speaks of its 'gentle insipidity' (p. 110), and elsewhere describes it as 'the last word of the religions of nature' (p. 163). We should have thought that Buddhism, which at all events preached the love of man with a moral power and a missionary zeal unknown before Christianity, ought to be exempt from the reproach of 'insipidity'; and it is a singular inversion of the facts of the case to present it as 'still a religion of Nature.' For the organisation of society on such a basis the student must go to China. There, in the worship of Tien (heaven) as Shang-Ti ('supreme ruler'), with whom the Emperor, 'the eldest son of heaven,' may be identified, is one of the most remarkable specimens of an animistic religion in its combination with government and popular order. Or, for the last word of philosophical animism, the student must go to India, indeed, but to India before Buddhism. Brahmanism, with its doctrine of the self in the heart identical with the Self in the universe, with its dreary speculations of the Higher Brahman from which all predicates must be thought away, till the mind is lost in blank abysses of being destitute of any attributes—this is the end of Animism as an interpretation of the world. Buddhism, however, was from first to last, in its founder's teachings, a protest against this doctrine.

It swept away the whole conception of the self as the foundation of the consciousness, and denied the presence of any abiding Self giving unity to the universe. It did not deny, it is true, the existence of many of the popular objects of worship; but in embracing them all within one conception of impermanence, in affirming that even the great Brahṃa himself must one day die, and that the way of salvation could never lie in sacrifice and ceremony, it did essentially reject the animistic conceptions, and thrust them all away from its view of the moral order of life. But this is a large subject; and in taking leave of Dr. Réville we would only direct our reader's attention to his admirable remarks on the ethical value of the religions which he describes, the significance of their doctrine of a future life, and the thoughts suggested by such a parallel as that supplied between the fate of a Virgin of the Sun and a Roman Vestal unfaithful to their vows.

Of Mr. Wicksteed's translation it need only be said that in spite of an occasional inversion it is marked by his usual idiomatic ease. Great pains have evidently been taken with the references, a number of old English translations being carefully cited beside Dr. Réville's French titles. Here and there a word or a phrase—'disembarkment' and 'effects the orientation'—appears a trifle awkward; the 'plesiosaurs' and the 'megatherions' have not quite decided to what language they belong; and spellings such as *vermine*, *malise*, and *beshreibungen*, whether due to translator or printer, need some revision. J. E. C.

#### MR. GELDART'S 'GOSPEL ACCORDING TO PAUL.'\*

MR. GELDART describes his essay as an attempt to supply a deficiency in Baur's investigation of the development of the doctrine of the Atonement, by tracing to its source the idea that the death of Christ was in some sense an expiatory offering. Beginning with the statement that "the earliest patristic theology, however it varied in detail, concurred in representing the death of the Redeemer as in some sort a price paid to the Devil, the effect of which was that the latter lost a right, which he had previously possessed, of disposing of the souls of men," our author proposes to connect this theory with the theology of Paul, and finds the connecting link in Marcion, who held that the God of the Old Testament was neither more nor less than the author of evil. Marcion claimed Paul as his teacher; where did he find in Paul a ground for his theory? To answer this question is the aim of Mr. Geldart's first chapter, 'Paul's view of the Law.'

In the Epistle to the Galatians we find the contrast between the faith of Christ and the works of the law most strongly emphasized. So sharp, indeed, is the contrast, that Christ himself incurred the curse of the Law—not, however, the curse of God. What, then, was the authority of the

\* *The Gospel according to Paul. An Essay on the Germs of the Doctrine of Atonement.* By Rev. E. M. GELDART, M.A. London: W. Swan Sonnenschein and Co. 1884. Pp. 85.

Law which condemned him? It was not divine, either in purpose or in origin. It was superadded to the Promise, with no other motive than "to cause transgressions" (Gal. iii. 18, 19). And immediately in this connection follows the passage upon which the weight of Mr. Geldart's argument mainly rests: διαταγὴς δὲ ἀγγέλων, ἐν χειρὶ μεσίτου. Ὁ δὲ μεσίτης ἑνὸς οὐκ ἔστιν, ὁ δὲ Θεὸς εἰς ἔστιν. This much-debated verse is interpreted by our author as follows: 'Ordained by angels in the hand of a Mediator, i.e., a medium, a communicator, as Jesus is called in Hebrews the Mediator, or Representative, of a better covenant; now he (ὁ δὲ) is the representative not of one like God [but (understood) of many, i.e., the angels]; the obvious conclusion being that Moses being a representative of a plurality of inferior beings, or "angels," not necessarily even good angels, by whom the law was ordained, could not claim to be the representative of the one and only God.'

These angels, far from being good angels, were malignant powers, being none other than the στοιχεῖα of Gal. iv. 3 and Col. ii. 8. "That στοιχείων means genii, and not elements, is sufficiently established by its patristic use, as Baur and Hilgenfeld think. But the fact that in Modern Greek στοιχείων means a 'genie,' or a ghost, is a striking confirmation of this view." This point Mr. Geldart has discussed at length in an appendix to his work on the *Modern Greek Language*. He concludes then that the angels of the law in Galatians are nothing more than the 'principalities and powers,' 'the spirits of wickedness in heavenly places,' 'the world-rulers of the darkness,' of the later Pauline epistles.

The Second Chapter deals with Paul's notion of Redemption. How did Jesus redeem us by becoming a curse, under the law, for us? Our author replies, By putting the law to shame; by dying, with such a sense of immortality and peace with God that we need no longer fear the curse of the law. "He died, not to save us from dying, but that we might be content to die with Him, that we might rise with Him again. . . . Self-identification with Christ, fellowship with His sufferings, not belief in Him as an expiatory sacrifice, is everywhere with Paul the faith that justifies." The Law, whose realm is the flesh, had a kind of claim upon the body of Jesus, as 'born of a woman' and 'born under the law.' He died, therefore, 'unto sin once.' Now we know him only as a living spirit, and after the flesh we know him no more. The disciple, as his Lord, dies to the law and the flesh, and is made alive with him in the spirit. (Cf. Romans vi. 9—11.) The death of Christ is therefore not vicarious, but representative, and it effects a salvation, "not from the wrath of God, for God has not appointed us to wrath, but rather from the wrath of the law, the condemnation of a conscience in bondage to a hard, unkindly code, which can neither command the allegiance of the heart nor secure the obedience of the will."

The Third Chapter treats of 'Anti-Pauline and Semi-Pauline views,' and is practically an attempt to account for the fact that the theory which our author has attributed to Paul has not left more traces of its prevalence in some quarters, or of its rejection in others, in the New Testament

literature. Among 'Anti-Pauline' works, James furnishes no trace of it; the Apocalypse of John contributes only the unexplained phrase 'he has purchased us with his blood' to any theory of redemption; while in 'Semi-Pauline' books a Catholicising tendency shows itself either in treating the law no longer as opposed to the gospel, but as a symbolical anticipation of it (as in Hebrews), or in smoothing away the peculiarities of Paulinism (1 and 2 Timothy), until at last it could be represented that Peter and Paul were in substantial agreement, and used the same language, on doctrinal matters (1 Peter). The fourth gospel, standing apart, and characteristically making the aim of Christ's mission to be 'to bear witness to the truth,' represents him as opposed and condemned by the law (xix. 7), but this is only a detail in the general enmity of 'the Jews.'

The Fourth Chapter insists on the wilful obscuration of Pauline doctrine in the Acts of the Apostles, which goes, in Mr. Geldart's judgment, to the length of adopting the very phrase which Paul had used for the special purpose of discrediting the authority of the law, for the purpose of exalting it (Gal. iii. 19; Acts vii. 53). But in this very book our author finds a clue to that 'historical basis' for Paul's theory of which he is in search, viz., sufficient evidence that Remission of Sins (*ἀφεσις ἁμαρτιῶν*) was the typical motto of the earliest Christian preaching as it was of the ministry of Jesus himself; this was his first word, when he took up the Baptist's call to repentance; it was his last word at the farewell supper (Matt. xxvi. 28). We gather (and we wish Mr. Geldart had been a little more explicit just here) that the *ἁμαρτίαι* are in his view essentially the technical transgressions of the law. Jesus opposes and abrogates the law, reverses its dicta, minimises the importance of its details, restores and uplifts those who were under its ban; while the demands of the kingdom which he preached were not satisfied by all the righteousness of the scribes and Pharisees.

As the friend of publicans and sinners he incurred the curse of the Law. Separation from sinners was the essence of Pharisaism and the logical issue of Mosaism, which lacked the kindly element of that redeeming love which went to seek and save the lost; as the Sabbath breaker, for the sake of humanity He incurred the curse of the Law; as the acquitter of the penitent adulteress, whom Moses had commanded to be stoned, He incurred the curse of the Law; above all, when He taught how the Son of Man, the poor and lowly, friendless, homeless One, who had not where to lay His head, was even in virtue of that sonship, without priestly title or professional standing, empowered to pronounce the penitent forgiven, He incurred the direst censure, the extremest penalty of the Law (pp. 81, 82).

We gratefully acknowledge the keen interest with which Mr. Geldart has invested the research of which we have briefly summarised the results, and the ability and independence of thought which his essay displays. It is, moreover, rich, especially in the second chapter, in suggestive exegetical points. But as an argument, the chain is no stronger than its weakest links. And—to begin at the end—one of these is that which is to connect all the rest with the word and work of Jesus. Admitting that there is much that is profoundly true in our author's



delineation of the attitude of Jesus towards the law and its representatives, we cannot persuade ourselves that in his own speech, or in that of his personal followers, Remission of Sins means the abolition of vexatious legal condemnations and disqualifications; that Sin here is matter of law, and not of conscience,—in other words, that ἀμαρτία on the lips of Jesus is exactly equivalent to παράβασις in the language of Paul. Next—to return to the starting-point—even if we admit that στοιχεῖα are genii, and that these genii are the ‘angels’ of Gal. iii. 19, and that Mr. Geldart’s rendering of the passage is satisfactory, we cannot even then admit that in Paul’s view the authors of the law are demonic and malignant. Paul, engaged in close conflict with Jewish literalists, enforcing his views by strange and unexpected applications of the very letter of Scripture, could not, surely, depart so far from the written word as to convert the ‘myriads of holiness’ of Deut. xxxii. 2 (upon which both the Targums and Rabbinical tradition greatly enlarged) into evil spirits. We cannot go further in this direction than Holsten and Sabatier, who see in the passage no intention either to glorify or to degrade the law, but a simple statement of the subordinate and intermediary part it plays in the divine plan. It is only a means, and is only valid for a time. It can add no condition to the Promise, and can offer no obstruction to the heir when, in the fulness of time, he assumes his rights. It has only the temporary authority of the guardian or trustee of his minority. We cannot believe, moreover, that if the conception of the demonic origin of the law had been so essential to Paul’s theory of redemption as Mr. Geldart believes, he would have been content to leave it out, or would have resorted to artifice to gloze it over, when he came to write out for the Romans the doctrinal scheme he had drafted for the Galatians. If Mr. Geldart is right in his interpretation of Gal. iii. 19, still we can only say, the point is one once made, and afterwards consciously discarded; and therefore not, in Paul’s mature opinion, an integral part of his system. Lastly, there are certainly some links missing between the patristic doctrine of the effect of Christ’s death as voiding a certain right possessed by the devil—surely not a doctrine characteristic of ‘the earliest patristic theology,’ but one which is scarcely full-blown before Origen—and the teaching of Paul, which can only be supplied by reference to the growth of Christian demonology, and the fantastic play of imagination around the subject of Christ’s descent into hell.

J. E. O.

#### ABAILARD AS A THEOLOGIAN.\*

IT is now nearly forty years since Charles de Rémusat published his masterly life of Abailard. Since that time there has been a great deal of talk about the man who is beyond question the most remarkable teacher in the twelfth century; but hardly any one has set himself to treat his work as a whole. His dialectical performances indeed have

\* *Peter Abälard ein kritischer Theologe des zwölften Jahrhunderts*: von S. M. DEUTSCH. Leipzig: S. Hirzel. 1883.



perhaps received sufficient elucidation and criticism, but little or nothing has been done to expound his theological position; unless we include the elaborate, if somewhat perverse, attempt of Professor Reuter, of Göttingen, in his *Geschichte der religiösen Aufklärung im Mittelalter*, to prove that the Christian elements in Abailard's theology are practically what the scientific call 'survivals,' and that he was, when all is said and done, little more than a pure theist. Professor Deutsch, in the careful and judicious treatise before us, limits himself to the consideration of Abailard's theology. He prefixes, it is true, a brief narrative of the events of the philosopher's life and a very intelligent summary of his dialectical views; but the subject of his book is theological, and if its interest is lessened by an over-anxiety to produce a complete systematic delineation of what we really know piecemeal, and through a variety of imperfect treatises, his book is undoubtedly the clearest and most conscientious piece of work that has yet been devoted to the subject.

Dr. Deutsch does rightly, we think, in considering Abailard's speculations on the doctrine of the Trinity to be in truth of a minor intrinsic importance when we view his theological conceptions as a whole. No doubt they were the first to arrest public attention; and, however innocent they might be in themselves, Abailard was made painfully aware of his indiscreetness in giving utterance to them, by the repeated prosecutions to which he was subjected by the more correct, or the less venturesome, theologians of the day. At the same time, the prominent place they evidently occupied in his thoughts is a fair measure of their historical value; and after all we can hardly claim much more than an historical (we do not say, an antiquarian) value for any of the productions of theological thought in the middle ages. Dr. Deutsch is so far in agreement with us that he confesses that he fails to find a genuine unity of system in Abailard's views; that they are in fact too much dependent on heterogeneous suggestions and mixed courses of thought, for one to expect conclusions at all approaching symmetry or completeness. The infirmity of resolution and the personal vanity which influenced in so striking a way the fortunes of his private life, extended, so Dr. Deutsch maintains, as deeply into his philosophical and theological writings. In this there is doubtless much truth; but when the critic proceeds to say that he can hardly believe that Abailard was quite in earnest in his labours for the promotion of the Christian faith, we are bound to protest. For it seems to us that though there was a good deal of self-conceit in Abailard's early work, especially as a public teacher, these faults cannot be justly charged to his studies in theology. If anything in his career was inspired by a high religious purpose, it was his devotion to that study, and his relinquishment of the field of scholastic success at Paris, just at the moment when opposition was removed and the way was clear before him to revive his fame as the most popular master of his time. In his treatment of theological problems, no point in which he showed himself animated by a nobler ambition than that of mere ephemeral notoriety, is more remarkable than the manner in which he addressed himself to the doctrine of the Atonement.

It is well known that Saint Anselm in the eleventh century had shaped this doctrine very nearly in the form in which it is now held by the evangelical churches. Abailard set himself to resist it. His efforts were so far rewarded that at least one part of the doctrine, the notion that the devil had previously to Christ's work possessed a strict right to the souls of men, was, thanks to his criticism, soon excluded from orthodox textbooks.\* But Abailard went far beyond criticism. Denying that the death of Jesus could have been accepted as a representative sacrifice or "satisfaction" for the sins of mankind, he substituted another view of the whole question, one in which more than anywhere else he shows his affinity to the modern spirit of conceiving theological relations. The incarnation of Christ, his life on earth, and his death, were all, and all alike, one great revelation of God's love, ordered with the single purpose of awakening love on man's side; so that thus he may shake off the bondage of sin and rise to the perfect liberty which is founded not on fear but on love. It may be said indeed generally that Abailard's contention was that the truth did not lie exclusively in the concrete doctrines of the church, perhaps, indeed, not so much in these as in the universal truths which they substantiate and define. He delighted in dissecting the church tradition and showing that it could not claim that uniformity and unanimity commonly asserted for it: the elements were diverse; only the controlling spirit was one. But that controlling Spirit was not peculiar to the Christian authorities; it pervaded also the philosophy of the ancients, so that by one or another channel all men might be guided to the knowledge of God. The difference between Plato and the Bible, it should almost seem, was one not of kind, but of degree. Such thoughts as these give Abailard an almost unique place in the history of mediæval Christendom. Their independence of the accredited theology makes it all the more difficult to estimate them justly in relation to their author's time and circumstances; and it is all the greater honour to Dr. Deutsch that he has succeeded to so considerable an extent as he has, in arranging and analysing the complicated elements of his subject. He has collected the available materials with industry and used them with judgment. His style and method are both commendably plain and logical. We only wish that the modern system of German punctuation did not insist on the use of commas as a rule instead of semicolons, and on the practical abolition of colons except to introduce quotations.

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#### A NEW SYNOPSIS.

OF all the aids to what may be called the personal study of the New Testament, as distinguished on the one hand from original research, involving a wider field of labour than is afforded by its own books, and on the other hand from the mere unthinking acceptance of some commentary, nothing that we have seen surpasses in convenience and

\* See Deutsch. P. 369, note.

compressed value the little volume which is the first instalment of the English version of Mr. Rushbrooke's Synopticon.\* A single and complete Synopsis of the Gospels it is not possible to produce. The diversities of matter and arrangement are so great that without considerable transposition and repetition it is not possible to bring all the parallel passages together, and the attempts that have been made have resulted in a more or less confused view of all the gospels. It is evident that what is required of a synopsis is to enable the reader to see at a glance what is common to the three gospels, and then to detect also what is common to any two of them, and what is peculiar to each. The first is what the present volume presents. It is printed in four parallel columns. The second column gives Mark in full; the third, Matthew; the fourth, Luke. In each of these columns the words which are common to all three are printed in "black type," so that the reader can see at a glance, and without turning his eye from column to column, what is the "common, or triple, tradition" of the evangelists. Then in the first column are given all the passages (or rather successive words) which are peculiar to Mark. "It is intended in due course to publish a separate volume containing the 'Double Tradition,' that is to say, the portions of the Synoptic Narrative common to Mark and Matthew, Mark and Luke, Matthew and Luke; and also the passages peculiar to each of the three Synoptists." With these two volumes before him the student of the English New Testament will be well off, indeed. Hitherto those who were unable to read Greek have had no proper means of comparing the gospel narratives with one another. The total unfitness of the Authorised Version for any such purpose (the same Greek word being rendered by different English words, and *vice-versâ*), and the wrong methods pursued by the harmonists, left them perfectly helpless. They found themselves in a maze to which they had no clue. Dr. Abbott and Mr. Rushbrooke have been able to make use of the Revised Version, and it is evident that the care of the Revisers, so far as possible always to translate the same Greek into the same English, makes this version peculiarly apt for their purpose, and they themselves have pursued the only rational and profitable method. This unassuming little volume, of very moderate price, with its successor, will, in fact, supply English readers with the nearest possible equivalent to the most valuable of all Greek Synopses. Dr. Abbott has prefixed an interesting introduction pointing out how much may be expected to result from new methods of Gospel criticism and comparison. It is to be hoped that he will not tempt too many young students to embark upon the stormy sea of conjectural emendation; but we must accept even such a result if it should prove inseparable from the attempt to enable them at least to understand its navigation.

F. H. J.

\* *The Common Tradition of the Synoptic Gospels*, in the text of the Revised Version. By EDWIN A. ABBOTT, D.D., and W. G. RUSHBROOKE, M.L. London: Macmillan and Co. 1884.

## DR. COX ON MIRACLES.

DR. COX has republished three articles on the Miracles\*, which lately appeared in the *Expositor*, but we cannot honestly place a very high value on his contribution to the subject. Readers of his former works will be prepared to find here much sound learning and an open candid manner, but also to find a want of thoroughness which deprives his labours of much present or any permanent value. He says much that is very good and true about the relation between science and religion, but stops far short of the point at which he will convince a real student of science that it is possible to reconcile truth and orthodoxy. He gives a good general sketch of the development of theology which may be traced in the Old Testament, but it is worthless in regard to specific details, because the essential facts on which such a history of development must be based, viz., the dates of the composition of the various books, are wholly misapprehended, and the arguments of modern scholarship simply dismissed with contempt. The fundamental question with regard to miracles is "What evidence is there for them?" It is asserted by good Biblical authorities that throughout the Bible, narratives recorded by contemporaneous writers are free, with very few exceptions, from miracles, and that miracles grow and multiply in proportion to the distance of time between the event recorded and the writing down of the record. If this assertion can be made good, even to any considerable extent, it settles for logical thinkers this fundamental question of the evidence, and if Dr. Cox wishes to enter into this critical warfare he had better not do it with quite such "a light heart" as he here displays. We must enter an emphatic protest against Dr. Cox's contention that it is impossible to detach the question of miracles from the Sermon on the Mount, because "our Lord represents some of his followers as claiming to have wrought miracles, nay as having really cast out devils in his name, and in his name done many wonderful works. . . . And yet how should he have spoken of them as working miracles and working them in his name, if He himself did no miracle?" We answer that exorcism, or the casting out of demons, was a regular profession among the Jews of that period, that wonderful cures are frequently effected by natural means in times of religious excitement, and that any difficulty in believing that demons were supposed to go out at the name of Jesus Christ attaches solely to the representation that this name was successfully invoked by "workers of iniquity." Dr. Cox appears to think that bad men could work miracles simply by using a certain Name. What is this but to degrade religion to mere magic and superstition? After this we are not surprised to find Dr. Cox citing Paul as a witness for miracles and representing him as saying "in these epistles," i.e. Romans, Corinthians, and Galatians, "that his own conversion was due to a miracle." Where, in these four greater Epistles, does Paul say this? The

\* *Miracles: an Argument and a Challenge.* By SAMUEL COX, D.D. London: Kegan Paul. 1894.

only account he gives of his conversion is Galatians i. 15, 16, "But when it was the good pleasure of God, who separated me, even from my mother's womb, and called me through his grace, to reveal his Son in me that I might preach him among the Gentiles;" and, perhaps, 1 Cor. xv. 8, "And last of all he was seen of me also, as of one born out of due time." It is of course natural to any one who has already accepted, as historical, the tradition of Paul's conversion by external miraculous means, to call the tradition to mind when he reads these passages; but can any one say that a miraculous and not a purely spiritual process is described in the words of Paul himself? Could any words, indeed, more clearly than the first of these passages, indicate to us a conversion effected not by miraculous, but by spiritual means? It was an internal revelation, appealing to his soul, not an external demonstration appealing to his senses, which convinced Paul that Jesus of Nazareth was Jesus the Christ, the Son of God.

Dr. Cox thinks he escapes all the principal difficulties of a belief in miracles by affirming that these are not violations of Nature's laws, but simply the manifestation of a higher but equally natural law. He says truly that this theory has been before the world for 50 years, and he complains that no one has taken the trouble to refute it. Surely the reason is that it has not been deemed worth refutation. Dr. Cox clearly does not realise the effect of accepting such a theory with full logical consistency. It would simply place Jesus among the inventors and discoverers; he would be the Edison or the Jenner of the first century; and science would owe him a great grudge for not having recorded his discoveries in such a way as to be available for the subsequent use of mankind; when higher laws of nature are once found out, very inferior men can repeat the experiment and apply the law. The one thing such a theory could never contribute a particle of evidence to prove is, that Jesus was one of God's true prophets. Of course Dr. Cox does not follow out his argument along this line. What he does show is that if Trinitarianism be true, and Jesus Christ was and is God the Son, then we have no reason to be surprised at any unique displays of power which may have attended his Incarnation. He shows that the believers in the Trinity can without much more difficulty believe also in the miracles. But was it worth republishing three articles from the *Expositor* to prove this?

H. S. S.

#### BIBLE FOLK-LORE.\*

THIS is one of those books which are the despair of a reviewer, it is so well-meaning, but so hopelessly ill-executed. The writer's aim is to apply to the Biblical records the principles, methods, and results, of the comparative mythology of Egypt, Mesopotamia, and India. He desires in this way to set it free from the orthodox divinity which has hedged it in as a "unique production of genius or inspiration," and enable it to take its place among the world's Scriptures, the greater Bible of the

\* *Bible Folk-Lore, a Study in Comparative Mythology.* By the Author of "Rabbi Jeshua." London: Kegan Paul, Trench, and Co. 1884.

human race. This is an excellent and commendable object. No one can question the author's sincerity; he has devoted, he tells us, twelve years of serious and special study to his task; and from a wide range of reading he gathers up his conclusions in an easy and readable form.

But before the student of comparative mythology can safely bring the literature of the Bible into the circle of his operations, he must take a few simple precautions. The interpretations of mythology are largely concerned with the meaning of words, and the inquirer<sup>2</sup> into the mythology of the Old Testament ought therefore, in the first place, to know a little Hebrew. Our author has hardly fulfilled this elementary demand, or he would not suppose Elohim to be the plural of El (p. 102), or render Phicol by 'all-mouth' (p. 37), or identify Joseph with the winter sun because his 'coat of many colours' signifies the bright tints of the aurora (p. 53). The investigator must likewise have some idea of the affinities of Hebrew with other languages, so as not to be carried away by casual similarities of sound; whereas our author, ingenuously observing that the word Nephilim, Gen. vi. 4, giants, 'bears a curious resemblance to the Greek Nephelê, or cloud,' proceeds boldly to talk of 'the cloud giants,' offspring of the winds (the sons of heaven) and the waters (the daughters of earth). Egyptologists and Sanakrit scholars may deal with the confident assertion that Osiris is the Aryan Asuras, and Isis the Ushas of the Vedas; but we must protest against the identification of Caleb (the dog) with the Indian Sarama, the equivalent of Hermes and the moon (p. 71.). Before the author deals in this style with animal names in Hebrew tradition, he should consult Prof. Robertson Smith's well-known essay on this subject. The arbitrariness of his mythological interpretations leaves the critic bewildered and helpless; no reasoning can touch them. Joshua, we are informed, means the 'Saviour, or Salvator Mundi.' Now, elsewhere it is casually remarked that 'Salvator Mundi' was a title of the sun-god Mithra in Rome. Joshua, therefore, is roundly identified with the 'rising sun.' Rahab's red thread proves her of course to be the dawn! The episodes of Achan and the siege of Ai cannot be made by any ingenuity to fit themselves to this style of treatment; they are, therefore, at once set aside as later insertions.

This leads us to our second count. The student of Old Testament mythology must have some notions of the structure and composition of his texts. The writer of 'Bible Folk-Lore' has some idea that the Pentateuch is not of uniform authorship, and in his opening chapters we hear him talking of the Elohist and the Jehovistic Commentator. We do not quarrel with him for his view of the relative ages of Gen. iv. and v., for example; nor even for the assumption implied in the description of the Jehovist as a Commentator; but it is quite intolerable that in defiance of all literary analysis the narrative of the Exodus and the Wanderings should be treated as a whole, with all its incidents drawn from all sources lumped together, and then interpreted as a solar story. 'The epic is too complete and homogeneous not to be accepted as a conscious myth,' says the author. But as soon as a myth becomes *conscious* it ceases to be a



myth, viz., the spontaneous description of natural phenomena in terms of human action, and turns into deliberate invention. We have already referred to the cool way in which inconvenient narratives in Joshua are dismissed, because they cannot be properly 'solarised.' A little study of the composite character of the Book of Joshua would have cleared up the difficulty. The traditions of Judges undergo like handling. As the author advances towards more historical ground he abates none of his boldness, but courageously attacks each fresh group of narratives. Deborah is 'perhaps the dewy and flaming dawn, or perhaps the moon who aids the sun.' This caution is praiseworthy; but the writer does not apparently mind bringing out incongruous results. Witness his interpretation of the series of antediluvian patriarchs in Gen. iv. and v. His object is to arrange them in two orders of twelve, but these are only obtained by a little manipulation. Gen. iv. yields the requisite number by beginning with Adam, inserting Seth after Cain, and concluding with the four children of Lamech. The list founded on Gen. v. ought to begin with Adam also, but, as it is to wind up with Shem, Ham, and Japhet, this would make thirteen, so Seth here stands first. These two series of twelve names are then identified with the twelve months of the year. Unfortunately, the lists contain some duplicate names, which do not occur in the same places. The author, however, suspects nothing wrong, but contentedly remarks at the close of his exposition, 'We have thus traced the two lists of patriarchs throughout the year, and find their attributes to agree with the seasons which they are supposed to represent.'

It would be easy to give more instances of the false etymologies, the rash and arbitrary interpretations, the ill-considered combinations, with which this book abounds. The writer has fallen an easy prey to the comparative mythologists, beginning with the Rabbis, to whose fancies he so constantly appeals. He does not appear to have studied the history of Israel at all. Of the method of interpretation founded by Ewald and carried on by Kuenen and Wellhausen he is wholly ignorant. Not a single reference to these writers occurs in his pages. He claims the credit of being the first to point out twelve episodes in the Samson legends, wholly unaware that Ewald had long ago described his 'twelve giant deeds from first to last against the Philistines.' In the same way he proceeds to deal with the higher conceptions of Israel's religion, identifying the Servant of Yahveh, for example, in the Babylonian prophecies, with the Persian Mithra. Into the discussions of Christian legend and Pauline doctrine we cannot follow him now; but readers must be warned against his reckless treatment of the texts, which may momentarily mislead the unwary, as in the audacious identification of Jesus and Zarathustra in the temptation story of Matthew (p. 236), or in the substitution of other words in a Buddhist verse so as to bring out a close parallel with a saying attributed to Jesus (p. 215). Of course the resemblances of some of the Gospel narratives to elements in the legend of Gotama Buddha lead to easy assertions



of the derivation of Christianity from Buddhism. These are supported by such instances as the following: 'The agony in Gethsemane is but another instance of connection with Buddhist tradition, for we learn from the Nirvana Sutra that so deep was the grief of those who saw Buddha die that "all the minute pores of their bodies gave forth blood, which was sprinkled on the ground."' No reference is given for this quotation, which does not occur in the oldest narrative of the Buddha's death, the Mahāparinibbāna Sutta, and must belong therefore to a later stratum. And how the incident was transferred from the disciples to the Master in the course of its passage westward into the third Gospel, we are not told. It must have been one of those blunders which our author so severely condemns. 'The Gospel of Luke,' he says, 'like the traditionary history of the Apostles, is remarkable for the inaccuracies of its historical statements, no less than for the confident tone of its narrative. This inaccuracy is peculiarly Oriental, and arises from that superficial self-sufficiency which is so remarkable in the writings of Josephus, and in the Talmudic literature.' Alas, inaccuracy, confidence, and self-sufficiency are not the monopoly of the East alone; not even the discipline of 'twelve years of serious and special study' suffices always to eradicate them from the Western mind.

J. E. C.

#### GENESIS, SPIRITUALISM, AND THEOSOPHY.\*

"IN the beginning God created the heaven and the earth. And the earth became desolate and void; and darkness was upon the face of the deep." So Mr. Pember translates Gen. i. 1, 2, and afterwards proceeds:—

It is thus clear that the second verse of Genesis describes the earth as a ruin; but there is no hint of the time which elapsed between creation and this ruin. Age after age may have rolled away, and it was probably during their course that the strata of the earth's crust were gradually developed. Hence we see that geological attacks upon the scriptures are altogether wide of the mark, are a mere beating of the air. There is room for any length of time between the first and second verses of the Bible. And, again, since we have no inspired account of the geological formations, we are at liberty to believe that they were developed just in the order in which we find them. The whole process took place in preadamite times, in connection, perhaps, with another race of beings, and consequently does not at present concern us (p. 28).

Knowledge in this life is a gift fraught with peril . . . And it is an ominous fact that, after the fall, the first inventors of the arts and sciences were the descendants, not of the believing Seth, but of the deist and murderer Cain (p. 28 sq.).

Notwithstanding this danger, Mr. Pember inquires into the interval between the first and second verses of Genesis, and it appears that Satan 'was appointed prophet, priest and king, of the world,' that he was placed in 'an Eden, or region of delight,' of a 'more substantial character' than the Eden of Genesis, 'resembling the New Jerusalem,' that he dwelt 'in a

\* *Earth's Earliest Ages, and their connection with Modern Spiritualism and Theosophy.* By G. H. PEMBER, M.A. London: Hodder & Stoughton. 1834.

splendid palace of gold and precious stones [alas, that a palace of gold should be esteemed above the sweet natural delights of the Eden of Genesis] near to the place of God's presence,' that he 'proved himself a rebel,' and that 'therefore the Lord Jesus came forth from the Godhead, to assume the abused dignities and restore the confusion' (pp. 64, 65). 'The golden age of which ancient bards so rapturously sang was no reminiscence of Paradise, but of the times of that former world when Satan's power was still intact. A change in the heavenly dynasty, the expulsion of Cronos or Saturn, is always mentioned as having brought to a close this age of unmingled joy' (p. 71).

But this interval came to a terrible termination :—

The vast deep, to which God has set bounds that are never transgressed save when wrath has gone forth from Him, had burst those limits; so that the ruined planet, covered above its very mountain-tops with the black floods of destruction, was rolling through space in a horror of great darkness (p. 33)

After this less pleasant portion of the indefinite 'interval,' the earth is restored to a state apparently between that of the 'more substantial' Eden, and the faulty state in which it is now.

On the sixth day God pronounced everything which he had made to be very good, a declaration which would seem altogether inconsistent with the present condition of the animal as well as the vegetable kingdom (p. 34).

Those who wish to know what Adam and Eve and the serpent were like before the fall will find the desired information in the following passages :—

While they remained in obedience, the spirit which God had breathed into them retained its full power and vigour. Its pervading influence defended their whole being from the inroads of corruption and death, while at the same time its brightness shining through the covering of flesh shed a lustrous halo around them; so that the grosser element of their bodies was concealed within a veil of radiant glory. And thus, as the rulers of creation, they were strikingly distinguished from all the creatures which were placed under them (p. 139).

While Eve was standing near the tree a serpent approached and addressed her. The fact that she was not startled at such an occurrence seems to point to the existence of an intelligent communication between man and the inferior creatures before the fall. But we must not of course think of the serpent as the repulsive and venomous reptile to which we now feel an instinctive antipathy. For it had not then been cursed, but held itself upright, the most intelligent and, probably, the most beautiful of all the beasts of the field. . . . The creature was, then, free from venom and not improbably winged, while its scales glittered in the sun like burnished gold. Perhaps too it was recognised by Eve as the most intelligent and most companionable of all animals (p. 127).

Having pursued his investigations, or rather let fancy carry him as far as the deluge, Mr. Pember proceeds to "an exposition of the nature and history of Spiritualism of sufficient length to exhibit its apparent identity with the antediluvian sin" (p. 239). Those who are impelled by admiration of his exposition of Genesis to follow him in his exposition of Spiritualism, Theosophy and Buddhism may do so; they will find, from first to last, four hundred and eighty-one pages, the result no

doubt of conscientious industry, well written and well printed. But we can only lay the book down with a feeling of sincere regret echoing the writer's own words, "In carrying on the dispute, how much time has been wasted by able servants of God who would otherwise have been more profitably employed."

F. H. J.

CHRISTIAN OPINION ON USURY.\*

THE purpose of this interesting little volume of 84 pages is to examine the effect upon trade, and especially upon the trade of England, of the Canon Law restrictions upon usury; and the conclusions reached are very remarkable and unexpected. Mr. Cunningham believes that the views of the Schoolmen were admirably suited to the guidance of honest and Christian men under the industrial conditions which obtained before the Reformation, that they studiously and successfully provided for the development of all legitimate industries and only checked oppression. In these respects they were distinctly in advance both of civil law and of public opinion, both of which were far more indiscriminating in their condemnation of usury. The fundamental principle of the Schoolmen was to distinguish between "*damnum emergens*" (risk) and "*lucrum cessans*" (privation of gain that would otherwise have accrued) on the one hand, and a charge for the use of money pure and simple on the other hand. If it could be shown that the lender would be the worse for having lent unless he received some extra payment, it was legitimate to require indemnification. If on the other hand a convenience had resulted to the borrower without any real loss or inconvenience to the lender, then the exaction of a payment was often oppressive and always covetous, and therefore to be condemned. With the changed conditions of industry which have made it possible always to invest capital lucratively this distinction has fallen to the ground; for there must always be a "*lucrum cessans*"—the cessation of a gain that would otherwise have accrued—in a gratuitous loan. Since this great change which has enabled the industrial power of the country "to use money as a servant to do its bidding" instead of having "to bow to it as a master" the clear and strong testimony of the Christian consciousness has been dissipated into a Babel of confused and contradictory opinions, and indeed Christian teaching, failing to get any grasp of the new conditions, has practically abdicated as far as this branch of ethics is concerned. But we need guidance more than ever. There is, rightly or wrongly, a growing feeling that in the aggregate capital is now making oppressive terms with labour, "We cannot be sure," says Mr. Cunningham, "of the wisdom of impulse alone: though the boldness and sincerity of many socialists and enthusiasts may rouse our sympathy. Nor, however dogmatic their assertions may be, can we rely on the completeness and width of the views of

\* *Christian Opinion on Usury, with special reference to England.* By W. CUNNINGHAM, B.D. Printed for Macmillan and Co., at the Edinburgh University Press. 1884.

economists who descant on the ignorant prejudices of the Fathers and Schoolmen in their code of commercial morality." What can the church still do to help us? May it not at least teach us that the question is at bottom an ethical one, and as such within the competence of "public opinion" rather than scientific specialism to resolve? "Public opinion," to quote once more from our author, "may be difficult to rouse, but when it pronounces unmistakeably that oppression exists for which a cure must be devised we may rely on the truth of the indictment, though we may always prefer the opinion of specialists in regard to the manner of remedy."

P. H. W.

#### VILLAGE COMMUNITIES VERSUS TOWN ROOKERIES.

SOCIETY has long been aware of the existence of the "dangerous classes," and has been threatened with terrible disasters at their hands, but it has paid its police to do their duty, locked its doors, and slept peacefully. It has recently been roused by a more serious cry than "danger," viz., "dishonour." The respectable and wealthy citizen may laugh at the danger, but he cannot laugh at the misery and degradation, or at the deep disgrace to himself that he should stand by and not stir a finger to cure the evil. Innumerable suggestions are made, and we welcome none more heartily than the one very ably supported by the Rev. Henry Solly\* of encouraging and promoting village life in the place of town life. Objection will no doubt be raised to this as to every other scheme that it is impracticable. Certainly, it would be difficult at once to accomplish all that Mr. Solly sets forth in his concise and yet very interesting little volume of forty-eight small pages. But, that village life is sweeter and purer and healthier and more manly than life in the crowded parts of our great towns cannot be denied. Nor can it be denied that in many instances the attempt to encourage and develop this village life of combined industrial and agricultural, or horticultural, occupations has been eminently successful. In the name of common-sense and all that is most truly practical let it go on; and let doubters read Mr. Solly's little book, and, after it, the other and larger works to which he refers. And if convinced, let them not sit down and hope for "organisation" to appear upon the scene and do the work, but let them seize every opportunity of encouraging, supporting, and promoting it.

F. H. J.

#### SERMONS.†

THOSE who enjoy the reading of sermons will do well if, instead of confining themselves to the pulpit literature of their own sect, whatever it be, they will obtain this volume, which contains sermons

\* *Re-housing of the Industrial Classes, or Village Communities v. Town Rookeries.* By the Rev. HENRY SOLLY. London: W. Swan Sonnenschein and Co. 1884.

† *The Contemporary Pulpit.* Vol. I. London: Office of *The Contemporary Pulpit.* 1884.

by Canon Knox-Little, Dr. Macgregor, Cardinal Manning; Dr. W. R. Dale, Canon Westcott, Dr. Maclaren, &c. It would be a good thing too if those who are usually hearers of sermons, as well as those who make them, would take some of the "outlines" given in this volume, and exercise their minds in filling up for themselves. We cannot of course accept all we find in those varied sermons, but we welcome the volume nevertheless. Why does it contain nothing from Martineau, Stopford Brooke, Brooke Herford, or Robert Collyer? F. H. J.

#### THIRTY THOUSAND THOUGHTS.\*

WE were compelled to animadvert rather severely on the want both of knowledge and of common fairness and common-sense, shown in the first volume of this enormous storehouse of quotations, whenever the subject illustrated required especially careful consideration and a competent acquaintance with authoritative sources of information. In the present volume, bringing the reckoning up to Thought No. 6,527, we have not marked any offences of the same kind, no burning questions of religious or social doctrine being included in its contents. We have two hundred and fifty pages of items, often dry and uninteresting enough, on Man's Nature and Constitution, and the Laws by which Man is conditioned. Then the Epistles (in the Apocalypse) to the Seven Churches of Asia are illustrated by a commentary of Mosaic work, taken largely from Plumptre, Trench, and Farrar; and the Seven Sayings on the Cross are overlaid with a mass of words, and turned to uses of edification; more than 600 paragraphs being devoted to them. The present instalment is completed by the first part of Section X, the heading of which is "Virtues including Excellences." The reader who has patience to hunt through a large mass of mere commonplace, will come across a fair number of instructive and suggestive thoughts; but the editor should have carried the process of sifting and selecting a great deal further.

#### VOSMAER'S AMAZON.†

THE current classifications of literature are to blame if this work is to be called a novel. The productions of Miss Braddon and Mr. Wilkie Collins are called novels; and for "Romola" and "John Inglesant" we have no other name. "The Amazon" is doubtless a novel also, but it is a noble piece of literature (even in translation), a consummate work of art, an intellectual and spiritual drama, a brilliant contribution to the religious discussions of our day. Vosmaer affords one more argument for the recognition of Dutch letters as an element of modern culture, and one more protest against the exclusion of his countrymen from the communion of European literature.

\* *Thirty Thousand Thoughts*, &c. Edited by Rev. Canon SPENCE, Rev. J. S. EXELL, and Rev. C. NEIL. Vol. II. London: Kegan Paul. 1884.

† *The Amazon*. By CARL VOSMAER. Frontispiece by L. Alma Tadema, R.A.; Translated by E. J. Irving; Introduction by George Ebers. London T. Fisher Unwin. 1884.

Aisma and Marciana, hero and heroine of his story, are both devotees of Art, the one an executant with the brush, the other with the pen. The story introduces both to us nobly endowed, but through disappointment tainted with a vein of pessimism, and with rare skill and delicacy traces the clearing of either nature from this evil trait under the influence of mutual sympathy and enlargement. The gospel of the book is "the simple creed of beauty, which includes, as a matter of course, the true and good—the pure religion of humanity" (p. xvii). It is a religion, as Marciana so passionately declares, "rooted in the sublime earnestness of beauty" (p. 150). In her and in Aisma this religion rises to a height at which it can support and satisfy their own exalted natures, and art is to them a cultus of divine holiness. In "the genial humanist Van Walborch" it takes a lighter form, enriching and elevating the man of culture without overmastering him with enthusiasm. In "the light-hearted cripple," the musician Salviati, it takes a yet more airy shape, keeping sweet and sunny a life which deformity and sickness might well have clouded.

Vosmaer is an art-critic of the highest type. His characters are chiefly Dutch, but the scene of his story lies in golden Italy—Pestum, Naples, Rome. The masterpieces of the Eternal City and the principles of the Art which produced them are the topics of perennial discussion. For a "novel" this does not sound promising. Yet we can conceive no reader "skipping" these conversations; and every artist will feel with how extraordinary a skill they are not only kept subordinate but made to minister to the dramatic unity and the artistic development of the whole. He will be no less sensible to the exquisite beauty of individual scenes. Only in the crucial scene between Marciana and Askol, the sculptor, is a false note struck, and the harmony of her womanhood violated.

The inspiration of the book, its motive, its purpose, is, as we have indicated, the gospel of Ideal Beauty, whether in the nature which we call inanimate or in the human form. And never has that gospel been offered more earnestly as the answer to the great interrogation, nor ever has it been presented in more perfect alliance with the pure. Against an unreal and sentimental Romanticism and the base French Realism alike, the protest of Vosmaer is profoundly earnest. And yet the great interrogation receives no sufficing answer here. To a Van Walborch, in his lettered ease, Horace may be an all-sufficient Bible; but not to the men and women who have the battle of life to fight. Aestheticism, however pure, can never alone sustain moral strength. Exclusively cultivated, it weans men from the severe strain of duty inseparable from human life; veils from them the awful responsibilities of membership in a complex society; woos their eyes away from the hideous and the horrible among men, and slackens the sense of a warfare to be made by all the good on the positive forces of evil. Calvinism in its narrowest and most egotistic form exhibited as the influence ruining the life of Ada, and Romanism in its most trivial and superstitious guise as the faith of the waiting-maid, Marietta, are skilfully indicated as foils to "the sublime



earnestness of beauty." How would the drama have run, and how would the picture have looked, if there had moved upon the stage one breathing the largest culture of the modern time, yet inspired by the faith in God and the devotion to man taught by the Nazarene of old?

R. A. A.

#### WHAT IS ART?\*

MR. LITTLE is unfortunate in a reviewer who reads his book immediately after closing Vosmaer's *Amazon*. Both volumes seek one end. Each is a plea for truth and purity in Art and a vindication of the claims of Art pure and true to take rank as Religion. But while Vosmaer writes with genius, Mr. Little writes only with intelligence and conscientious sincerity, and writes, too, wholly without artistic method or literary discipline. None the less does his plea deserve respect. His "outcry against oppression and prejudice," his "demand for freedom and fair play" are just and urgent. It would be well indeed for the artist to heed his warning against selling his soul for gold or praise; well, too, for the art-critic to listen to his protest against current canons of criticism; best of all for the British public to look, as he exhorts them, for truth in Art, and to realise that imitativeness never can be Art. Mr. Little smites the Royal Academy hip and thigh, mourns over Cecil Lawson as "at once grandly realistic and marvellously idealistic;" and tells how Rossetti, meeting in Cheyne Walk a friend who complained that the Academy persistently refused Cecil's work, exclaimed, "More fool he to send it there!" We wish, indeed, that we could share Mr. Little's hope that his volume may "open the eyes of those who have the power to bring a healthy tone into the whole realm and practice of Art." But where Mr. Ruskin fails, shall Mr. Little avail?

R. A. A.

#### POEMS OF MODERN THOUGHT.

MR. SAVAGE is stronger in prose than in verse. We prefer his powerful reasoning from the pulpit to his somewhat uncertain touch upon the lyre. In the little collection of his Poems lying before us,† we are never quite sure that we shall not find him tripping in his metre or dropping down from the grace and dignity of poetry into some absolutely prosaic phrase. Yet there are many pieces of great sweetness and even of great power in this volume; and there are few poets who more surely touch and round into measured phrase the truest, broadest and most hopeful religious thinking of this modern day. Though we may wish him a fuller training and sterner discipline in the *technique* of the Poet's Art, the MODERN REVIEW cannot deny a welcome to the "Poet of Modern Thought."

R. A. A.

\**What is Art?* By JAMES STANLEY LITTLE. London: Sonnenschein and Co. 1884.

† *Poems of Modern Thought*. By MINOR J. SAVAGE. London: Williams and Norgate. 1884.



## BIOGRAPHIES, &amp;c.,

**F**IRST on our list of biographies we must place Mr. Watson's Life of Marcus Aurelius.\* English readers have had to wait long for a life of one who was great among Roman Emperors, and the noblest of the Stoic Philosophers. Until very recently they have had nothing, and when at last Canon Farrar gave them his interesting sketch in his volume, *Seekers after God*, it could scarcely be dignified by the name of a biography. Mr. Watson's handsome, well-printed volume is written in exceedingly readable style, and carries us on with unflagging interest from first to last. Occasionally he trusts rather too much to imagination to fill in the lights and shadows of the picture which history gives, but his references are full, even for small details, where available; and he seldom leaves us in doubt whether he has 'authority' for his statements or not. It is scarcely possible that a work which covers so wide a field—the state of the empire, Roman domestic life, the legislation of the Antonines, the wars in the East and in Germany, the philosophy of the Stoic Emperor, the state of Christianity, and its attitude towards the empire and the emperor's attitude towards it—could be free from error at least there are few such works that escape both the Scylla and Charybdis of error and pedantry, and Mr. Watson is certainly no pedant. After reading the following passage:—

We have a rescript of his to a woman who claimed a certain sum of money from her father for the payment of her daughter's education; Marcus's reply is, "You have no claim upon your father for that which the sentiments of humanity command you to furnish your daughter, even though his father did pay the expenses of educating him" (p. 98)—

we were not surprised to be told that 'this rescript exhibits a spirit [in the mother we should think] which was somewhat novel at that time'; but we confess we were surprised to find, on looking at the original rescript in the note, that what Marcus really says is, that the judges will settle how much the *girl's* father ought to afford for necessities, but that the mother must not expect him to supply all that her *maternal affection* might lead her to ask for the child, even if he did consent to rear her. Even where there is no error of this kind the notes are not always sufficient to substantiate the statements of the text, though it is quite possible that the context might sometimes do so if it were given. It is to be feared that Mr. Watson has allowed his freedom of style to lead him sometimes beyond due bounds. In his attempt to make the letter given on p. 208, for instance, readable, he has transgressed the limits of a translator, and indeed in this also there is one very marked blunder. *In causis majestatis haec natura est ut videantur vim pati etiam quibus probatur* certainly does not mean 'It is the peculiar nature of treason that the evidence of it is itself the thing which constitutes the injury,' even if this English sentence means anything at all, which we are inclined to

\* *Marcus Aurelius Antoninus*. By PAUL PARRON WATSON. London: Sampson Low. 1884.

doubt. But though these and similar errors will prevent Mr. Watson's work from being an 'authority,' they do not prevent it from being exceedingly interesting and valuable. It is to be hoped he will have many readers. And surely they will rise from the study of so noble a life with anything but the feeling of 'depression' which Mr. Watson so strangely seems to think is the natural effect of the study of the great philosopher's thoughts. If there is a book full of calm dispassionate strength it is the *Meditations of Marcus Aurelius Antoninus*.

Mrs. Lowe offers to her readers a closely-printed volume of six hundred pages in memory of her husband, an eminent and accomplished Unitarian minister.\* There is something touching in her loyal and simple confidence that the reader will be glad to know all that he thought and said and did, and to follow through chapter after chapter the story of his quiet and devoted life. And the reader who finds leisure patiently to trace the career here portrayed through childhood and the honourable course at college, through the ministries at New Bedford, at Salem, at Somerville, through the Eastern travel, the war chaplaincy, the secretariate of the Unitarian Association and the editorship of the *Unitarian Review*, to the affecting and beautiful closing scenes, will receive a more vivid impression of the quality of a faithful minister's daily life, than could be conveyed by a briefer summary. The very monotony of each successive week's record of duty discharged, the very quietude of the little successes and disappointments, are not without a charm. And just as some long stretch of unbroken strand softly shimmering in the light of the setting sun has to be patiently painted all along from south to north if the picture is to produce the true effect, so the story of sermon upon sermon and visit after visit week by week through the long years must all be told, if the man is to be set forth as he really lived and served. We trust the book may come into the hands of sympathising readers, who will feel that it is good thus to share the widow's memories, and be invited to participate in her tender love and reverence. And, indeed, to ministers themselves the book, with its long record of little difficulties steadfastly faced, and the inevitable disappointments cheerfully met, by the very likeness of its incident to the familiar circumstances of their own lives will be like comparing experiences with some old friend. Mr. Lowe's life, however, was not wholly without variety. The German experiences and the talks with Tholuck are very interesting. Here is a curious bit of literary history:—

When Clark, the publisher in Scotland, was to publish his series of German translations, he requested Tholuck to write a preface; and Tholuck consented, but said he must speak unfavourably of the enterprise. He wrote the preface, in which he said that he considered these German works an injurious publication for Scotland, considering the state then of Scottish religious belief. (Clark never put in the preface.) (p. 181.)

The marvellous war, still fresh in our memories, yet reading already—like the whole slavery story—as if it belonged to some former age of the

\* *Memoir of Charles Lowe*. By his Wife, MARTHA PERRY LOWE. Boston: Cupples, Upham, and Co. 1884.

world, is always full of interest and romance; and Mr. Lowe played well his part in that. To the wide circle of his own friends, above all to his fond and venerating parishioners, the *Memoir of Charles Lowe* will be a possession which they would not willingly have foregone.

Some of our readers may remember the following passage in Dr. Guthrie's letters: "We went through the *Victory* and saw the cockpit, three stories below the quarter-deck, where Nelson expired. This was interesting, but to me it was more interesting still, when we left the scenes associated with Nelson and his battles, to go away to an old-fashioned humble street, and in a small shop in a two-storied house built of wood, not above seven feet broad and some fifteen long, to stand on the scene of John Pounds' labours." A few years ago one of the multitude of children's illustrated semi-religious papers gave a picture of John Pounds, the shoemaker and schoolmaster, surrounded by his scholars. He was represented as a neat-looking young Sunday-school teacher, in cobbler's apron, of elegant figure and smooth hair well oiled and brushed. Once or twice we have seen, and often we have wished to possess, a poorly-executed but bold and characteristic engraving of the real John Pounds—large featured, ugly, deformed, surrounded by a medley of poorly-dressed scholars. Mr. Hawkes has published a vivid sketch of the life, character, and labours of this very remarkable man.\* The son of a ship-carpenter at Portsmouth, and himself destined for the same trade, he was crippled and deformed for life by a fall into a dry dock. In consequence of this misfortune he had to relinquish the occupation of carpenter for that of shoemaker. Maintaining himself by his trade, he gradually gathered in his little workshop a crowd of scholars from among the neglected children of one of the worst parts of Portsmouth. He would accept payment for none, and only very occasionally and as a special favour would he receive scholars whose parents would have been able to pay. Not only did he teach, he also very frequently supplied his scholars with food, and many a time in the summer—without any appeal for subscriptions—led them off for a "day's holiday in the country."

We could wish that Mr. Hawkes had been a little less prolix, and had not thrown so much of his narrative and description into the form of a conversation between himself and a friend; but, after all, when we are reading the lives of the saints we should not quarrel with the peculiarities of their biographers; and we strongly recommend our readers to see for themselves what one man could do, unaided save by natural genius and simple religious earnestness, for neglected and perishing children.

We heartily welcome another of Miss Cooke's fresh and vivid biographies.† Dr. Channing's life presents no startling incident; yet few lads will, we think, prove insensible to the charm which is thrown over his story in this bright little sketch. Miss Cooke, without any moralising,

\* *Recollections of John Pounds.* By HENRY HAWKES, B.A., F.L.S. London: Williams and Norgate. 1884.

† *The Story of Dr. Channing*, written for Young People. By FRANCES E. COOKE. Sunday School Association. 1884.

powerfully draws out the lessons of character ; she does so by means of a perfect sympathy and faithful and simple presentation. Such books afford the noblest training for our boys and girls.

It is generally agreed that it was well for the craft of letters when authors ceased to shield their weakness under a patron's ægis. Amid the present intense competition of writers to get their books read, the system of obtaining an Introduction from some well-known man, however tempting, is hardly more defensible than the old practice of going hat in hand, to seek the patronage of some Lord Chesterfield. Dr. Walter Smith's Introduction to Mr. Hillock's *Hard Battles*\* is less an Introduction than an Apology, not in the classic but in the colloquial sense of the word. And, indeed, it would be hard to give any praise to this book from a literary point of view. Grammar is still a condition of good writing, and it would have been well for Dr. Smith to have saved his friend from printing "this has been done all the readier" (Preface), and from the like slips throughout the book. Setting aside literary defects and a certain self-complacency that obtrudes itself unpleasantly, Mr. Hillocks has an instructive tale to tell of a life made up of "hard battles" and marked by much steadfast and noble service in the dark places of the earth. Nor can any writer be wholly useless or uninteresting, who has such stores of personal experience to draw from, in the discussion of the condition of the most depressed strata of society. We would not speak unkindly of one who has passed his life in struggling to solve problems which most of us are content to discuss from outside and, as we fancy, from above.

With biographies we may associate Mr. Benham's very charming selection from the great store of Cowper's letters.† Lovers of Cowper, of whom there are many, and will be more, are already indebted to Mr. Benham for the excellent editing of the Globe Edition of his poems, and the admirable little biography of the poet prefixed to it. They will find in this selection of letters a valuable supplement. Occasionally, where letters are printed which really require an acquaintance with earlier ones, which do not appear, to make them fully intelligible, it would have been well if some short note had been introduced. Editors, no doubt, are right to keep themselves in the background and withhold, as far as possible, remarks that they might be tempted to introduce. Unfortunately, it is just the most competent who are the most modest, and Mr. Benham, who might have felt himself at liberty to accompany the letters with a running explanation without any danger, has excluded himself entirely, and, having simply introduced us to the poet and his friends, retires entirely from the scene. The chronological order is of course followed in Mr. Benham's arrangement of the letters, but, by some

\* *Hard Battles for Life and Usefulness: an Autobiographic Record; also a Review of the Roots and Remedies of London Misery.* By the Rev. J. INCHES HILLOCKS. With an Introduction by the Rev. WALTER C. SMITH, D.D. London: Sonnenschein and Co. 1884.

† *Letters of William Cowper.* Edited, with introduction, by the Rev. W. BENHAM, B.D., F.S.A. London: Macmillan. 1884.

mischance, we suppose, some of the earlier letters are disarranged, three to Lady Hesketh being grouped together, and then followed by three to Joseph Hill, which should properly alternate with them. The result being that we find Cowper, upon very good terms with no less than five families, in Huntingdon, and then in the following letter read that he has received 'only one visit' since he came there (pp. 6—14). By some accident, surely, a paragraph appears in the postscript to a letter of Nov. 12th, 1776, belonging to a letter of Aug. 1st., which is not inserted. In July he had written to Hill, saying he wishes for pupils. In August he speaks of the heat, evidently wants rain for his garden, and adds, 'If it were to rain pupils,' &c. Does Cowper write 'to play the piper' (p. 250) or is this an old transcriber's error? It can hardly be Mr. Benham's. Those who are already familiar with the prince of letter-writers will miss many favourite letters. Indeed, to have omitted no favourites would have involved the printing of an almost complete collection instead of a selection. We could have spared some, however, even from this volume, if necessary, to make room for the letter of Nov. 30th, 1785, to Lady Hesketh, with its account of Walter Bagot's visit, and his generous, yet delicately-given, subscription to the translation of Homer, the letter to Unwin on 'Pluralities,' with its good common sense (April 6, 1780), and the pathetic description of the lace-makers (July 8th, 1780). But we must confess that if these replaced letters already in the volume other readers might complain that *their* favourites were excluded. To say that this volume is one of the Golden Treasury series is to say that in regard to paper, print, and binding, it is just what such a companion should be.

To our list of biographies we may also add, perhaps, Mr. Maccall's saints.\* We wish that some one would give us a small volume of legends of the saints really fit to be put into the hands of young boys and girls. Mr. Maccall's book is well intended, is attractive in form, and is written in a sympathising and truly religious spirit. But the stories as told are not fit reading for young people in a pure household. The story of the faithless nun whose place was kept for her by the Virgin Mary till she returned from her sinful life is beautiful, and has a deep lesson—but is it necessary to set forth so much of the details of her sinful career? The story of "Gregory of the Stone," again, might be a source of strength to a repentant sinner, who feared that he could never atone for his sin or receive pardon; but a story of a man, the offspring of incest, and himself again unawares married to his own mother, is not one to be read with profit in itself, and if it teach anything to the innocent it can only be that they can never commit a sin so great but that it may be forgiven. This may be 'sound doctrine' but it is certainly 'dangerous,' and surely not what Mr. Maccall would wish. What is really required is a little volume in which the Mediæval 'legend' can be given in essence, and with details of all that is best and the shortest possible reference to whatever is not 'golden' in it.

R. A. A. AND F. H. J.

\* *Christian Legends*. By WILLIAM MACCALL. London: Sonnenschein. No date.

WE must acknowledge several books, some of which require only a short notice, others of which have arrived too late for the full notice that they deserve.

Messrs. Sonnenschein and Co. send us a good readable reprint of "the most valuable parts" (Pref.) of *Fuller's Holy and Profane States*, and a volume of *Selections from Jeremy Taylor* in similar form, valuable additions or rather restorations to our religious literature; also a very different but nevertheless very interesting little volume by the Rev. E. M. Geldart, *The Folk Lore of Modern Greece*, which both old and young may enjoy. From the same firm we have a translation of Guyot's valuable *Principles of Social Economy*, and a little volume, *The Dilemmas of Labour and Education*, by Akin Károly.

From Messrs. Lougmans and Co. we have a translation of Professor Hausrath's novel, *Antinous*; a popular edition of Mill's *Logic*, excellently printed in spite of the smallness of the type and the objectionable double columns which alone can render small type readable at all; and *The Mystery of The Kingdom*, by Andrew Jukes, of which we need only say that the writer begins by "claiming a mystical import for the Books of Kings."

From Messrs. Kegan Paul, Trench, and Co. we have received *The Law-breaker and the Coming of the Law*, by the late James Hinton, edited by his wife.

From France (Librairie Fischbacher) we have a life of Athanase Coquerel Fils, by Jules Devèze, which will be gladly welcomed by his many English admirers as well as his own countrymen.

Dr. Ray's *Text Book of Deductive Logic* (Thacker and Co., Calcutta) may be useful to others besides his own students at Dacca College. It gives a clear and compendious account of the principal work done by the acknowledged authorities on the subject. We have, for instance, a good statement of Mr. Mill's famous argument that every syllogism involves a *petitio principii*; and it is interesting to see that the writers whose replies it is thought worth while and sufficient to quote are Dr. Martineau and Professor De Morgan. The former quotation is from an article that appeared in *The Prospective Review* for 1852, and is republished in the second volume of Dr. Martineau's *Essays*, but has never received the attention it deserves. Dr. Ray's book is well illustrated with the diagrams of circles which, perhaps, give the clearest representation of the statements conveyed by propositions and proved by syllogisms.

THE END OF VOL. V.

